

Military Intelligence

April - June 1986



**SPECIAL
OPERATIONS**
and terrorism



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COVER: This issue's cover depicts special operations forces rappelling from a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. A proposed role for special operations in the fight against terrorists is discussed in the article on p. 8. Cover design by Thomas Daley.



from the Commander

Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr.

Field Manual (FM) 100-5, entitled *Operations*, is the U.S. Army's keystone warfighting manual. The latest edition (May 1986), recently published and disseminated, is the guiding force behind our own keystone manual, FM 34-1, *IEW Operations*. In addition to our own doctrinal publications, FM 100-5 is a "must" read for all Military Intelligence professionals. I commend it to all MI soldiers.

A key element of the manual is Chapter 2, "Fundamentals of AirLand Battle Doctrine," which comprises the Army's basic fighting doctrine. It reflects the structure of modern warfare, the dynamics of combat power, and the application of the classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield requirements.

As intelligence professionals, it is incumbent upon all of us to seriously think about our role and the requirements associated with that role in support of the execution of the AirLand Battle. In my view, the success of the AirLand Battle rests on the crispness, sharpness, and responsiveness of the intelligence arm.

Our capability to determine the *Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why* regarding the enemy and the ability to provide the required terrain and weather data in a timely and accurate manner will make the quintessential difference. I say quintessential difference because the answers to these interrogatives will provide direction to the operational effort, enhance combat support and combat service support, and facilitate the efficient application of combat power.

The intelligence system makes possible what I have just described. The intelligence system includes all units in the combat force, from the front-line soldier all the way up to those at the national level. Units at each echelon in the combat force, by virtue of their mission, capabilities, and areas of operations, have an implied mission of collecting and reporting information.

Within the intelligence system, commanders are assigned "areas of operations" beyond the forward line of troops, but they must monitor and identify enemy activities in the "area of interest," or that area outside of the area of operations which could affect future operations. Within these areas, commanders require weather, enemy, and



terrain data in preparation for, and during, the conduct of operations. At each level of command, there is an organic intelligence capability. Ideally, we would like to provide each commander all of the assets needed to satisfy his intelligence needs. However, that is fiscally unrealistic. Therefore, our philosophy is that higher echelons supplement the capabilities of subordinate commands; for instance, divisions support their brigades, corps support divisions, echelons above corps, to include NATO, support corps and divisions, and national-level assets supplement all lower echelons. This echelonment, consisting of the G2/S2 staff, the MI organization, and intelligence-related organizations and activities, from the forward line of troops, beginning with the cavalry and extending to the national level, inclusively, constitutes the *intelligence system*. A final point to keep in mind is that the intelligence system must be interactive between echelons, to include a skip-echelon capability, if it is to respond to the commander's needs in a timely, efficient, and effective manner.

Each echelon is a subset or a subsystem, so to speak, within the overall intelligence system. It is the system that should respond to the commander's information needs. And while the intelligence system provides responses to the commander's information needs, the process we use that results in the actual production of intelligence is the *intelligence cycle*. The intelligence cycle is to the MI officer what the lanyard is to the Artillery officer.

My next article will concern the intelligence cycle in the context of AirLand Battle doctrine. ***Toujours en avant—Always Out Front!***

HOME OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE



from the CSM

CSM Robert H. Retter

In my travels to various units and organizations, I have sensed an apprehension among Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers concerning the effect a career management field (CMF) restructure will have on their careers. I am taking advantage of this space to present some background information and explain the philosophy behind restructure actions as it pertains to the MI force structure.

In September 1982, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER) conducted a functional review of Military Intelligence. As a result of this review, a number of tasks were identified and assigned to different agencies, staff elements, commands, and the MI Proponent.

The Proponent (then Brig. Gen. Weinstein) directed a comprehensive task group analysis of the MI enlisted CMF to satisfy those tasks levied by the DCSPER. The task groups were concentrated in the functional areas of MI: analysis, signals intelligence/electronic warfare; imagery intelligence; maintenance, ground surveillance; and human intelligence/operations security/signals security, and were charged to determine how the MI enlisted force should be structured to execute the requirements of the AirLand Battle.

An analysis of this magnitude was not taken lightly. Many agencies have enormous responsibilities in developing personnel structures, managing the personnel systems, and accomplishing the Army's MI mission. To that end, the MI CMF Structure Review Conference in September 1984 included representatives from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Soldier Support Center-National Capital Region, Military Personnel Center, Combined Arms Center, and the Intelligence Threat Analysis Center.

This conference, and subsequent analysis, brought about a significant adjustment to the MI force structure. The MI Branch took historic action in minimizing its stated enlisted requirements in its own units, and objectively constraining senior NCO requirements to effect improvements in the accession base. The constraints were necessary because the MI Branch cannot populate a



structure which calls for greater numbers in the higher grades. We cannot afford a structure which forces us to proselytize NCOs from other MOSs and send them to the field with skill level one experience. As long as we have an imbalanced authorization base, we are hurting the soldier. Soldiers face slow promotions because of grade imbalances; and yet, they sit in units which are perpetually short of the very grade to which they aspire for promotion. They work for supervisors with less technical background than they have. These situations are not good for the soldier, and a restructuring was necessary to alleviate the inconsistencies in the system.

By their very nature, the restructure actions will be controversial and may lend themselves to resistance on the part of incumbent commanders—and to confusion and dismay on the part of soldiers who may perceive promotion opportunities being lost. Neither response takes into account the difficulty of filling the large number of senior grade requirements or the possibility of long-term improvement in unit manning and professional development resulting from grade feasibility. Promotion opportunities should be more consistent throughout the CMF. As a result of the restructure, greater levels of experience will be seen in soldiers of lower grades.

As a final thought, it is important to remember that restructure actions cannot happen overnight. Many talented people have worked hard to develop a viable restructure which would meet the DCSPER directive, maintain a functionally effective MI force during the implementation phases, and protect the careers of MI soldiers.

LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Behind the Lines

John Locke once said, "New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but because they are not already common." In today's Army, the truly enlightened leader is distinguished by his ability to look beyond "how something is being done" and see "how something could be done better." This quality is called *vision*, and the visionary is unafraid and confident enough to truly explore and entertain new ideas. The visionary's nemesis is the leader who fears change, despises creativity (for it is a threat), and loathes the kind of constructive criticism which might lead to change and improvement. The Army, like any organization, has its share of both kinds of leaders.

One of the jobs of the branch journal is to "disturb" us, to make us pause from time to time and consider ideas quite different from those with which we are most comfortable. For if we become too contented with the way things are, we risk traveling down the primrose path to mental lethargy and complacency. Recent history has aptly demonstrated the dangers of such a false sense of security. In speaking of the Challenger disaster, President Reagan placed a large part of the blame on the state of "complacency" which had crept in at NASA. Each of us must make every effort to avoid the trap of self-deception. We can only do so by striving to maintain our intellectual honesty: we must constantly test our own ideas by seriously exposing ourselves to ideas which are contrary to our own way of thinking; an open-minded "thinker" seeks contrary opinions and rigorously applies them to his own logic, thereby scrutinizing the validity of his own approach.

By continually questioning our own assumptions, we force ourselves to really "think" about our actions. New ideas can then be infused into our approaches; this leads to new insights, to change and, ultimately, to growth as individuals and as an organization. The alternative is narrow-mindedness and intellectual sloth.

The military has always valued the "doers." And why not? Their results can be readily measured and quantified. "Thinkers," on the other hand, cannot be so easily evaluated. Yet, neither can thinkers accomplish anything without "doing," that is, translating ideas into practice.

Ever since sociologists theorized about the advent of the so-called "division of labor," an artificial dichotomy between mental labor and physical labor has plagued man. That the American military has fallen prey to this same notion should be no surprise. Nonetheless, thinking and doing are integrally linked—and always will be. Too often in today's military, we find ourselves recouping from failures brought about because someone did not think through the outcome of his actions.

Both thinkers and doers have a place in our Army; and, in the ideal case, gifted leaders succeed at becoming both. When speaking about the nature of government over 2,000 years ago, Plato said that philosophers needed to be kings and kings needed to be philosophers. He was suggesting the synthesis of the best of both worlds. In our military, it is not only necessary to recognize and appreciate different kinds of people and skills, but also equally important to encourage doers to become thinkers and thinkers to become doers—that is the challenge for today's enlightened leaders.

Stephen P. Aul

Editor



Dear Editor:

Once asked about his rules of procedure, Thomas Edison rudely replied, "Rules! Hell! There ain't no rules around here! We're tryin' to accomplish sump'n."

When someone proposes a proper question about past events and selects factual responses, he must base his assumptions on the rules of Aristotelian logic; otherwise there will be no logical consequence. On the other hand, if one denies the logic of rational assumptions, he abandons rationality itself. Capt. Ralph Peters' article, "Unmatched Spurs" (*Military Intelligence*, January-March 1986), is an example of abused rationality in military history. In military history, unlike other fields of history or areas of creative thinking, the conclusions to questions about past events can have deadly results, for the conclusions are often the premises upon which armies and soldiers fight future battles. Military history is a serious endeavor and not something to be played with lightly. Therefore, it is important that we recognize the difference between reasoned and rhetorical military history.

A rhetorical style relies upon emotional persuasion rather than seasoned and balanced judgment. Capt. Peters has an excellent mastery of the writing craft. His style is carried smoothly and quickly with a heavy use of figurative language which sets the emotional tone for persuading the reader. Figurative language introduces an ambiguity which obscures the reader's ability to tell whether or not a literal meaning is intended. Some examples from Capt. Peters' article involve: the misapplication of words for effect—"Russians began aping," "mounted swarm," "gagged the fortress"; joining contradictory terms—"spectacularly inept," "clinical abstractions," "aptitude for failure"; and overstatement for effect—"dazzled western analysts," "unparalleled confusion." With a rhetorical writing style, Capt. Peters is able to move events and reach conclusions without in-depth analysis or thorough knowledge of past events. And the results sound plausible.

The article plays to stereotypic images of cowboys, cossacks, and, in the end, the unthinking Russian. Peters' historical examples are too general and simplistic; they raise concerns about his selectivity and connectivity and allow him to support any conclusion. What becomes apparent quickly are the exceptions to his premises or other possibilities that would seriously challenge his conclusions. For example, while he will tell the reader that "autocratic control," "iron orders," and "Newtonian clockwork conception" are antithetical to OMG operations, he fails to reconcile these same factors in the Khan's horse armies that

feedback . . .

conquered Asia and eastern Europe.

Capt. Peters relies too heavily on the influence of cultural patterning on soldiers in the transition from Russian to Soviet. What really influences soldiers and armies in battle is still very much an open question. One single factor—savage instinct, cultural patterning, or territorial imperative—is too simplistic. As for the transition from Russian to Soviet, no one has adequately researched the continuities and discontinuities between Tsarist Russia's and the modern Soviet's military. So, one must closely scrutinize a conclusion that portrays Soviet OMGs chasing a cossack cavalry style. His premise on the defensive nature of Russians ignores the Russian traditions of Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Brusilov, and the Soviet offensive operations in World War II. His projections of trends in Soviet doctrine, based on selected historical examples, are the result of his own stereotypic intuitions, not researched analysis. While he will drop the name of Tukhachevsky, he does not acknowledge the roles of Gusev, Isserson, or Trindafillov in developing a distinctive Soviet doctrine, nor does he address what was revolutionary about the Soviets—for him there was no revolution; culture overrides all.

While this article may be considered unfettered, creative play with history which actually is "tryin' to accomplish sump'n," it was similar rhetoric on the military capabilities of the Russian subhumans that launched the German army to its destruction.

Maj. Richard N. Armstrong
Chief, CTC Support Element, III Corps
Fort Hood, Texas

Dear Editor:

I generally enjoy your magazine, but as a geographer I wish to point out two locational errors which appeared in the October-December 1985 issue of *Military Intelligence*.

In the "History of the 138th MI Battalion," the locations for the 53d and 524th ASA companies were reversed. In the ingenious Crossword Puzzle on the Soviet Union the "correct" answer for 14 across is technically incorrect. The city of Petropavlovsk is located in the middle of the country, in northern Kazakhstan, and is an Oblast' capital. The complete and accurate name of the Far East port is Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Now a more positive contribution: The term "combined arms army" has been used for many years in official U.S. mil-

itary publications as the name for Soviet army-sized formations which control primarily rifle or motorized rifle divisions. This term is a literal translation of the equally awkward Russian "Obshchevoyskovaya Armiya," which began appearing in Soviet literature in the late 1950s.

Occasional official and semi-official U.S. Army publications substitute the term "Rifle Army," although these formations may also have had a significant number of armored or cavalry units. It would seem useful to substitute the term, "Field Army," a name traditionally used in English-speaking countries by military historians and specialists. This switch would bring military writers into closer conformity with broad and traditional usage, along with saving pencil lead, typewriter ribbon, and breath.

James F. Goff
Professor of Geography
Mankato State University
Mankato, Minn.

Dear Editor:

I must congratulate you on one of the finest issues of any military publication I have ever read (*Military Intelligence*, October-December 1985). The articles were well written and most informative. I was very impressed with "Yom Kippur War: A Matter of Perception," especially after General DuPuy's article, "Vietnam: What We Might Have Done And Why We Didn't Do It," in the February 1986 issue of *Army*. LTC Cosklo's description of the Israeli "conception" meshes very well with the American "conception" that the Vietnam War was a counterinsurgency operation rather than a steady military invasion from a hostile country.

Capt. Ralph Peters continues to illuminate and educate the military with his perceptive comments on writing and how the failure of the American educational system (civilian and military) to teach people how to communicate effectively on paper has left us much the poorer.

The articles on low-intensity conflict (LIC) dramatically highlight the need to fully use all assets in gathering information that can someday, hopefully, be used in intelligence. In a low intensity conflict, the primary source of information will be people. By integrating a well-planned and philosophically sound strategic PSYOP program as part of a LIC campaign, one addressing the needs and desires of the population with tangible works that improve the quality of life

(roads, water/sewer projects, farming techniques, etc.), the synergistic effects of success in different arenas build toward victory. But what has not been examined in any LIC operation is the question of what the people want—not what we think they should want, but what they **really** want. As Americans, we tend to believe that the people of the world would all be like us if given the chance. That isn't necessarily so, but we act as if the panacea to all problems is to set up a multi-party democracy with a system of checks and balances, a free enterprise economy and a free press. That is an example of our basic cultural ethnocentrism. Until a data base has been assembled which describes what the majority of the people in a country want, I fear that we will repeat Vietnam in a different fashion in other countries.

All in all, a most satisfying and educational issue.

Maj. Larry A. Altersitz
New Jersey Army National Guard

Dear Editor:

As leaders of tomorrow's Army, young officers and NCOs in the Military Intelligence field have a special challenge. A war is always a potential experience for us. We need to be prepared physically, mentally, technically, tactically, and professionally. More importantly, we must also train our soldiers and units to be ready. They are the key ingredients for future contributions to the Army. I encourage intelligence officers and NCOs to study the many professional journals and books available on the military to keep abreast of political, economic, and military developments around the world.

Intelligence soldiers have a special responsibility. Our success or failure can contribute directly to the outcome of a battle or war. Although trained in a particular discipline, we need to be truly "all source" intelligence soldiers—knowledgeable in both potential enemy and friendly capabilities.

Maj. John Skelton
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Board
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Editor's Note:

"Putting PSYOP in its Place," by Capt. Michael T. McEwen (*Military Intelligence*, October-December 1985), prompted quite a bit of feedback from

various levels of the intelligence community and beyond. Judging by the volume of feedback, the branch journal is accomplishing its mission, namely, to serve as a forum for progressive thought. The following few letters provide insight and responses from three distinct areas within the PSYOP community: the European theater, the Reserve Component, and 1st SOCOM.

Putting PSYOP in its Place

Dear Editor:

In response to Capt. Michael T. McEwen's article, "Putting PSYOP in its Place" (*Military Intelligence*, October-December 1985), I agree with some of his comments, particularly those concerning the absolute necessity to get PSYOP out of Special Operations. PSYOP is, in effect, a combat support operation designed primarily to enhance the combat capability of conventional forces. Although only a small percentage of PSYOP supports special operations forces (SOF) and/or low intensity conflict activities, keeping PSYOP in the special operations arena gives the rest of the Army the idea that PSYOP not only is a special operation, but also that it primarily supports SOF. That notion is absolutely false. PSYOP belongs with the conventional forces. PSYOP officers belong in the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) functional area and PSYOP soldiers are being better prepared through 96F training to fulfill their PSYOP mission. I believe that there is a general consensus throughout the Army PSYOP community concerning this last statement.

Concerning the officer specialty, it is essential that PSYOP return to FAO in some form, whether as a separate FAO specialty or as an additional specialty to supplement the newly reorganized FAO area specialty system. Bluntly speaking, to keep PSYOP in the 18 (Special Operations) field would likely mean that many future PSYOP officers would be Special Forces first and PSYOP second. This could lead to inadequate PSYOP training and background, a distorted view of foreign military and civilian target audiences, and lack of experience in dealing with conventional forces. As FAO area specialists, PSYOP officers would at least be capable of evaluating target audiences in terms of language, culture,

and psychological susceptibility.

I totally disagree with Capt. McEwen's contention that PSYOP belongs in G2. Nothing could be farther from reality! PSYOP is not a **generator** of intelligence. Although proper intelligence is absolutely essential to effective PSYOP, it is also absolutely essential to tactical operations (the G3's business). PSYOP is a **user** of intelligence. The primary function of intelligence analysts in PSYOP units is to analyze available intelligence—produced by MI and other resources—to extract data which may be exploited in a PSYOP campaign, and to come to conclusions concerning possible target audiences. PSYOP is a combat support weapon (as is MI)—a combat multiplier, if you prefer—in support of, and fully integrated into, tactical operations. Its basic battlefield mission is to deplete the enemy, to reduce the enemy's combat power, and to make him weaker.

Does this sound like an intelligence function or a combat operations function? Now that the U.S. Army has finally taken PSYOP out of G5 doctrinally, don't blow the whole thing by putting it in G2! Leave it in G3 where it belongs. Don't create another "where-do-we-put-PSYOP" debate at a time when we are trying to get commanders to follow established doctrine to put PSYOP in G3 and to fully integrate it into tactical operations at all levels. (Note: Even in my Allied HQ here, where PSYOP is located—somewhat arbitrarily—in the G5 division, leaders are slowly coming to the realization that it is a G3 function. That's progress!)

Concerning tactical deception, PSYOP is **not** a deception weapon. Because of the type of equipment contained in PSYOP units, those units can very well support the G3's deception plan—in fact, that is one of their secondary missions—but they do not plan and conduct deception operations. Their principal activities are much farther reaching than merely deception support, and to tie PSYOP primarily to the deception mission would be to ignore most inherent PSYOP capabilities. There are a few people in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command community today who want to do just that. To change the orientation of PSYOP to a major deception role would be a tragic mistake and would totally ignore the primary purpose and capabilities of PSYOP units.

There are problems with PSYOP today. Some have been resolved already, such as taking it out of the G5 sphere, and the movement toward taking it out of SOF. Others are being addressed based on Office of the Secretary of Defense/ Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. But as far as the issues raised in the magazine arti-

cle, guys, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it!"

Lt. Col. Robert L. Hemphill
Chief, PSYOP Branch, CENTAG
Heidelberg, Germany

Dear Editor:

In the October-December 1985 issue of **Military Intelligence** Capt. Michael T. McEwen proposes to "put PSYOP in its place" by placing it in G2 intelligence staff areas. Some comments on his article are required:

First, PSYOP is **back** in its place now, in G3 operations, after years of being combined with civil affairs operations in G5, in most major commands. PSYOP is Psychological Operations and is properly placed in G3. The intelligence aspects are critical but are only the start point for an **operational** function.

Second, PSYOP has been at Fort Bragg, N.C., functioning under Special Operations, or Special Forces, since 1952. It is not the result of a recent Army reorganization. Capt. McEwen is correct in his assumption that it is misplaced. PSYOP should be reorganized as a separate branch or specialty with a more direct chain of command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Why? Because this is how it has operated in past wars and will, no doubt, be tasked to operate that way again. PSYOP is a unique professional field which must have close coordination and command channels to the highest policy levels of the military and the government.

PSYOP has been at Fort Bragg along with civil affairs, due in part to the small size of the active Army PSYOP group and its subordinate battalions. Considered a special warfare asset, it was always small in peacetime, basically overlooked for the impact it has on combat, and considered a dead-end career.

If war should occur, PSYOP would become of great interest to the highest levels of our government due to the absolute need to closely coordinate psychological operations at all levels of military operations. This is essential to ensure psychological campaigns achieve their intended results and to ensure U.S. national policy is both served by PSYOP and that PSYOP does not violate that policy.

PSYOP should be moved from Fort Bragg and established as a separate joint service command under FORSCOM. This would allow PSYOP units to train and prepare for the unique mission they have. This headquarters could then quickly be placed in the proper level of the command chain to oversee the PSYOP effort in any combat theater.

During World War II and Vietnam, offices were established at government

policy levels and high military levels to oversee PSYOP; for instance, the Office of War Information (OWI) and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II had close coordination with the chiefs of staff. The chief of the PSYWAR Division (PWD), who ran the PSYOP effort in the field in Europe, reported directly to Gen. Eisenhower's chief of staff.

In Vietnam, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), under the supervision of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), controlled PSYOP. The PSYOP directorate, under Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), exercised supervision of U.S. Joint PSYOP, with Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps assets. Lessons learned in World War II were forgotten in Korea and caused the United States to react slowly to the PSYOP war. Lessons relearned in Vietnam caused the expansion of PSYOP in 1975 to establish reserve units capable of supporting future conflicts. Current interest at the highest levels of government has added emphasis to the need to finally put PSYOP in a peacetime posture to train for immediate mobilization.

Third, the 96F Psychological Operations Analyst MOS was **recreated** after a ten-year battle to get a training program which produced the type of human intelligence expert needed for PSYOP. Under the 96B MOS, PSYOP soldiers were trained for order of battle intelligence, not trained to do PSYOP. Therefore, the active duty soldiers had little potential for advancement, and the turnover in PSYOP units was high. In reserve units, 96B training took almost two years and was followed with on-the-job training in the unit for PSYOP, as well as attendance at the PSYOP school at Fort Bragg. The current cross-over to 96F at an E-6, E-7 level is essential for active duty careers, but has little effect on the Reserve, where the service tends to be much longer in PSYOP, with more flexibility in changing MOS and duty positions.

PSYOP is finally separated from a strictly combat intelligence MOS and must remain so.

Fourth, the 48B specialty is appropriate for PSYOP officers and should be continued. Placing PSYOP officers in the Special Operations (18) field keeps active officers from having a career field which fully prepares them for the mission. As long as the active component PSYOP organization remains small, it needs a highly-specialized field which will bring officers into PSYOP. By maintaining branch immaterial status, PSYOP allows officers with unique qualifications to train as Foreign Area Officers (48B). And if they do not stay in PSYOP, they can continue a career in their primary branch.

Having **all** service branches represented in PSYOP units is essential. Varied expertise in branches is extremely useful in the development of PSYOP which is capable of getting the results intended, especially in PSYOP aimed at the enemy's military.

Finally, placing PSYOP under CEWI units, as Capt. McEwen suggests, to give it a "solid home within accepted corps and division elements," (assuming this would provide PSYOP with a more visible platform which would lead to "regular and routine use . . .") is badly conceived.

PSYOP should **not** be subordinate to any organization such as CEWI. The similarities are few and the concept of combat electronic warfare is not . . . "extremely compatible with PSYOP . . ." as Capt. McEwen asserts. Discussion of deception as a basis for this organization misses the point that PSYOP support of deception is a small part of the PSYOP mission. Psychological operations assets should be used to **support** deception operations—which are developed and conducted by the G3. There is potential for use of CEWI and PSYOP in joint support operations, but certainly not to the extent which justifies subordinating PSYOP to CEWI.

As stated in my first point, long years of discussion have led to PSYOP being placed back in G3, where it belongs. PSYOP in G2 was considered and all aspects of the PSYOP mission reviewed and debated.

Since this doctrinal change was effected in 1983, considerable effort has been made to reeducate the Army, especially G3s, about PSYOP. Great progress has been made, due in large part to CAPSTONE training. Programs of service-wide education in PSYOP are underway and are getting results. The current PSYOP strength in the Army is greater than any peacetime strength in history and PSYOP units are training harder than ever.

The solution to acceptance of PSYOP, as the force multiplier and weapons system that it is, is PSYOP education throughout the military, equipping PSYOP units with state-of-the-art production capabilities, training units and individual officers and soldiers in the profession, and providing a proper, workable organization to coordinate and supervise the total effort. Opening a new debate on putting PSYOP in G2 would be counterproductive. PSYOP is in its place in G3. When a joint PSYOP center, with all services, is organized and functional, the United States will finally have

(Continued on page 46)



Special Operations Forces

and
the

Challenge of Transnational Terrorism

by Capt. William H. Burgess III

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Recent strikes against Libya notwithstanding, the United States has yet to embrace the full range of legal, diplomatic, economic, political, and military measures needed to contain and ultimately defeat transnational terrorists.¹ To prevail, the United States will have to initiate a sustained and unified political-military offensive against international terrorists, their organizations, and their sponsors. U.S. military power—and, in particular, special operations forces (SOF)—should be a critical element in such an offensive. If the United States is to finally bridge the gap between its counterterrorist rhetoric and reality.

Presently, the potential use of U.S. military force, including SOF, is governed by a counterterrorist policy premised on the belief that the United States is "at peace." U.S. counterterrorist strategy emphasizes *deterrence* (the defensive prevention of attack) and *recovery* (the reactive reoccupa-

tion of facilities taken over, or the taking back of persons or equipment seized). Such a policy is flawed because it routinely allows terrorists to maintain the initiative by picking the time and place of their attacks. It relinquishes to the terrorists a superior tactical and strategic position from which they can employ the principles of mass, objective, security, economy of force, maneuver and surprise. A monumental example of the consequences of this policy occurred on October 23, 1983 when 241 U.S. servicemen were slaughtered in the bombing of the Marine garrison in Beirut, Lebanon.² In light of this and other grievous terrorist attacks on U.S. targets over the past four years, a counterterrorist policy focusing on deterrence and recovery is grossly inadequate.

To seize and maintain the initiative, U.S. counterterrorist policy must be premised on the recognition that a state of war exists between the United States and transnational terrorists.³

Furthermore, U.S. strategy should be correspondingly expanded in the areas of *preemption* (the offensive thwarting of attack) and *retaliation* (the punishment of the past use of force and the active discouragement of future attack with force).⁴ It is within the framework of preemption and retaliation, rather than deterrence and recovery, that SOF and other forms of military power can be employed to the fullest effect in the fight against transnational terrorism.⁵

An expanded U.S. counterterrorist policy which takes full advantage of SOF capabilities will demand more than just a change in national policy direction: Complex political, legal, moral, and mechanical issues need to be squarely addressed. Additionally, innovative, comprehensive, and unified targeting of the actors, organizations, and sponsors of transnational terrorism should be undertaken at all levels of government.

For their part, SOF must be prepared to meet the challenges of in-

depth and sustained terrorism counteraction with improved organization, logistics, intelligence support, and planning. Conventional commanders who have SOF within their commands must be sensitive to the efficient utilization of such forces. Political and military goals should be straightforward, unified, attainable, and endowed with clear political and legal support. Responsibility and authority for SOF oversight, policy, management, direction, planning, and execution will need to be streamlined and clearly defined. In short, bold new directions must be charted for SOF before they can most effectively contribute to a comprehensive national counterterrorist policy.

The Targeting Process and the Potential Role of SOF

If preemption and retaliation were formally adopted as a part of U.S. counterterrorist policy, SOF could be used in a wide range of attributable and nonattributable ways to attack individuals, subnational groups, installations, and systems, including sponsoring governments.⁶ In prosecuting a full-scale counterterrorist campaign, the United States would need to pursue the basic goals of destroying the enemy's ability to wage terrorist operations and the enemy's will to conduct them.⁷ SOF, for their part, must be prepared to rapidly and effectively strike both preplanned targets and targets of opportunity in all four of these target categories. (See Figure 1, Page 10)

SOF can be instrumental in operations against identified, culpable **individuals** who cannot, or will not, be tried in their host countries, and who are beyond extradition through the legal process. SOF, in particular, have the training, experience, and firepower to acquire such usually "hard" terrorist targets as ideological leaders, military commanders, planners, intelligence personnel, logisticians, and henchmen. Forced extradition (such as was used on May 11-21, 1960 by Israel to bring Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann to justice) is one mission for which SOF can be used, either unilaterally or in conjunction with indigenous or third country forces.⁸ Efforts to apprehend culpable individuals with the assistance of indigenous or third country personnel could be stimulated, in many

cases, by public and private offers of various rewards for information about, and for the actual capture of, such individuals. The State Department has taken a step in this direction by offering rewards of up to \$250,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those responsible for the December 4, 1984 hijacking of Kuwaiti Airlines flight 221 and the subsequent murder of Americans Charles Hegna and William Stafford, and of those responsible for the June 14, 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 and the resulting murder of Navy seaman Robert Stethem.⁹ However, passive offers of reward are likely to have few takers in the absence of active measures which demonstrate a serious intent to defeat terrorists.

SOF, in concert with appropriate counterintelligence support activities, can also be employed to "turn" targeted individuals into sources of intelligence and conduits for psychological operations (PSYOPS) and disinformation.¹⁰ In addition, SOF can engage in creative efforts to delay, harass, intimidate, and to take more extreme measures against individual transnational terrorists and their sponsors.¹¹

In targeting **subnational groups** involved in transnational terrorism, SOF can, using organic or attached assets, engage in intelligence collection (for example, human and signals intelligence), and operations to turn, delay, harass (by intercepting and modifying weapons and equipment in transit), to politically neutralize, and to take more extreme measures against such groups.¹² Such measures could be effected by SOF either unilaterally or in concert with indigenous or third country forces who favor such action.¹³

Special operations forces, PSYOPS assets in particular, can also be used to target the systems of popular support and the political alliances on which transnational terrorist groups rely. For instance, SOF could help undermine such support by exposing and emphasizing the more despicable aspects of the enemy's activities (if the enemy had committed horrible human rights abuses against its own people), by sowing the seeds of doubt and discord (through "black" propaganda and "pseudo operations") within the ranks of the terrorists, and by creating rifts between the various subnational groups and their respec-

tive sponsors.¹⁴ In a related area, SOF assets could also be used to subvert the ability of terrorists to communicate with the media by organizing political actions against the terrorists and their sponsors.¹⁵

Installations identified as being directly involved in transnational terrorism, such as sites for planning, training, billeting, and long-range communications, can be targeted with SOF assets for human and signals intelligence collection, political neutralization (through international political and legal tribunals and through the international media), and physical destruction. In the case of physical destruction, SOF can be particularly useful in augmenting air and artillery strikes through laser designation of the target(s) and/or the emplacement of terminal guidance beacons: The devastating October 1, 1985 Israeli air raid on Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia,¹⁶ and the April 14-15, 1986 U.S. Air Force and Navy air strikes on terrorist installations in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya,¹⁷ are two examples of the type of surgical actions SOF can support in an overt, covert, or clandestine way. In extreme cases, such as those requiring the seizure and destruction of large enemy installations, such as arms depots or barracks complexes, SOF can be used in both the initial seizure of the sites (perhaps as the vanguard of a larger force) and in the subsequent destruction or capture of enemy personnel, equipment, and facilities encountered therein.

Finally, SOF can be used to attack the **strategic systems** which support transnational terrorism. In particular, SOF can be used to subvert terrorist systems of political support, propaganda and media relations, security and intelligence, internal decision-making, mobility, and logistics.¹⁸ Through unconventional warfare and PSYOPS in the territories of sponsoring nations, SOF can undermine popular support for the regimes supporting terrorism, as well as their political allies, penetrate and subvert their intelligence and security systems, and impede internal decisionmaking. SOF can also attack enemy strategic economic targets used to support terrorism. Prior to the 1985 Iraqi air offensive, Iran was earning approximately one billion dollars a month by export-

ing oil from a handful of facilities on the Arabian Gulf through the narrow Straits of Hormuz. The interruption of such a large cash flow would have an obvious effect on a nation's ability to continue supporting terrorist organizations abroad.

SOF could also set up conduits for flooding enemy economies with counterfeit money, ration cards, and the like, and perform other operations directed at enemy economic infrastructures. To impede mobility and logistics, SOF can be used to destroy the critical components of key communication and transportation centers, or engage in operations to physically or electronically alter or destroy data as relatively minor as airline reservations and personnel rosters or as major as intelligence files and bank

records.

The Challenge to SOF

The basic means for a substantial SOF role in preemption and retaliation are at hand. Beyond the relatively small dedicated counterterrorist forces that could be directly employed in combat against transnational terrorists and their sponsors, the principal active-duty Department of Defense (DoD) assets include: in the Army, one Ranger regiment with three battalions, four Special Forces groups, one psychological operations group, and one aviation task force; in the Navy, two Naval special warfare groups; and, in the Air Force, five special operations squadrons and one separate helicopter detachment.¹⁹

There are, nonetheless, several fac-

tors militating against a long-term commitment of SOF assets to systematic and protracted terrorism preemption and retaliation. First and foremost, virtually all SOF units are tied to one or more of the general war plans of the various unified commands (U.S. Readiness Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command, Atlantic Command, and Central Command). Although the probability that SOF units will ever be employed under any of these war plans is remote, such plans are the SOF's very reason for existing, conclusively determining the size, configuration, annual budget, intelligence support, and capabilities of practically every SOF (and conventional) unit assigned duty with the unified commands.²⁰

Figure 1

TARGET ACTION	RESPONSIBILITY		
	STATE DEPARTMENT	NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INDIVIDUALS			
Trial in host country	1st	2nd	NONE
Extradite to US for trial			
by legal process	1st	2nd	NONE
by force	3rd	2nd	1st
Turn/delay/harass/intimidate	3rd	1st	2nd
Politically neutralize	3rd	1st	2nd
More extreme measures	NONE	2nd	1st
GROUPS			
Collect intelligence	3rd	1st	2nd
Turn	3rd	1st	2nd
Delay/harass/intimidate	3rd	2nd	1st
Politically neutralize	3rd	1st	2nd
More extreme measures	NONE	2nd	1st
INSTALLATIONS			
Collect intelligence	3rd	1st	2nd
Politically/physically neutralize	1st	2nd	3rd
Physically destroy	NONE	2nd	1st
SYSTEMS (To disrupt/degrade)			
Political support			
popular support	3rd	1st	2nd
political alliances	1st	2nd	3rd
Publicity/media relations	1st	2nd	3rd
Security/intelligence	3rd	1st	2nd
Internal decisionmaking	3rd	1st	2nd
Finance	3rd	1st	2nd
Mobility/logistics	3rd	2nd	1st

Suggested relative order of responsibilities in the strategic targeting of transnational terrorism. Note that the range of options listed here is currently unavailable under U.S. law.

The lack of unity of command over SOF units is another problem. At present, command and control (C²) responsibilities are maintained by various headquarters which possess varying degrees of expertise in the conduct of special operations and varying degrees of concern for SOF in general. The present command structure, with its diffused authority and diminished accountability, makes it difficult to pin down individual responsibility for SOF. Too often, when things go wrong, blame is placed on "the system."²¹


As alluded to above, there is presently no SOF unit (possibly other than DoD counterterrorist forces) specifically organized, equipped and mobile enough, and adequately supported with real-time intelligence, to perform missions of preemption and retaliation beyond the four corners of the war plans of the unified commands. Such a lack of formal planning, aggravated by a system of diffused C², is one reason (among others) why U.S. policy responses to transnational terrorist incidents occur on an ad hoc basis, and why good intelligence (where it exists) often cannot be acted on quickly enough.²²

Beyond the problem of command and control, the SOF formations themselves, by and large, lack the requisite organizational agility (despite SOF doctrinal emphasis on flexibility) to engage transnational terrorists in a war of maneuver within the parameters of their current tables of organization and equipment (TO&Es).²³ For example, while few Army Special Forces (SF) commanders feel that the 12-man "A-Team" is inviolate, too few SF commanders have experimented with, or even considered, a cellular "building block" system of combat formations such as the one used by the special forces of Britain,²⁴ the Soviet Union,²⁵ and other countries.²⁶ By adopting such a system, a standard SF battalion could deploy fifteen standard A-Teams, more than sixty 3-man action elements (or "patrols" in British parlance), a single 200-plus man force (as against a single target complex for which Rangers are unavailable or inappropriate), or any combination in between. But because of inflexibility and the military's ad hoc approach to contingencies arising outside conventional war plans, major special opera-

tions responses to transnational terrorism are unlikely to employ standing SOF formations. Instead, counterterrorist policy will continue to be executed by supra-elite "task forces" cannibalized from existing SOF units.²⁷

Providing sufficient, up-to-date equipment to SOF units is another challenge which must be overcome before they can be employed against terrorists. The larger problem can be illustrated by looking at a couple of examples of actual equipment shortfalls. Take the AN/PRC-70 radio, recently issued to several SOF units to upgrade their communications capabilities. It is heavy, cumbersome, and uses technology that is more than 20 years old.²⁸ Another example, the parabolic canopy MC-3, the standard Army SF free-fall parachute system, was designed in the early 1960s and is only now being slowly replaced by the MT-1X square canopy design. Virtually all other major SOF organizations in the world have long abandoned parabolic parachutes in favor of maneuverable and accurate square canopy designs, which in turn has allowed these organizations to gain considerable experience with precision free-fall operations, such as those involving landings on the roofs of selected buildings during periods of limited visibility.

Worse yet, the deplorable state of SOF aviation support raises serious questions about the United States' ability to even deliver SOF to the battlefield: At present, the United States has exactly the same number of MC-130 Combat Talon (14), and two fewer HH-53 Pave Low (7) penetrator aircraft, as existed at the time of the Iran



raid in 1980. All MC-130 airframes are at least 20 years old. All HH-53 airframes are at least 10 years old. Both airframes have taken a tremendous beating over the years due to the extraordinary physical demands placed upon them; yet, there are serious accusations (vigorously denied by the accused) that some uniformed officials are dragging their feet in the face of Department of Defense and congressional pressure, not to mention the demands from the various theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs) that they be able to meet their SOF aviation requirements by the 1990s.²⁹ These shortcomings suggest that there will be severe limits on the United States' present and near-future ability to pierce the often substantial air defense veil of terrorist sponsors with special operations forces.

Beyond the lack of formal planning, flexibility, and adequate logistics support, there are still some conventional commanders reluctant to commit SOF assets they control under circumstances where such forces operate independently, apart from their traditional role in support of larger conventional formations. Such hesitancy is even evidenced in situations where the introduction of conventional forces would be impossible, impractical or undesirable. The effects of such reluctance are analogous to those which would result if elephant guns were favored over flyswatters when attempting to rid a

crowded public place of insects (though elephant guns serve a very valuable purpose in many other settings).

Because of the historic lack of unified formal planning, organizational deficiencies, and the overall reluctance to employ SOF on a timely basis outside of fixed, general war plans, no SOF units, possibly other than those with a stated counterterrorist function, now plan or train for contingencies related to preemption and retaliation. To take such initiative without clear and unequivocal approval from the highest authorities would be career suicide for any SOF commander, though many observers predict national policy shifts will soon make SOF involvement in such operations a reality. As such, SOF units are generally at a disadvantage in the rapid preparation and execution of a wide variety of missions that fall outside of established war plans. For example, in some SOF units, the relatively recent command emphasis on "strategic reconnaissance," to the exclusion of more traditional SOF missions, has contributed to the gradual atrophy of preexisting skills in foreign languages, marksmanship (including the use of small arms at close quarters), demolitions, barrier penetration, and unconventional warfare. Such has also precluded, in some SOF units, the acquisition and development of more sophisticated and efficient targeting techniques that would have direct application against transnational terrorists and their sponsors.

Another limit on the effective use of SOF in the preemption of, or retaliation against, transnational terrorists results from the chronic and pervasive lack of a systematic method of SOF targeting and SOF intelligence support (particularly HUMINT support) in and out of the SOF community.³⁰ Despite recent initiatives within SOF and the intelligence community to tighten up target selection, intelligence support, and the attendant methods of attack, the general picture remains bleak. There is still no substantial SOF targeting data base available on a timely basis to operators, planners, intelligence support personnel, or commanders. Nor are all SOF units getting sufficient operational guidance and intelligence support from the theaters, or theater ser-

vice components, whose war plans they support. Although it is generally the most critical type of intelligence for special operations, HUMINT continues to be a particularly severe weakness. And with SOF targeting in support of fixed conventional war plans in such disarray, it is uncertain whether there can be any hope for establishing a systematic and comprehensive method of SOF targeting supported by a proper intelligence program, especially under the more fluid and volatile conditions inherent in transnational terrorism, with its peculiar mix of preplanned targets and targets of opportunity.

Necessary Reform

Before the United States can use SOF (and other resources) to exact an unbearable price on transnational terrorists, several important moral, political, legal, and military issues must be addressed.³¹ First of all, the national will must govern whatever role SOF are expected to fulfill. A policy which is understood and supported by the public will preclude the kind of alienation toward an "Executive war" which occurred during the Vietnam war. There must also be a clear legal basis for SOF operations (up to and including an actual or equivalent congressional declaration of war,³² appropriate modification of the War Powers Resolution, and revision of the Intelligence Oversight Act³³). A solid legal foundation for operations will help to preserve U.S. international standing and to protect the operators who will execute such policies.

The United States must also establish well-defined, unified, and attainable political and military goals, such as the termination of enemy sponsor nation petroleum exports, the interdiction of weapons and munitions shipments to enemy subnational groups, or the isolation of outlaw installations such as the Beirut International Airport. The United States must also create a streamlined political-military command and control structure capable of developing and implementing such a unified strategy. Any solution to these problems must begin at the very top and permeate the entire SOF community.³⁴

Under a revised SOF structure, as depicted in Figure 2, the president would oversee special operations by appointing his own Special Opera-

tions Advisory Board (PSOAB), composed of a dozen or so subject matter experts who would advise him on the adequacy of planned or ongoing special operations. The PSOAB would be assisted by a three-member Special Operations Oversight Board (SOOB), appointed by the president, to act as the inspector general of the SOF community, making sure current law is enforced and obeyed. The SOOB would play an important role in, among other things, ensuring that personnel involved in "black" operations avoid even the appearance of impropriety in financial matters. The lack of such oversight is one reason for the current controversy over alleged abuses of trust on the part of some SOF personnel engaged in covert operations.³⁵ The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) would also have to be in the advisory cycle to oversee SOF funding and to assist the president in framing SOF funding requests to Congress.


U.S. SOF policy would be developed by the National Security Council (NSC) with the assistance of in-house SOF expertise integrated with a Terrorism Counteraction Policy Staff. As with most other matters considered by its members, the NSC would normally advise the president through the president's national security advisor.

Overall SOF management would be the responsibility of the secretary of defense, who would advise the president and the NSC on all SOF matters, including policy. The secretary would also make sure SOF organizations were functioning well and would set SOF funding within the DoD budget. The secretary of defense would be assisted by a Defense Special Operations Advisory Board (DSOAB), which he would appoint. The DSOAB would provide the secretary with advice on SOF preparedness and budgetary matters.

Direction of SOF would be the responsibility of the director of the Defense Special Operations Agency (DSOA), who would also have the title of assistant secretary of defense for special operations. The director would be responsible for ensuring joint readiness and for the development of joint strategy and doctrine. He would be assisted by a civilian-military DSOA staff which would, among other things, coordinate with

commanders must be **required** to take the initiative to become more responsible and to make their formations more flexible. This ought to include giving action element commanders responsibility for planning the details of the operations for the forces they will personally command.³⁷ It ought to also include making planning staffs subject to combat deployment when needed, for there exists an immutable law of the SOF bureaucracy which states that an operation becomes more feasible the farther away one is from the physical risks involved in

Figure 3



Proposed three-tiered pyramidal structure of the SOF targeting intelligence base to be used in a campaign of preemption and retaliation against transnational terrorists. At the lowest level would be **generic** intelligence, such as the fundamental vulnerabilities to small-arms action of telecommunications systems. The middle tier would comprise **specific, but not time-perishable**, intelligence on individuals, groups, installations and systems, such as photographic maps of particular target areas. The upper tier would comprise **specific, time-perishable** intelligence, such as the location of mobile targets. The lower two tiers would be assembled on the basis of approved target lists, while the upper tier would be assembled after issuance of a warning order.

that operation.³⁸ SOF formations must plan and train for preemption and retaliation, and such units must be given the responsibility, authority, funding, and equipment necessary for these missions.

The long-neglected topic of SOF intelligence is another area which requires major reform. SOF targeting and intelligence support needs to be more systematic, efficient, and responsive. Real-time intelligence, particularly police-type HUMINT using indigenous sources, native-speakers, third country nationals, and other assets, must be sufficient to allow SOF to accurately see, hear, and know the enemy wherever and whenever the enemy operates.³⁹ An all-source SOF targeting intelligence data base, as depicted in Figure 3, must be assembled, maintained, and made readily accessible to SOF action elements, staff, and commanders, particularly when major targets of opportunity are involved.

Conclusion

If implemented with speed, imagination, precision, and appropriate force, the use of SOF in preemption and retaliation will, at a minimum, save innocent American lives, complicate terrorist planning and preparation, discourage some attacks altogether, increase the risks of failure of actual attacks, and significantly raise the general manpower, material, and financial costs of enemy security. Over the long run, such action may, in conjunction with other measures, ultimately convince terrorist adversaries that the costs of combatting the United States are more than they can bear.⁴⁰ Without the requisite political, legal, and military groundwork in place, the United States will continue to counter transnational terrorism with much rhetoric and little effect. ★

Endnotes

1. Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate Judiciary Committee, *State Sponsored Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1985). See also Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, *Counterattack: The West's Battle Against the Terrorists* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982).

2. Jeffrey W. Wright, "Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare," *Military Review*, October 1984, pp. 35-45.

3. "[Terrorism] cannot be defeated with defensive measures alone. Preventive measures, good preparation, and good intelligence are not enough. We must recognize that we are in a state of war, an undeclared and broad war, a war against Western society . . . [To] exclude the option of taking the offensive, is as suicidal in the case of terrorism as it would be in any other form of warfare." Moshe Arens, "Terrorist States," in **Terrorism: How the West Can Win**, ed. Benjamin Netanyahu (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Inc., 1986), p. 93.

4. The international legal basis for retaliation, known as the "right of reprisal," is found in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (recognizing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack has occurred) and in various international conventions. Such reprisal should be necessary and proportionate to the degree of violence committed by the attacker. To fit the language of Article 51 more closely, acts of preemption and retaliation may instead be referred to as "self defense," "preventive self defense," and "self defense against a continuing threat." The difference is in semantics, not substance.

5. Peter Grier, "Terrorism in '85 Prompts Fresh Look at US Special Forces Units," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 2, 1985, pp. 1, 36.

6. In many instances, the United States might elect to take action without openly acknowledging responsibility. Such may be a method of avoiding a dramatic escalation of violence while still getting a message across to the enemy.

7. Harry G. Summers Jr., **On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War** (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 88. See also Carl von Clausewitz, **On War** (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 122-138.

8. Stewart Steven, **The Spymasters of Israel** (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), pp. 132, 134-139.

9. "U.S. Posts Big Bounty, Names 3 in TWA Terror," *Newark Star-Ledger*, October 18, 1985, p. 1.

10. See Michael T. McEwen, "Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The Unused Weapon," *Military Review*, January 1986, pp. 59-67.

11. Section 2.11 of Executive Order 12333, issued by President Reagan on December 4, 1981, states that "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." Assassination in wartime is regulated by the annex embodying the regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land of Hague

Convention No. IV, *Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land*, October 18, 1907, to which the United States is a signatory. Article 23, paragraph (b) of the annex states that "It is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army." This clause traditionally has been interpreted to only prohibit putting a price upon an enemy's head, or offering a reward for an enemy "dead or alive." It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere. Assuming a state of war exists between the United States and certain terrorist organizations, the attack of members of the terrorist infrastructure *arguendo* would not constitute assassination. Note, however, that, as terrorists are not lawful combatants but international criminals, they would not be entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. See also Walter Shapiro and Richard Sandza, "Assassination: Is It a Real Option?" *Newsweek*, April 28, 1986, p. 21, and David Ignatius, "US Readies Anti-Terrorism Policy," *Wall Street Journal*, March 12, 1984, p. 32.

12. Access to such weapons and equipment shipments in some cases is through the black market in U.S.-manufactured items. See Gaylord Shaw, "The Iranian Connection," *Military Logistics Forum*, November-December 1985, pp. 20-29, Warren Richey, "Hungry for US-made Arms, Iran Sometimes Burned by Swindlers," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 30, 1986, p. 5, and "Cutting Off Arms to the Ayatollah," *Time*, May 5, 1986, p. 20.

13. Undertakings with resistance groups must, however, be accompanied by a firm U.S. commitment embodied in a declared consensus of Congress and the president to aid such subjugated peoples until they

have concluded their struggle. Without such resolve to support and not abandon these groups, conditions will not be conducive to an effective long-term role for SOF.

14. Robert J. Ward, "LIC Strategies," *Military Intelligence*, January-March 1985, p. 59.

15. See Rudolph Levy, "Terrorism and the Mass Media," *Military Intelligence*, October-December 1985, pp. 34-38, Benjamin Netanyahu, et al., "Terrorism and the Media," *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Inc., 1986), pp. 109-129, and Rushworth M. Kidder, "Manipulation of the Media," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 16, 1986, pp. 18-20.

16. William E. Smith, "Israel's 1,500-Mile Raid," *Time*, October 14, 1985, pp. 42-43.

17. William R. Doerner, "In the Dead of the Night," *Time*, April 28, 1986, pp. 28-31. See also "U.S. Demonstrates Advanced Weapons Technology in Libya," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April 21, 1986, pp. 18-21, Russell Watson, John Barry and John Walcott, "Reagan's Raiders," *Newsweek*, April 28, 1986, pp. 26-31, and "Reagan Ordered Air Strikes to Preempt Libyan Terrorists," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April 21, 1986, pp. 22-23.

18. Rushworth M. Kidder, "How Nations Support Terrorist Operations Around the World," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 14, 1986, p. 13, and "State-Sponsored Terrorism," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 14, 1986, pp. 17-19.

19. *United States Military Posture FY 1986* (Washington, D.C.: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1985), p. 68. See also "America's Secret Soldiers: The Buildup of US Special Operations Forces," *The Defense Monitor* (Washington D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 1985), pp. 4-8.

20. Additionally, despite having strategic missions for which proper planning and training would span years, SOF units are still budgeted on an annual basis: It is axi-

omatic that there can be no real long-range SOF planning without long-range budgeting.

21. Richard A. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 8.

22. "America's Secret Military Forces," *Newsweek*, April 22, 1985, pp. 22-23, 29.

23. Agility within U.S. Army doctrine "requires flexible organization and quick-minded, flexible leaders who can act faster than the enemy An organization's flexibility is determined by its basic structure, equipment and systems." (emphasis added) FM 100-5, *Operations*, August 20, 1982, p. 2-2.

24. Britain's 22 Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment is built on a "block four" system, for example, four men to a "patrol," four patrols to a "troop," and four troops to a "squadron." In practice, the SAS is even more flexible, often using patrols of as few as two men or as many as ten. Reinforcing this, the SAS has a good personnel selection program and good officer management. See Tony Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins* (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., 1983) and Peter Dickens, *SAS: The Jungle Frontier* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983), pp. 37-38, 149.

25. Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," *International Defense Review*, September 1983, pp. 1209-1216. See also Viktor Suvorov, *Inside Soviet Military Intelligence* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 136-154, and Max Walmer, *An Illustrated Guide to Modern Elite Forces* (New York: Arco Publishing, Inc., 1984), pp. 68-73.

26. See Stephan Terblanche, "Recce Commando," *Soldier of Fortune*, January 1986, pp. 76-83.

27. Task Force Ivory Coast, employed in the 1970 Son Tay prisoner of war camp raid, and the task force employed in the 1980 Iran raid intended to free hostages held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran are two examples. See Benjamin F. Schemmer, *The Raid* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976), Richard Garrett, *The Raiders* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1980), pp. 187-202, Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, *Delta Force* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), and Paul B. Ryan, *The Iran Rescue Mission: Why It Failed* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985).

28. Critics of the AN/PRC-70 point to the off-the-shelf availability of several vastly superior HF/VHF radios. One such radio often mentioned is the AN/PRC-319 produced by the British firm MEL. The AN/PRC-319 is half the size, about 35 pounds lighter, and offers significantly higher performance features than the AN/PRC-70. See Brian M. Walters, "Fight-

(Continued on page 48)



The Falcon Talks: Testimony of a Convicted Spy

Ten years later, Christopher Boyce tells the sobering tale of how he began dealing with the KGB and how others might fall prey to the seductive glamour of espionage.



Illustration by Billy Joe Deacon

Falconry was once a noble sport, fit for lords and ladies. It survives today among indulgent Westerners, though it hardly guarantees their nobility. The most notorious twentieth-century falconer was Christopher J. Boyce, whose exploits in espionage became the subject of a book and movie entitled **The Falcon and the Snowman**. In April 1985, Boyce testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations concerning the effectiveness of government security practices. Despite the Falcon's perfidious past, his testimony rings true as an account of the ordeal of espionage and as a warning to the four million Americans with security clearances.

"I know something about predatory behavior," said the movie's Boyce in describing the American intelligence community. The real Boyce did indeed know something about predatory behavior, but what he did not learn from his pet falcon he learned from his two-year association with the Soviets. Though the movie highlights the Falcon's anti-CIA sentiments, the real Boyce had much more to say about the KGB. Of the contrast between the two, the convicted spy who had worked with both told the Senate subcommittee, "I think, even in these responsible times, that if not carefully monitored, the intelligence community of a Western nation can be, potentially, a threat to an open society. But there is nothing 'potential' about the KGB. That state apparatus not only threatens every open society, it crushes open societies. That is the distinction I could not see at a rebellious 21. It is a distinction which Americans must see."

Boyce described his early attitude toward the American intelligence community as one of "suspicion and

by Capt. Brian P. Mitchell

distrust." Having come of age in the early seventies with Watergate, Vietnam, and reported CIA scandals, he had seen the United States and the Soviet Union as armed camps competing for world domination. He thought they were motivated by nationalistic bigotry rather than any ideological difference. In the United States, Boyce thought the American government was to blame, not the American people. The real culprits were the bureaucratic organs of the establishment that deceived and misled the people. What he saw when he went to work, for a company contracted by the CIA for various satellite projects, seemed to confirm his suspicions. His low opinion of American intelligence was further depressed by his co-workers' facetious regard for security and the apparent inability of the government to protect its own secrets.

All this would have become known, said Boyce, had anyone cared to ask, but he was never questioned about his feeling toward the government or the CIA and did not even know that he would be working for both when he took the job. His rebellious youth would have opened like Pandora's box in a competent security investigation, but the investigation that cleared him for the most sensitive employment failed to include a single friend or peer as sources. "Had they done so, the investigators would have interviewed a room full of disillusioned long-hairs, counter-culture falcons, druggie surfers, several wounded, paranoid vets, pot-smoking, anti-establishment types, bearded malcontents generally, many of whom were in trouble." Instead, they interviewed only his adult acquaintances: teachers, neighbors, and friends of his parents, none of whom knew the real Boyce.

In early 1975, after less than a year of work with the contractor, Boyce took his "first stumbling steps toward the KGB." His childhood friend, and professional drug-pusher, Andrew Lee visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to offer their services. For Lee, it was a way to make easy money; for Boyce, it was a way to get back at the system.

After their initial contact, spying for the Soviets became surprisingly easy. Company security was shamefully

lax, and Boyce had no trouble removing hundreds of documents from the "black vault" where he worked. The documents were photographed using a miniature camera then returned to the vault in the briefcases used for classified messages and, on one occasion, in a potted plant which Boyce allowed an unwitting security guard to carry in for him. Reflecting upon his own experience, for the benefit of the Senate subcommittee, the former spy recommended, not surprisingly, that all packages and containers going in and out of such facilities be routinely inspected.

Boyce listed seven other ways to make espionage more difficult at such facilities. The list included frequent inspections of work areas by supervisors and security personnel and a means by which complaints of security breaches can be reported anonymously, a recommendation repeated in a recent report by the Stilwell Commission on Defense Department

"No American who has gone to the KGB has not come to regret it."

security practices. Boyce also recommended the use of metal detectors to guard against cameras and recorders being smuggled into a facility and the electronic coding of classified documents to prevent documents from being smuggled out, as some libraries code books to prevent unauthorized removal. Any one of these measures would have made him think twice about his actions, he said. At the very least, the measures "would have increased my awareness of security as well as my chances of getting caught."

On the subject of polygraph examinations, another of his recommended measures, Boyce noted with irony that while his younger sister was polygraphed to work as a clerk in a 7-Eleven store, he was given access to extremely sensitive national secrets without being similarly examined. The polygraph alone would have deterred him from spying for the Soviets, he said later. Despite the claims of his KGB control agents, that they had

ways to beat the polygraph, Boyce told the committee, "I knew I could not pass a polygraph and greatly feared it." His fear had already dissuaded him from accepting a job with the CIA, even before the Soviets suggested that he pursue one.

Boyce told the committee that all of his recommended measures would be next to worthless if each of the four million Americans with security clearances did not grasp how espionage can personally affect him or her. Like most Americans, he had been ignorant of the cancerous effect of conspiracy on the conscience. His only warning about the world of espionage came in the form of a briefing he and others received from a clean-cut security agent who described a world in which handsome spies seduced lonely secretaries. This romantic description was quite unlike the world of espionage Boyce knew: "Where was the despair? Where were the sweaty palms and shakey hands? This man said nothing about having to wake up in the morning with gut-gripping fear before steeling yourself once again for the ordeal of going back into the vault . . . None of them knew, as I did, that there was no excitement, there was no thrill. There was only depression and a hopeless enslavement to an inhuman, uncaring foreign bureaucracy. I had not made myself count for something. I had made my freedom count for nothing."

His family and friends sensed that he was troubled by something beneath his obvious enjoyment of life. "I had become a withdrawn, paranoid person," he is quoted as saying in the book. "I lived behind a curtain; I had one life that was a normal existence that I tried to make as wholesome as I could, and I had this poison gnawing away at me in the other life." His paranoia eventually strangled his future with the woman he loved. There was no hope of getting married and living happily ever after, and when he could no longer tolerate her being tortured by his secret sadness, by what he dared not share with her, he broke off their relationship with the excuse that he did not love her anymore.

Boyce warned the committee that, even as he spoke, other Americans
(Continued on page 34)

An Open Letter to MI Soldiers

by Maj. Gen. George R. Stotser and Lt. Col. Steven J. Argersinger

Providing timely, predictive intelligence to a battlefield decisionmaker is a tough job. Some intelligence soldiers are more successful at it than others. Let me share with you three critical skills successful Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers must develop to effectively support their commanders.

First, you, as MI soldiers, must have the ability to clearly read the commander's intelligence needs. You must be able to match the intelligence collected and analyzed against the commander's expectations. At division level, the commander needs to know where the enemy commander intends to be and what he intends to accomplish twelve hours out, where the second echelon regiments are located, and when and where the second echelon division will be committed. These are prerequisites for successful decisionmaking. Don't focus your total energies on what is occurring now on the battlefield; that will be history by the time you tell your commander. Focus on prediction, regardless of the level of command. Prediction does not mean guessing. Rather, it is a carefully reasoned estimate based on your knowledge of the weather, enemy and terrain. Without this type of analysis, your commander will have to react to the enemy and will not be capable of seizing the initiative.

To be a successful predictor, you will have to learn to deal with uncertainty. You will never have all of the pieces of the puzzle in front of you. If you do, it is probably because you have taken too much time or used excessive collection means. Learn to trust your professional experience.

The second critical skill for success as an intelligence soldier is the ability to use the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. You must appreciate what IPB is designed to accomplish in support of your commander and integrate it into all of your activities. Here are a couple of thoughts on how the IPB process can make you a better intelligence soldier.

First, it will help you focus your terrain analysis effort in greater detail. How you look at terrain has a great deal to do with your appreciation of the commander's intent and what you know about the enemy. Both must be considered because it is the intelligence soldier's responsibility to discuss terrain in terms of both the enemy and friendly courses of action. What and where are the lines of communication? How do they support the enemy's attack? How might they support your commander's maneuver? Where are the choke points? How will forested areas affect the offense and the defense? Is there a common appreciation of key terrain? Do terrain features form engagement areas that can be used to the commander's advantage? Terrain analysis is never completed and you should never become complacent about your knowledge of the terrain.

Seasons, precipitation and visibility can significantly affect the commander's plan as well as the enemy's use of the terrain. Unfortunately, we have never adequately tied together weather and its effects on terrain. We are getting better, but too often that is a part of the analysis which is put into the last category of things to do.



The IPB process will also help you think like the enemy commander as you analyze your commander's operations plan and participate in the planning and decisionmaking process. Too often we become overly concerned about our knowledge of the enemy's equipment and organization. While this is important, we forget that

behind all this is a commander. Regardless of the level of combat, the commander must be the object of our analysis. He will make the decision to go from offense to defense; he will slow or speed up his subordinates; and he will be the one to instill confidence or fear in his soldiers. What do we know about his decisionmaking process? How much initiative is he likely to exhibit? What is his staff and command structure? What actions on our part will cause him to react the way we want him to? These are the important questions. Do not memorize facts; understand your opponent.

A third, critical skill which all MI soldiers must develop is the ability to create a reconnaissance plan which ensures scarce collection and communications assets are used economically. Recognize the capabilities and limitations of each collection system. Do not give your commander a false sense of confidence; be objective about what he can see and what he will know about the battlefield. In most cases, your analysis and IPB will be all you have. That is OK. Establish standards to measure the performance of your reconnaissance plan. If targeting data must be in the hands of the fire support officer in 15 minutes with an accuracy of 100 meters or better, then train to that standard and accept nothing less. Drive the assets to perform and make the reconnaissance plan discipline the intelligence system.

Focus your reconnaissance plan on enemy systems that support his attack. Examples of these systems are fire support, air defense, engineer, command and control, logistics, intelligence and electronic warfare, and maneuver. What are the critical nodes in each of these systems? Prioritize and template them on the battlefield. Where do your assets have to be positioned to collect and target these nodes? Which of them provide the highest payoff? Finally, the reconnaissance plan should include the use of combat

forces to satisfy significant priority intelligence requirements. Your commander will commit the forces necessary to support the reconnaissance plan only if you have clearly established the need.

Two concluding thoughts: First, develop an appreciation of these three critical skills. You will need them to provide your commander the support he requires; second, the human dimension on the battlefield is very important. That involves not only our soldiers and leaders but the enemy's as well. Spend time developing your perspective on this aspect of battle.

Military Intelligence soldiers are performing superbly in the field. Continue the good work. **Rock of the Marne! ★**

Maj. Gen. George R. Stotser assumed command of the 3d Infantry Division (Marne Division)

on June 14, 1985. Previously, Maj. Gen. Stotser served as the deputy chief of staff, operations, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and as the commander of the 2d Armored Division (Forward) at Garlstedt, Germany. Other career assignments include: assistant division commander (maneuver), 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; deputy director for operations, National Military Command Center, J3 Operations Directorate, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.; division chief and later assistant director, Operations and Readiness Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.; president, U.S. Army Combat Arms Training Board, Fort Benning, Georgia; commander, 1st

Brigade, 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army, Europe; deputy commandant, U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas; and G3, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), U.S. Army Pacific, Vietnam. Maj. Gen. Stotser was graduated from Middle Tennessee State University with a bachelor of science degree in Biology and commissioned in the Infantry. He holds a master's degree in Education from Middle Tennessee State University. Maj. Gen. Stotser is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, the Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College, and the U.S. Army War College.

Lt. Col. Steven J. Argersinger is currently the G2 of the 3d Infantry Division.

A Commander's Perspective on the Tactical Intelligence System

by Gen. Glenn K. Otis and Maj. John F. Johnson Jr.

In Europe, NATO forces are charged with the mission of deterring aggression by the Warsaw Pact. Roughly 2,600,000 NATO soldiers face 4,000,000 highly trained and well-equipped Warsaw Pact soldiers, sailors and airmen. Given this disparity, it is critical that the intelligence system provide the commander with the kind of detailed knowledge of the enemy, weather, and terrain which will help offset the numerical disadvantage should deterrence fail. Here, then, is a user's perspective of how the ideal intelligence system should work.

Simply stated, intelligence is the process of collecting large amounts of data from numerous sources and reducing that data to a few key pieces of information which a commander at any echelon can use to make an informed decision relating to his


course of action. Otherwise, too much information will obscure the key issues and be as potentially harmful as too little.

This process of reducing and refining raw data can be likened to the operation of a filter. As liquid passes through a filter, it is purified (or refined) according to pre-arranged settings. The intelligence "filtering" process, better known as the analytical process, operates in a similar way, based on the commander's guidelines and his needs.

The first and perhaps most critical filter in the intelligence process is intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). (See *Diagram*) IPB provides a methodology for analyzing the battlefield. It is not tied to any specific intelligence discipline, and it should be the precursor to nearly

every intelligence task. It is a process for combining environmental factors (terrain and weather), enemy doctrine and organization (order of battle), and, once forces are engaged in battle, friendly actions. The result of the process is an assessment of the enemy situation and the identification of the enemy's probable courses of action. Although a good deal of the IPB process is accomplished as a pre-battle effort, IPB must be performed continuously. The peacetime research effort provides the data base and background required for the wartime application of IPB.

Through IPB, the task of collecting information is greatly simplified. IPB permits collection managers to focus collection resources on critical events and locations. Imagery intelligence offers a good example of this applica-



tion. Without IPB, a division G2, who wanted to locate an enemy regimental headquarters, would be forced to sort through images of hundreds of square kilometers within his area of influence. On the other hand, the analytical discipline imposed by the IPB process will help the analyst immediately identify the most likely locations for the enemy regimental headquarters. Focusing the collection effort conserves collection resources as well as the imagery analyst's time.

An important point that is overlooked in existing IPB literature is the significance of friendly action on the

battlefield environment. The analysts involved in the application of IPB methodology cannot remain aloof from friendly operations. To be effective, analysts must have a good understanding of what friendly forces are doing, and are planning to do, in order to accurately assess probable enemy courses of action. This is true of all three analytical levels portrayed in the model.

Once collection guidance is issued to collectors (SIGINT, IMINT, or HUMINT), discipline-specific specialists must translate that guidance into the technical parameters required for

the collection operation. Even with tightly focused guidance and precise collection management, the collection effort will still produce a tremendous volume of data. This data must then be passed through a second set of analytic filters. Each of these analytic cells (SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT) accepts data from the collectors to form a single-source "picture" of the battlefield.

From these single-source views, collection guidance is modified, input is provided to an all-source fusion and correlation center, and targeting information is passed rapidly to a tar-

geting center where it can be used to bring fire on enemy locations. Targeting information, by its nature, is highly perishable. Therefore, the assessment time for targeting information is measured in seconds, while the assessment time involved in analyzing the single-source views is usually measured in hours, or even days, depending on the echelon where it is accomplished.

From the single-source nodes, filtered assessments must be passed through the third filter in the filtering process, the all-source analysis filter. At this stage, the input from the various intelligence disciplines is combined. The all-source analysis filter represents the critical juncture in the intelligence process because, at this stage, information is analyzed and formatted for presentation to the commander. Within the intelligence system, this is the last opportunity to reduce the volume of information to those critical facts required by the decisionmaker and to present those facts in such a way that they can be used by the commander. The facts should be presented to the commander in a concise, preferably graphic, form. Economy of presentation is of the utmost importance.

The overall goal of the intelligence process is to reduce uncertainty, allowing the commander to make informed decisions and to take action in less time than would be required without good intelligence. In order to act and react more quickly, the commander must rely on his intelligence analysts to present him with only the critical relevant facts worthy of his consideration. Once the commander makes a decision, the action taken will affect the battlefield environment, which, in turn, modifies the input to the IPB filter.

The intelligence process then continues as the collection manager modifies collection guidance to the single-discipline collectors. The filtering process provides an overall integration of the intelligence disciplines which increases the efficiency of each collection effort. Once again, limited targeting information is a by-product of the assessment performed at the all source filter. However, at this stage, targeting is probably of secondary importance because of the time lag resulting from communications delays and processing.

Communication problems and the time required for information processing are consistently identified as the Achilles' heel of the intelligence community. Every postmortem of intelligence "failures" from Pearl Harbor to the '73 Arab-Israeli War has indicated that all of the required data was available "in the system" to enable the intelligence community to warn of an impending operation. However, the information was buried in a mass of extraneous data. It is for this reason that we have chosen to call analytical nodes filters. The lines connecting elements in the diagram represent a finite number of communications paths. We cannot tolerate them being clogged in a brute force attempt to produce intelligence.

By reducing the flow of extraneous information, the commander benefits in two ways: First, it lightens the burden on the communications system, permitting other information to flow more easily; second, it assists the analyst, and ultimately the commander, by reducing the amount of information with which he must deal to more manageable proportions. We cannot afford the communications or processing equipment that would permit us to provide all the information to all of the users all of the time.

Steps are being taken to increase the automated support within the intelligence system. Automation will increase the speed at which information can be processed and presented to another analyst in the filtering process or, ultimately, to the commander. However, even with increased automation, we should not lose sight of the fact that intelligence is very much an intuitive art, not a science. No matter how much automation is made available, human judgment will still play the major role.

In order to work well, the ideal intelligence system requires highly-trained, motivated soldiers capable of making hard choices under tremendous pressures. We must use technology to assist them, never to replace them. These soldiers must be led by officers with the knowledge and imagination to apply technology wisely, the integrity to choose, as the West Point Prayer says, "the harder right rather than the easier wrong," and the dedication and sense of purpose required to accomplish a tough mission under demanding conditions.

Over the last several years, we have witnessed the coming of age of the tactical intelligence system in Europe. Almost all collection and processing capabilities at corps and division have been replaced or improved. We have put the technological pieces of the system in the hands of a dedicated group of well-led young professionals and turned them loose. They are accomplishing some great things. Thanks to their efforts, we are developing an intelligence system in Europe which approaches the "ideal" we have just described. ★

Gen. Glenn K. Otis became commander-in-chief of U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army and NATO's Central Army Group in April 1983. Previously, Gen. Otis served as commanding general, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He has also served as deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, Department of the Army, and as commander of the 1st Armored Division. Other career assignments include: deputy commander of the U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Knox, Kentucky; chief of staff, 3d Armored Division; and chief of the XM1 tank task force and commander of the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division. During the Vietnam war, Gen. Otis commanded the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, of the 25th Infantry Division. Gen. Otis enlisted in the Army in 1946. He was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1953. Gen. Otis holds a master's degree in Mathematics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Maj. John Johnson Jr. is chief of the SIGINT section in the office of the deputy chief of staff, intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe. Johnson has held a variety of intelligence assignments in the 82d Airborne Division and 5th SFGA. He was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and holds a master's degree in Communications Systems Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology. Johnson is scheduled to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in August 1986.

A Dynamic Application of Radar Imagery

by William J. Cox, Carroll L. Lucas and James M. Newlin

Currently, much of the tactical intelligence community—and many of the supported tactical commanders—are unfamiliar with the many tactical applications for fixed target indicator (FTI) and moving target indicator (MTI) side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) imagery. Nevertheless, there is a unique and practical intelligence application associated with radar imagery.

SLAR provides a critical long-range, stand-off, all-weather, day-night intelligence collection capability. The various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces employ a wide array of imaging and mapping radar sensors. The subject of this article, the Army's Motorola APS-94 radar system, is mounted on the OV-1D (Mohawk) reconnaissance aircraft. Imagery featured in this article was taken with the APS-94E model, which has operating characteristics that include 25, 50, and 100 kilometer range settings; range delays of 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 kilometers; and the ability to image in two directions (left and/or right) perpendicular to the flight path of the aircraft. Radar ground resolu-



tions are on the order of 20 meters to 790 meters, depending upon the range to the target. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) systems obtain even higher resolutions relatively independent of

Above (Plate 1) is an MTI image of Austin, Texas. Shown below is the FTI image of the same city (Plate 2).

range.

Plates 1 and 2 represent imagery of an urban scene. The ability to conduct surveillance of distant urban areas is crucial to the combat commander. Urban centers are usually focal points of logistical and regional transportation networks, which provide logistical arteries for mobilization, movement, and supply of enemy forces. Typically, this activity is monitored with MTI radar capabilities. However, the FTI format provides surveillance capability for such critical targets as bridges and dams and provides indications of land use, construction, and hydrology patterns in a map-like image format. This information may be used for targeting and battle damage assessment.


Austin, Texas, is the city featured in Plates 1 and 2. Plate 1 is an MTI display with major road networks clearly delineated by heavy vehicle traffic patterns. The Colorado River is faintly



visible, trending across the center of the scene. The FTI image in Plate 2 provides an interesting comparison. While road networks are readily apparent, urban buildup identifies the city center. Construction along major highways suggests the presence of a mass transportation network. Side by side, the MTI and FTI scenes provide complementary information of practical intelligence value. MTI imagery identifies the transportation network, while the FTI imagery provides bridge locations/conditions and urban patterns creating a greater understanding of the city's geography.

The imagery produced by the APS-94 system provides a rudimentary mapping capability. This can be seen in the plates of the rural landscape in Karnes County, Texas. Plate 3, the MTI image, features a highway delineated by the vehicular traffic pattern. At the scene's centerpoint, a highly reflective pattern is produced by a refinery. This industrial function is not readily apparent by viewing the MTI-processed signature. Although the moving target bias control switch in the radar's control console was set for minimal reception of background returns (to accentuate moving target signatures), intense returns can surpass the bias threshold of the system and result in a fixed target signature on the MTI display. This explains the presence of a fixed industrial signature on the MTI scene.

Plate 4 features an FTI image of the



The open country of Texas shows up faintly in the MTI image above (Plate 3), and more clearly in the FTI image below (Plate 4).

same area. The dominant rural nature of the landscape is readily apparent. Individual cultivated fields can be delineated. Several streams are visible in the scene. Channels are bordered by dense vegetation. The extensive canopy-covered area is probably undeveloped farmland. A parallel railroad and highway cross the image.



Some moving objects, which are visible on the MTI image, and which are strong reflectors of radar energy, are also resolved on the FTI scene. These targets, visible on the highway, are probably large tractor-trailer rigs (the metal trailer sides and the ground provide good contrast and strong corner angles for reflecting radar energy). In the center area of the scene, the industrial complex is identifiable as a refinery. Part of the internal plant infrastructure is discernible, as are three contiguous cooling ponds or brine pits.

In this relatively static scenario, the FTI format provides significantly more information of practical intelligence value than the MTI scene. The FTI phase provides an image closely resembling a shaded relief map. Thus, the potential intelligence applications are limited only by the experience and creativity of the analyst.

Results from surveillance of military installations, representing a more dynamic situation, further illustrate the usefulness of radar imagery for meeting the requirements associated with indications and warning, targeting, and battle damage assessment. The next two sets of imagery feature an airfield and an Army installation.

Plates 5 and 6 are of Bergstrom Air Force Base, near Austin, Texas. In scene 5, the MTI image, a road network defined by an irregular, sparse traffic pattern is observable. In the

center of the scene, a long, linear feature is barely discernible; this is the main runway. Plate 6 provides a remarkable comparison. In this FTI image, runways and taxiways are readily apparent. Hangar areas and facilities bordering the taxiways (large, metal structures) are stronger radar energy reflectors than the neighboring administrative and housing areas (structures built mostly of wood and brick). Highways bordering the airbase are visible. A portion of the Colorado River appears at the edge of the scene. Again, the intelligence utility of FTI imagery is readily apparent. The apparent dearth of information on the MTI scene, however, masks an important attribute.

Massed armor formations provide strong signatures on both MTI and FTI imagery, although static armor formations will only appear on the MTI display if the target is relatively close to the radar antenna and the returns are strong. That armor formations appear on both MTI and FTI displays provides a unique capability to acquire and track major enemy formations, including the potential for defining significant assembly areas and the levels of activity day or night, in all kinds of weather, and in near-real time.

Plates 7 and 8 are of Fort Hood, Texas. The MTI image (Plate 7) exhibits a remarkable definition of "motor pool row," a long, rectilinear feature



The runway of Bergstrom AFB provides a startling comparison between the MTI image above (Plate 5), and the FTI image below (Plate 6).

in which vehicles from more than two armored divisions are parked. Vacant motor pools are distinguishable from "parked" units. Information in the FTI scene is similar in detail. In Plate 8, the FTI imagery, some cultural information, such as the housing areas and Highway 190 (trending across the image), is more definable.



In conclusion, the APS-94 radar system provides an intelligence collection capability that can be exploited for a comprehensive understanding of the battlefield. The techniques for exploiting both radar products are determined by the need for timeliness and by the resources available to the tactical commander. The technique currently in use by imagery analysts entails viewing the "hard copy" positive transparencies of each format side-by-side on a light table. On the other hand, the MTI image could be used as an overlay for the FTI scene, creating a composite radar image that would be highly relevant to the decisionmaking process. Such a procedure can also be conducted through softcopy exploitation. If the radar image is not initially available in a digital format, digitization of the hard copy format can be easily accomplished. Using such techniques, digital products from each sensor format can be superimposed using different color-coded schemes. The resulting color-composite image can then be displayed on a cathode ray (CRT) work station (such as a personal computer with a color monitor), or plotted as a paper product for use as a map overlay. Recognizing that periodic coverage of the same target areas will be routine, the establishment of a flexible, historical, digital data base that



can be immediately queried, displayed, and updated should be seriously considered by the tactical intelligence community. Such techniques would be highly compatible with the emerging Geographic Information System (GIS) data bases and would complement other efforts geared toward near-real time and multisensor intelligence exploitation management.

The APS-94 radar's inherent mapping and imaging ability, featured in the FTI and MTI formatted displays, can now provide the kind of time-sensitive information essential to winning in modern warfare. Digitally fused with other imagery formats and intelligence data, radar imagery can provide an all-weather, round-the-clock, comprehensive understanding of the physical layout of, and dynamic activity occurring within, a targeted area of interest. There are, then, certain tactical applications for SLAR-derived intelligence in urban and rural environments using a basic, non-coherent, brute-force system. A radar system's tactical utility is only limited by the creativity and experience of the tactical intelligence staff using the products. ★

The motor pools of Fort Hood, Texas stand out clearly in the MTI image above (Plate 7) and in the FTI image below (Plate 8).

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T by 2nd Lt. Daniel L. Thomas
o the Western observer, the advent of communism in China seems to be a story of the new eclipsing the old, with Mao and his comrades depicted as putting an end to traditions and ancient ways, replacing them with a creation unique to the twentieth century: the communist form of government. In warfare, too, Mao has been portrayed as a prophet who preached a new style of warfare, recording his precepts in strategic bibles, such as **Basic Tactics**, **Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War**, and **On Guerrilla Warfare**. The success of this new brand of combat climaxed in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek and his army of American-assisted soldiers fled mainland China for Taiwan, sealing the Communists' victory. To the outsider, it seemed to be a triumph of new ideas over ancient ways. Conse-

Sun Tzu's "Revolutionary" Principles

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quently, its vehicle of accession, the Red Army's strategy and tactics, was characterized as revolutionary. But, in reality, the truth is neither that clear nor that simple. The military stratagems responsible for the Red victory, far from new, are hardly a creation of Mao's original thought. In fact, Mao's writings on strategy and tactics reflect ideas which have been borrowed or entirely paraphrased from the principles outlined by the ancient military genius Sun Tzu in his classic work, *The Art of War*. Therefore, the success of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was not due to a modern doctrine, but, rather, to the practical application of the oldest and most traditional. Indeed, the extent of Sun Tzu's influence on the Communist Chinese cannot be overemphasized. To know Sun Tzu is to know Mao Tse-tung—and to understand Chinese thought and action.

Sun Tzu and the Art of War

Scholars throughout the ages have disputed both the identity of the author and the exact age of *The Art of War*. The debate began in the eleventh century when a Sung scholar, Yeh Cheng-tse, concluded that Sun Tzu never even existed, but was more likely "a fabrication of disputed sophists" of the Warring States period (453-221 B.C.). The argument as to whether Sun Tzu existed or not has yet to be settled. Whether or not he was the actual author of *The Art of War* also remains in doubt; nevertheless, whoever did write the book was an imaginative individual who had considerable practical experience in war. And, since evidence suggests that *The Art of War* was written between 400-320 B.C., it is the oldest of all military classics.¹

The Art of War consists of thirteen sections dealing with a variety of areas pertaining to warfare, including espionage, national unity, and economics, as well as the military aspects of terrain, maneuver, and offensive and defensive strategy. Each section incorporates a series of maxims of a particularly philosophical and oriental flavor. B.H. Liddell Hart summarizes Sun Tzu's essays very well: "They have never been surpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding. They might well be termed the concentrated essence of wisdom on the conduct of war. Among all the military thinkers of the past, only Clausewitz is comparable, and even he is more dated than Sun Tzu, and in part antiquated, although he was writing more than two thousand years later. Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insight, and eternal freshness."²

Mao and the Art of War

Mao Tse-tung became acquainted with military writings at a very early age. As an avid reader, Mao was most interested in the romances of old China and stories of rebellions. One of his favorite books, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, recounted the ploys and battles of such figures as Chu-ko Liang, Ts'ao Ts'ao, Lu Sun, and Liv Pei, each of whom was a life-long student of Sun Tzu's treatise. Through these stories, Mao began to formulate definite ideas about the practice of war.

In later years, Mao continued to avidly study Sun Tzu and his apothegms. As commander of the Red Army during the first three "Bandit Extermination Campaigns" launched by Chiang Kai-shek, Mao successfully used them against his enemy. However, in December 1931, Mao fell into disfavor with the other ranking party members and subsequently lost his position as commander. During this period, he maintained a low profile and followed the party line; but, privately, he reread the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* countless times. For serious study, he chose to pore over the strategy of Sun Tzu.³ He correctly predicted that he would be recalled as soon as the Red Army encountered setbacks; it did during the Fifth Extermination Campaign and was forced to undertake the now historic Long March to Northwest China. Having arrived at Yen-an, from the temporary Red capital of Pao Am, Mao began to transcribe the cumulative lessons of Kiangsi and the Long March.⁴ Mao would continue to write throughout the years of Japanese occupation and civil

war. It is in these transcripts that the extent of Sun Tzu's influence on Mao becomes obvious.

In his writings on strategy and tactics, Mao's own wisdom reveals an intimate connection to Sun Tzu's teachings. Indeed, Robert Payne goes as far as to say, "[Mao's ideas on warfare] were not original, though their new form was original, and all of them can be found in the remarkable military writings of [Sun Tzu] . . ."⁵ Mao Tse-tung's teachings on war are, for the most part, rephrasings of Sun Tzu's maxims. A comparison of the two authors' works can be very instructive:

Sun Tzu: "... the skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated . . . a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle."⁶

Mao: "If we do not have a one hundred percent guarantee of victory, we should not fight a battle . . ."⁷

Sun Tzu: "If he prepares to the front, his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable, and if to the right, there will be few on his left . . . when he prepares everywhere, he will be weak everywhere."⁸

Mao: "We must strike the weak spots in the enemy's flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and dissipation of his strength."⁹

Sun Tzu: "[Those adept at waging war] rely for provisions on the enemy. Thus the army is plentifully provided with food."¹⁰

Mao: "We have claim on the output of the arsenals of London and Hanyang, to be delivered by the enemy's transportation corps. This is not a joke, but the truth."¹¹

Sun Tzu: "Treat the captives well, and care for them. Chang Yu: All the soldiers taken must be cared for with magnanimity and sincerity so that they may be used by us."¹²

Mao: "We shall not change our policy of giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war . . . we shall neither insult them nor browbeat them, but explain to them the harmony between the interests of the people of the two countries, set them free, and let them go home."¹³

Sun Tzu: "All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near."¹⁴

Mao: "Illusions and inadvertence may deprive one of superiority and initiative . . . 'making a noise in the east while attacking in the west' is a way of creating illusions for the enemy . . . it is often possible, by adopting all kinds of deceptive measures, effectively to drive the enemy into the pitfall of making erroneous judgments and taking erroneous actions . . ."¹⁵

Sun Tzu: "Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance . . . offer the enemy a bait to lure him."¹⁶

Mao: "Ambush by luring the enemy . . . our troops, so to speak, prostrate themselves and hold out both arms, enticing the enemy to penetrate deeply."¹⁷

Sun Tzu: "... feign disorder and strike him."¹⁸

Mao: "It is carried out by first placing our main force in ambush along the two sides of the road . . . and then attacking the enemy with a small force. This force then feigns defeat and withdraws, luring the enemy deep into our lines, after which the main force rushes out . . ."¹⁹

Periodically, Mao even quoted Sun Tzu in his military lectures and writings: "Yet war is nothing supernatural, it is one of the things in the world that follow the determined course of their development; hence, Sun Tzu's law, 'know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster,' is still scientific truth."²⁰

While this brief comparison fails to do justice to the full extent of Sun Tzu's influence on Mao Tse-tung, it does provide substantial evidence supporting the fact. A complete reading of *The Art of War* and Mao's works would further underscore Sun Tzu's profound influence on Mao.

Sun Tzu and the Chinese Red Army

While it is clear that Sun Tzu had a tremendous effect on Mao's military thought, Sun Tzu's influence can also be seen extending far beyond Mao's military theory. In fact, Sun Tzu's principles of war live on in the present-day activities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). China scholar Samuel B. Griffith notes: "The impact of Sun Tzu goes beyond his influence on Mao and Mao's direction of the P.L.A.: it extends down to the combat action and reaction of many generals, and even some battalion commanders. It provides the spirit, if not the letter, of guidance."²¹ Indeed, the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* has been avidly read by a large number of junior commanders and officers for direction. And the military principles from *The Art of War* serve as the practical guide to Red Army activities.

During the war against the Kuomintang, the PLA followed its ninth military principle to the letter: "Replenish ourselves by the capture of all the enemy's arms and most of his personnel. The sources of the men and material of our army is mainly at the front."²² (Sun Tzu: "Hence, the wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy . . .")²³ In May of 1931, Nanking estimated the Red Army had 60,000 rifles, 768 machine guns, 29 cannon, and 74 trench mortars, ninety percent of which had been captured from the Nationalists.²⁴

The mobility of the PLA forces overwhelmed Chiang's troops. The Communists always seemed to appear from nowhere, strike at the flanks or rear, and slip away before the surprised Nationalists could recover from the shock.²⁵ In one incident during the civil war, 60,000 PLA troops were supposedly completely encircled by Nationalist forces, but when aerial reconnaissance attempted to search them out, not a single uniformed body of troops could be found. The troops of the Central Plains Army simply dispersed, slipped through the enemy's lines, and disappeared to reassemble two months later.

The PLA continued to practice Sun Tzu's principles during the Korean War. With the advance on the Yalu by U.N. forces, the Chinese began to infiltrate large bodies of troops into Korea. Smoke rising from scattered hamlets across the countryside did not attract the attention of those conducting U.N. observation flights. In

reality, thousands of Chinese soldiers sat there, right before their eyes, preparing their evening meal. At night, they moved south under the cover of darkness. During these night deployments, the Chinese were led by North Korean guides.²⁶ (Sun Tzu: "Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground.")²⁷ From October 15 to October 31, 1950, the U.N. Command's intelligence estimate read: "There is no evidence that Chinese Communist units, as such, have entered Korea." At that very time, there were 200,000 troops belonging to at least four Chinese armies in North Korea, three of which were in the zone of action of U.N. forces.²⁸ (Sun Tzu: "... when near, make it appear that you are far away ...")²⁹

When the Chinese finally launched their assault, they struck violently from unexpected routes and through impossible terrain at the flanks of shocked and bewildered U.N. forces. In early November, the Chinese withdrew, but only to lure the U.N. troops deeper into North Korea where units would become separated from one another and annihilated.³⁰

Later, when the war changed from one of mobility to stagnation, the Chinese sometimes deviated from the teachings of *The Art of War*, but not to the extent reflected by popular opinion. For the most part, the Chinese were governed by Sun Tzu's teachings throughout the war. As the official history of the Marine Corps relates: "Press correspondents were fond of referring to 'the human wave tactics of the Asiatic hordes.' Nothing could be further from the truth. In reality, the Chinese seldom attacked in units larger than a regiment. Even these efforts were usually reduced to a seemingly endless succession of platoon infiltrations. It was not mass, but deception and surprise which made the Chinese Red formidable."³¹

The PLA also applied the maxims from *The Art of War* during the brief conflict with India in 1962. For example, at the battle of Se La, Chinese patrols continually interdicted roads and trucks, set ambushes, and incessantly infiltrated Indian lines successfully.

In the future, Chinese strategems can be expected to remain unchanged. When adhering to Sun Tzu's principles of war, the history of the People's Liberation Army has been one of success; when it has departed from it, such as during the Fifth Extermination Campaign, it has failed. Along with Mao Tse-tung's works, *The Art of War* stands as the letter of law on warfare. In fact, Sun Tzu is still required reading in Chinese military schools. One can reasonably expect the Chinese to follow Sun Tzu's principles in the years to come.

When planning to engage in hostilities, Chinese leaders will strive to select theaters of operation conducive to their strategy. They have sometimes failed to do this in the past and have suffered the consequences. For example, a hostile population in Tibet adopted Mao's guerrilla tactics and used them against the Red Army. In Korea, the PLA was hampered because the terrain was too cramped and restrictive to effectively apply Mao's tactics. Chinese commanders prefer wide open spaces with plenty of room for deployment and maneuver. The leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) will try to avoid future Tibets and Koreas. The Chinese Military Affairs Committee and the high command of the PLA

are primarily concerned with a war fought on their own soil where the principles from *The Art of War* are most suitable. If the PRC chooses to become involved militarily outside of its borders, its leaders will attempt to select an area that allows them to practice Sun Tzu's principles to their fullest.

In conclusion, the extent of a single ancient author's writings are dramatic; the history of the PRC is not due as much to revolutionary change as it is proclaimed to be. Certainly, further study of Chinese history and scholarship would prove that the Communist leadership relies on its past much more than initially suspected. Finally, it is important that Westerners come to understand the military thought and philosophy of a nation whose prominence in the world will only increase in the future, and which may become an important ally, or perhaps, as in the past, a dangerous foe. ★

Footnotes

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.
2. Ibid., p.v.
3. Eric Chou, *Mao Tse-tung, the Man and the Myth* (Briarcliff Manor, New York: Stein and Day, 1980), p. 100.
4. Sun Tzu, p. 50.
5. Robert Payne, *Portrait of a Revolutionary: Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1961).
6. Sun Tzu, p. 87.
7. Mao Tse-tung, *Basic Tactics*, trans. by Stuart R. Schram (New York: Fredrick A. Praeja, Inc., 1966), p. 56.
8. Sun Tzu, p. 87.
9. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Fredrick A. Praeja, Inc., 1961), p. 68.
10. Sun Tzu, 74.
11. Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg, Penn: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1952), p. 189.
12. Sun Tzu, p. 76.
13. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, ed. Anne Fremantle (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1954), p. 98.
14. Sun Tzu, p. 66.
15. Mao, *Selected Works*, p. 216.
16. Sun Tzu, pp. 66, 67.
17. Mao, *Basic Tactics*, p. 102.
18. Sun Tzu, p. 66.
19. Mao, *Basic Tactics*, p. 102.
20. Mao, *Selected Works*, p. 215.
21. Rigg, p. 49.
22. Ibid, p. 182.
23. Sun Tzu, p. 74.
24. Samuel B. Griffith, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 39.
25. Ibid, p. 40.
26. Griffith, p. 129.
27. Sun Tzu, p. 104.
28. Griffith, p. 129.
29. Sun Tzu, p. 66.
30. Griffith, p. 134.
31. Rigg, p. 1.

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The Challenge of Teaching COMSEC

by Maj. Walter R. Schumm

Communications security (COMSEC) is an area that raises the anxiety levels of prospective COMSEC custodians tremendously. In fact, it is one of those rare subjects that can raise anxiety and produce boredom simultaneously, as anyone who has struggled with the old edition of Technical Bulletin (TB) 380-41, *Procedures for Safeguarding, Accounting, and Supply Control of COMSEC Material*, might testify. Student soldiers want to understand what they need to do, but find the material extremely difficult. For the instructor, this presents a dilemma: The instructor would like to stick close to the "book" in order to avoid putting out inaccurate information; on the other hand, the instructor needs to present the required material in the most learnable manner possible.

With a technical subject like COMSEC, there is almost always the issue of definitions; it is important that everyone have a common grounding in the same vocabulary from the start. I have found that electronic warfare terms, of which COMSEC is only one, can be best explained by using graphic representations of the material involved. For instance, the chart depicted in Figure 1 can help the student gain an immediate perspective on COMSEC. The student will be able to see that COMSEC is but one aspect of the larger area of signal security, which is a defensive and passive/supporting aspect of electronic warfare. Without good signal security, including good COMSEC, it may be futile to apply electronic counter-countermeasures (an ounce of prevention being better than the proverbial pound of cure). Similarly, good COMSEC will make the enemy's signals intelligence/electronic warfare support measures (SIGINT/ESM) col-

lection task much more difficult, thereby putting a damper on his electronic countermeasures (ECM) effort as well. COMSEC refers, of course, to communications equipment rather than other electronic equipment to which the term ELSEC (electronic security) pertains.

Therefore, when teaching COMSEC, the instructor must strive to show students that COMSEC is the very cornerstone of defensive electronic warfare, although it also includes minimizing transmissions in general and radiations directed toward enemy collectors in particular, as well as coding the meaning of one's message traffic.

Once grounded in vocabulary, students often need to be convinced of the importance of COMSEC. Why, after all, should COMSEC receive as much emphasis as any other aspect of security? I have found two approaches to be helpful here. In Field Manual (FM) 11-27, *Signal Cable and Wire Company* (15 October 1985), Table 7-2 points out that COMSEC measures and techniques include physical security, cryptosecurity, transmission security, and emission security, illustrating examples of each from left to right across the table. However, in presenting this material, it is more helpful to present it in a slightly different manner (See Figure 2), reversing the order of transmission and emission se-

curity. By doing so, the instructor can explain that the enemy will try to attack the weakest link in the message transmission process. First, the enemy may try to steal the message in its original form or to steal the codes and equipment used to encode or encrypt the message. To prevent such theft, careful physical security measures are instituted. After a message is written, it may be encoded, on-line or off-line. Once it is encoded, the enemy must try to break the code if he is to fully interpret the content of the message. To prevent him from breaking the code or being able to unscramble signals encrypted by equipment, it is the task of the National Security Administration (NSA) to provide reliable codes and equipment. The next stage of handling a message encrypted off-line is to usually type it up on a teletype or other piece of equipment (the order of emission and cryptosecurity may be reversed for on-line encrypted messages); here it may be possible for the enemy to intercept signals

	DEFENSIVE	OFFENSIVE
ACTIVE	Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM)	Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Jamming Imitative Communications Deception (ICD)
PASSIVE	Signal Security (SIGSEC) COMSEC ELSEC	Electronic Support Measures (ESM) Unit freqs Location Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) COMINT ELINT TELINT

Figure 1

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☐ Military Intelligence ☐ Air Defense Artillery ☐ Armor ☐ Artillery ☐ Aviation
☐ Engineer ☐ Infantry ☐ Other branch ☐ Not Applicable

5. Rank or Grade:

☐ E1-E3 ☐ E4-E6 ☐ E7-E9 ☐ W1-W4 ☐ O1-O3 ☐ O4-O6 ☐ O7-10
☐ GS 1-GS 5 ☐ GS 6-GS 9 ☐ GS 10-GS 13 ☐ GS 14-GS 16 ☐ Does not apply

6. Education:

☐ High School Graduate ☐ Some College ☐ 2-Year Degree
☐ 4-Year Degree ☐ Graduate work ☐ Graduate degree

7. Location:

☐ Continental United States ☐ Outside the United States

8. How many issues have you read in the past year?

☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4

9. Have you read an issue in the past 3 months?

☐ Yes ☐ No

10. Where did you get your last copy?

☐ Subscription ☐ Library ☐ Office/Unit ☐ From friends ☐ Other

11. What do you do with your copy after you are finished with it?

☐ Keep it ☐ Pass it on ☐ Discard it

12. How much of these sections did you read?

	All of it	Most of it	Scanned it	Didn't read it
Commander/CSM message	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Behind the Lines	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cover/feature articles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Feedback	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USAICS Notes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USAISD Notes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Officer Notes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enlisted Notes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Branch/Organizational Notes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Professional Reader	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unit History	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13. Which section of the magazine do you like the most? _____

14. How often do you use the the magazine as a reference in reports, papers or briefings?

☐ Frequently ☐ Occasionally ☐ Never ☐ Does not apply

15. How difficult are the articles in MI Magazine to read?

☐ Too difficult to read ☐ Sometimes difficult ☐ About right ☐ Sometimes too easy ☐ Much too easy

16. How do you rate MI Magazine as a branch journal?

☐ Excellent ☐ Good ☐ Average ☐ Poor

17. Indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:

	Agree Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
a. It is interesting _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. It is informative _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Its content meets high standards _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. It has increased my professional knowledge outside my field _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. The articles are current and timely _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. It is a stimulating forum for new ideas _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. Authors are knowledgeable in their fields _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. The text is clear and easy to understand _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. The design and layout meet high standards _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18. How much of an emphasis would you like given to the following subjects:

	More Emphasis	Less Emphasis	Same
Tactical Intelligence _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strategic Intelligence _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
History _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Training _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Career Management _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OPFOR _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Electronic Warfare _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Low Intensity Conflict _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Terrorism/Special Operations _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Research and Development _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Psychological Operations _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

The space below is provided for any comments you might have. If there is not enough room, please attach additional sheets to the survey. This survey is designed to be folded, stapled and mailed. The postage is paid, so all you have to do is drop it in a mail box, or return it to your mail room. Thank you for your input.

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
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


Figure 2

from the equipment, before or after encryption, signals which could provide him with useful information. The final stage of the message flow is the transmission via radio, telephone, or messenger. In this final stage, the importance of transmission security is apparent.

Thus, each aspect of COMSEC fits into the procedure and process associated with sending a message from its inception to its reception at the distant site. Each aspect of COMSEC is aimed at foiling an enemy's specific attempt to penetrate the security at any given stage of the message-sending process. In other words, COMSEC techniques are integrally connected to the reality of how the Army communicates! If the Army sent

messages some other way, it would have a different form of COMSEC. COMSEC, then, must correspond to the way messages are sent and to the specific vulnerabilities associated with that way of sending messages.

However, even after a logical discussion of the importance of COMSEC, the student may still remain skeptical of the need for stringent COMSEC procedures. My final assault on such perceptions is centered on the use of another visual aid (See Figure 3). Figure 3 illustrates the potential damage of a compromise by comparing an ordinary security compromise to a COMSEC compromise. I ask students to think about what might happen if a soldier lost a SECRET document, such as an operations order for his unit, and it was captured intact by the enemy. How many units would be affected? Obviously, at least one! Of course, the adjacent, subordinate, and perhaps higher units might be affected, particularly if the compromise was never detected. But the effects on the other units would probably be less than those on the unit losing its

own document. Furthermore, the loss of one SECRET document is the loss of one document, not several. In contrast, the compromise of a SECRET key has the effect of compromising up to dozens, even hundreds, of messages/documents for every unit using that key. It is easy to see that the damage resulting from an unknown compromise of SECRET COMSEC keying material is normally much, much greater than that resulting from the unknown compromise of a single SECRET non-COMSEC document. Of course, there is always an exception in which the resulting damage might be worse in the case of the compromise of an ordinary SECRET document. However, on the whole, most students are impressed by visual comparison and hopefully begin to recognize the real importance of good COMSEC procedures.

Once an instructor has tackled the problems of definition and awareness, it is time to teach procedures. COMSEC accounting is one procedural area that is particularly difficult to make interesting. Once again, graphic representation is the most useful way to meet the challenge of teaching students to retain highly technical material. For instance, accounting legend codes (ALC) often strike students as being somewhat arbitrary. Figure 4 can be used to show the logic underlying ALC codes. In fact, ALC codes are a product of two factors that help define the need for the physical security of COMSEC




Figure 3

materials.

Some materials are of a sensitive nature. For such materials, control must be maintained by serial number; in other words, if lost, it is important to be able to establish an audit trail and to be able to pinpoint who lost the item in question—which may help to identify how it was lost and how to prevent similar occurrences in the future. The second dimension to COMSEC security involves those items which become obsolete or are superceded in a relatively short period of time, after which they are destroyed and no further accounting is needed.

Any item might fall into either one of these categories or a combination of the two. Therefore, ALC 1 was chosen to represent the most sensitive combination, those items that need serial number control and are not rapidly or frequently superceded. ALC 2 represents those items not needing serial number control but which are not superceded frequently. ALC 3 is a special category of sensitive items that need serial number accounting but are superceded frequently; accordingly, it is for ALC 3 items that destruction procedures become of particular importance. ALC 4 items are those that do not need serial number control and are superceded frequently. In summary, ALC codes reflect real-world conditions that have to be taken into account—ask students if they can think of any other logical way to do it. The exercise alone may lead the students to an appreciation of the current system.

One particular aspect of COMSEC accounting that tends to confuse students is the plethora of forms associated with controlling COMSEC transactions and inventories. Oftentimes, instructors approach this area with the simple phrase, "This is exactly how it has to be done." In doing so, they offer the students no overall picture of the essential process involved. On the other hand, a simple illustration, like the one depicted in Figure 5, is one way of improving an otherwise colorless approach. In general, COMSEC accounting exists to satisfy the needs of two agencies: first, the needs of the Army COMSEC Central Office of Record (ACCOR) and, secondly, the needs of the custodian himself or his unit. Documents fall into two categories—those that record or report inventories of items on hand and those that report the occurrence of transactions. Therefore, some forms serve as records of transactions for ACCOR and others serve as records of transactions for the unit's COMSEC account. Inventory records, too, consist of those that are of primary interest to the unit account and those that are of primary interest to ACCOR. Without these documents, the COMSEC accountant would not know what he had on hand or what transactions had transpired. ACCOR, on the other hand, must know what COMSEC items belong in each unit and what transactions are occurring. Within the current COMSEC accounting system, different documents have been developed to meet each of these four needs. Some of these documents

are listed in each cell of Figure 5. The flow of COMSEC transactions can also be presented in Figure 5. When an item is received, ACCOR will want to know of its new location, which usually means that it gets a copy of the SF 153 that accompanied the item. The SF 153 serves as a record of transaction for ACCOR (cell #1). To make sure the transaction is not forgotten, the COMSEC accountant keeps a copy of the SF 153 and uses it to log the receipt transaction in the local voucher control register (TB 380-41-3 has deleted the requirements to log incoming transfers on DA Form 4669-R.). The COMSEC accountant then adds the item to an item register card (DA Form 2011 or 2011-1), which serves as a local inventory of items on hand. Rather than sending xerox copies of item register cards to ACCOR to keep ACCOR informed of what the account owns, semiannual inventory and special inventory reports are forwarded on a regular basis to ACCOR from the account. Thus, the entire process of COMSEC accounting can best be presented as a flow of information. Rather than being viewed as a set of obstacles to getting things done, the forms involved in COMSEC accounting should be viewed as an essential part of the process of keeping ACCOR and the unit fully informed as to the current statistics (what you've got) and the current dynamics (what's happening) of the account. The astute COMSEC inspector realizes that, in all aspects of the flow of COMSEC accounting (the information in the four cells), the sta-




Figure 4




Figure 5

	For Official Use Only	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	TOP SECRET
"Ordinary Non-COMSEC Materials"	First Class Mail	First Class Mail	U.S. Registered Mail	Special Courier
COMSEC Materials other than Classified Equipment or Key Marked CRYPTO	First Class Mail	U.S. Certified Mail	U.S. Registered Mail	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS)
COMSEC Keying Material Marked CRYPTO	U.S. Registered Mail	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) (except individual editions or extracts only: by U.S. Registered Mail)	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS)	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS)
COMSEC Equipment	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) (except individual editions or extracts only: by U.S. Registered Mail)	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS)	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS)	Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS)

Figure 6

tistics and the dynamics should be consistent with each other if the process of accounting is being adhered to faithfully in accordance with regulations. The point of comparing information on different forms is not a matter of trying to catch a COMSEC accountant's simple mistakes, but a matter of being sure that the overall process is being complied with.

Another matter that can be confusing to students is the process of transmitting or transporting COMSEC items, a process that differs considerably from the requirements of Army Regulation 380-5, which applies to ordinary classified material. In this case, a chart can be used to summarize the procedures (See Figure 6). The requirements for securing items in transmission increase as one progresses from ordinary classified material to general COMSEC items, to CRYPTO keying material, to classified COMSEC equipment. Figure 6 presents information from AR 380-5 and TB 380-41 in one simple picture rather than in several paragraphs located in different manuals.

The use of the figures presented in this article can greatly simplify COMSEC instruction, enhance students' ability to learn the material, and increase their motivation. Visual aids help students realize that there is

an underlying logic to COMSEC procedures, a fact that may not be immediately apparent to the novice trying to make sense of TB 380-41. The figures also serve as a very convenient reference for the COMSEC account custodian, the NCO who needs training aids for soldiers in certain MOSSs, such as 31K and 72E, and the COMSEC account inspector or counterintelligence agent who wants to most efficiently train inexperienced COMSEC account custodians during required COMSEC account inspections. ★

Acknowledgement

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FALCON

(Continued from page 17)
might be working for the KGB, an ironic understatement as it turned out. "None of them are happy men and women," he said. "No American who has gone to the KGB has not come to regret it." Weeks later the Walkers were arrested, and the same complaints of paranoia were heard again from three of the four Walker spies. The experiences of ringleader John Walker and of Andrew Daulton Lee, Boyce's accomplice, showed other similarities. Both Lee and Walker were trained by the KGB in Vienna, and both shared the same greed and delusions of grandeur, enjoying their roles as spies and bragging about their treasons, despite their fears.

Both were also convicted under the government's policy favoring the prosecution of spies over the protection of classified information from courtroom disclosure. Previously, the intelligence community had prevailed upon the government to settle for exposing spies rather than prosecuting them, thereby avoiding the risk of revealing intelligence sources and methods in open trial. In the mid-seventies, the government shifted its policy toward prosecution in the hope of discouraging others from spying in the future. Boyce and Lee were among the first to fall under the new policy; the Walkers were certainly not the last. Within months of Boyce's testimony before the Senate subcommittee, there were 12 Americans on trial for espionage, more at one time than ever before. Before the year was out, the names of twenty other spies would make the news as they were caught, convicted, sentenced, or exchanged. Among the twenty were members of the FBI, CIA, NSA, the Navy, the Army, and several defense contractors. Little wonder that 1985 was dubbed "The Year of the Spy."

In the light of these recent events, Boyce's warnings take on an added significance: "In Mr. Gorbachev's new age of Camelot at the Kremlin, it will perhaps be easier for naive Americans to rationalize away the distinction between the restrained secrecy that defends them and the stealthy menace that seeks to deceive them." Boyce laid the responsibility for making that menace known on the shoulders of security educators every-

where: "I respectfully suggest that the overwhelming majority of the four million Americans with security clearances are extremely naive in their conceptions of espionage. This is the root of your problem . . . These are people you must seek out and reach with the truth. It is infinitely better for you to make the extra effort to ensure that your personnel understand beyond a shadow of a doubt how espionage wounds a man than for more and more of them to find out for themselves . . . I only wish, Senators, that before more Americans take that irreversible step, they could know what I now know, that they are bringing down upon themselves heartache more heavy than a mountain."

Within months of Boyce's testimony . . . there were 12 Americans on trial for espionage, more at one time than ever before.

Convicted of espionage in 1977, Boyce served three years of his 40 year sentence before escaping from Lumpoc Prison in 1980. He remained at large for eighteen months, practicing his predatory behavior by robbing banks to support himself before he was recaptured. The Falcon is now caged in an isolation cell in Marion, Illinois. With his sentence increased to 68 years, he has ample time to ponder the wages of espionage beneath a mountain of despair. ★

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Yesterday's Solution to Today's Language Crisis

by CWO 3 Garry L. Smith

The virtual acceptance of English as the *lingua franca* of the modern world has been both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it has created a common culture for people from diverse backgrounds; on the other hand, it has been partially responsible for the increasing cultural isolation of the United States from the rest of the planet. The downward trend in foreign language study continues to be a source of acute concern to leaders in the public and private sectors. The effects of linguistic deterioration become evident in foreign relations, international commerce, and national security. The foreign language proficiency problems in the Military Intelligence community are not unique, but they do stand out since there are so many soldiers with intelligence specialties who are supposed to be linguists—and clearly are not.

Many of these soldiers have low language proficiency because there are not enough opportunities to use their languages after they graduate from the Defense Language Institute at the Presidio in Monterey, California. The Army needs more linguists for contingency readiness than can be effectively used in peacetime. Consequently, the responsibility for maintaining and enhancing the language skills of these individuals lies primarily with the intelligence units to which they are assigned. Historically, these units have not achieved suc-

cess; this is evidenced by the average linguist's loss of whatever skills he or she had in direct proportion to the amount of time spent in the unit.

With the recent emphasis on foreign language study, intelligence units are now more aware of the need for language training. Nevertheless, linguists are still a long way from achieving the proficiency needed to conduct successful intelligence operations on the battlefield. The possible consequences of this weakness transcend the inability of units to provide effective language training—disaster could be the result of foreign language incompetence in a conflict. Because of the far-reaching implications, the language problem has assumed the proportions of a major crisis. It is no longer a minor problem easily solved by local unit trainers.

On the surface, instituting workable language programs in tactical intelligence units which could provide more than language sustainment training appears to be a simple matter, but it has been next to impossible. It is difficult to say why, but apparently a military organization's preference for easily quantifiable tasks has taken, and will always take, precedence over largely unquantifiable language skills. Vehicle maintenance is more important than language maintenance. If a commander fails a maintenance inspection, the reaction is mercilessly swift and predictable. If

a soldier cannot speak Russian, scarcely an eyebrow is raised. In essence, the seeds of destruction for unit language programs were sown when language training took on less importance than grass cutting. This is the reason command language programs, as mandated over a decade ago by AR 611-6, The Army Linguist Program, have not worked. It is also the reason why new programs, recently implemented by aggressive and conscientious leadership, probably will not survive the unrelenting erosion caused by the reluctance to alter the status quo.

A recent attempt to require more than token language training in intelligence units occurred in late 1984 when U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) Circular 350-84-11, The FORSCOM Command Language Program, was published. The circular directed the establishment of arrival training programs in FORSCOM intelligence units to raise the language proficiency of incoming linguists who did not meet the proficiency standards required for their military occupational specialties (MOSs). These soldiers were to receive language training half of their duty day for six months to raise their proficiency levels to meet FORSCOM standards. In addition, the circular directed that once soldiers reached the mandated levels, or if they were already there, they were to be enrolled

in unit training programs that would maintain and enhance their foreign language skills.

It was obvious that a lot of thought and effort went into developing a comprehensive plan of action to bridge the chasm between the level of linguistic readiness and the proficiency required to perform individual and collective combat intelligence tasks on the battlefield. However, the immediate and sustained reaction from commanders and intelligence officers in the field was that programs could not be implemented without cutting into the support required by their major commands. The following response from an MI battalion commander was typical of the reaction from the intelligence leadership throughout FORSCOM: "Unit implementation of the programs would involve six months of arrival training for all linguists during which they would be unavailable for task force support, field duty, or deployment. Given the shortage of linguists, the program would necessitate a choice between language training or support to brigade and battalion task force operations."

The most recent development in the battle to solve the foreign language problem occurred in August 1985, when the G2/Intelligence Commanders Conference convened at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. A wide range of topics was discussed, and language training was, predictably, at the top of the agenda. During the discussion, it became clear that the participants believed that they were being held responsible for something the Defense Language Institute could not do—produce linguists who met the FORSCOM standard. They stated that implementation of FORSCOM Circular 350-84-11 would severely curtail their ability to react to taskings, since their linguists would essentially be full-time students.

At present, the major tenets of FORSCOM Circular 350-84-11 seem to be unofficially on hold as a result of inaction or delay. If these units find it impossible to change the way they train, in order to accommodate foreign language instruction which leads to language proficiency, and if it is deemed critical to raise the profi-

ciency of linguists, then what steps can be taken to solve this vexing problem?

A convincing argument can be made that, after over a decade of trying various fixes with minimal results, foreign language proficiency in tactical units is as good as it is ever going to be. Assuming this premise is valid, and since the foreign language problem cannot, or will not, ever be solved in tactical intelligence units, then a solution must be sought from the outside. If this is the case, any realistic solution must incorporate an arrangement whereby tactical units no longer have linguists organic to their organizations, but task them to their units as needed.

There are problems with this as well. Linguists, or, more appropriately, intelligence specialists who are language qualified, are soldiers who have to also be proficient in other skills, some of which can only be learned in a unit. They operate unit equipment, perform collective tasks as teams, and learn to participate effectively in unit cohesiveness exercises. If their only requirement were to speak foreign languages, then assignment at strategic echelons would be an easy solution. But this is not the case.

On the other hand, if most of the foreign language requirements of intelligence specialists were removed, interpreters tasked from strategic echelons could be relied upon to accomplish individual tasks that require a foreign language. Of the dozens of individual tasks that make up the intelligence MOSs that routinely require knowledge of a foreign language, only a handful require a foreign language for performance to standard. These tasks could be performed easily with the assistance of qualified interpreters.

Of course, a large number of interpreters would be needed to support the large-scale deployment of regiments, separate brigades, and divisions. One way to accommodate the increased requirement for interpreters might be to continue training soldiers at the Defense Language Institute for shorter periods. At the end of the basic language courses, the top ten percent, after showing exceptional talent for language ac-

quisition, could be selected for extended intermediate and advanced language training. Upon reaching the prescribed proficiency levels, they would be assigned to existing units at corps, or echelons above corps, as interpreters in an "on-call" status for deployment to tactical intelligence units. Soldiers who were not selected to be interpreters would be trained as interrogators, voice intercept specialists, COMINT traffic analysts, or counterintelligence agents, and assigned to tactical units by broad language constituency. These intelligence specialists would be considered linguists; they would be designated as "language-trained," as opposed to "language-qualified." Their limited language duties would consist of basic vocabulary and sentence recognition; to some extent, they would serve as a check on the accuracy of interpreters by spotting blatant errors and omissions.

Approximately ten years ago, there were two straight linguist MOSs: interpreter-translator and expert linguist. Soldiers with these MOSs were routinely assigned to tactical intelligence units to augment the language skills of intelligence specialists. As part of a personnel-streamlining measure, these MOSs were deleted and most of the soldiers who filled them were reassigned as interrogators or voice intercept specialists. If the system of using interpreters discussed here is ever adopted, a similar version of these two MOSs would need to be brought back into service.

In order to perform their duties, interpreters would need to achieve a "minimum professional" level of proficiency, as measured by the Defense Language Proficiency Test. To qualify as expert linguists, interpreters would have to be certified at the "full professional" level, as measured by oral examinations administered by Defense Language Institute testers.

There is legitimate concern that interpreters and expert linguists at strategic units would still be subjected to the distractions that plague language programs in tactical units—grass still has to be cut at corps and echelons above corps. However, the main obstacle to reaching the upper levels of proficiency would have

already been overcome: interpreters will be proficient when they arrive at their strategic units. Once proficient, language maintenance is not difficult, and it certainly would not require the involved programs envisioned by FORSCOM for tactical intelligence units.

There are distinct advantages to having interpreters form the backbone of a strategic language pool. First, tactical intelligence units would have access to qualified linguists, something they cannot be sure of now. Second, attrition rates at the Defense Language Institute would not result in the waste of time and effort that presently occurs; most of the students who do poorly could be trained in an intelligence specialty, even one that currently requires a foreign language. Third, the basic courses at the Defense Language Institute could be shortened, possibly in half. The resulting savings would be tremendous. The basic language courses would provide initial familiarization training for potential intelligence specialists and help to identify students who could be considered for advanced language training and eventual assignment as interpreters. Fourth, fewer linguists would be needed because of the pooling effect; linguists would be deployed to tactical units at points of language activity, unlike the present situation where large contingents of linguists are in intelligence units whether or not their language skills are used. The current policy would not work well in wartime since it takes 18 months after potential linguists enter the Army to complete the required language and technical training before being assigned to a unit. A war would be over by the time units received their linguist replacements. And fifth, and most importantly, a potentially dangerous situation called "cross-leveling" would be diffused. This situation has serious implications that bear closer examination.

FORSCOM normally assigns only one foreign language to each tactical intelligence unit, so the unit to which a language-qualified intelligence specialist is assigned may not be the unit with which he or she goes to war. If these units were deployed, they would

have to move their language-qualified personnel back and forth to obtain correct language mixes for combat. The official euphemism used to describe this juggling act is "cross-leveling." Another consideration is that the equipment in intelligence units may be different; a linguist, cross-leveled from an airborne division into a mechanized infantry division, would probably need additional training to operate the assigned equipment. Needless to say, the time for soldiers to train together and learn about unit equipment is not when combat is imminent.

Interpreters with the correct language mixes would solve, in one swift stroke, the serious problem of switching linguists between units during combat. By depending upon strategic interpreters, a unit could go to war with all of the interpreters, voice intercept specialists, COMINT traffic analysts, and counterintelligence agents originally assigned to it.

Reserve intelligence units would also benefit from adopting a system for using interpreters since they have more problems with language proficiency than active units. But ironically, the reserves have the best linguists, as well as the worst. An informal sampling of a typical unit would probably reveal reservists holding language-dependent MOSs who are totally fluent and, at the other extreme, some who are not proficient in any language except English. The most proficient reserve linguists need to be identified by award of the interpreter-translator or expert linguist MOS. It is time to determine the true state of the reserve foreign-language pool.

In fact, the language requirement for reserve intelligence specialists should be removed. Quite frankly, reserve units are wasting valuable training time with basic foreign language study that could be better utilized. As it is, they have 38 days a year to train; this is not enough to do all of the required training. It is a mistake to have an entire unit studying Czech, or whatever, when few members would ever be capable of interrogating or translating voice intercepts in a foreign language. It would be better to recruit individuals who are already

language qualified to be interpreters, or to bring reservists on extended active duty for comprehensive language training before returning them to a strategic reserve language pool as interpreters.

The utilization of interpreters suggested here is not a panacea for the foreign language ills that afflict the active and reserve Military Intelligence community. Working through an interpreter can be cumbersome, and there is the possibility that a muddled communications effect will occur when messages are passed through an extra person. But the advantages of having qualified linguists perform as interpreters is infinitely superior to the present hit-and-miss system. Besides, this may be the only option left that will solve the foreign language problem.

In any event, a solution is long overdue. We have learned through extensive, expensive trial and error what will and will not work, and most importantly, what is acceptable to major commanders and intelligence officers in the field; without their support, nothing will work. It is time to get this issue solved and put it behind us. Our goal should be to create the finest corps of professional linguists in the world. We have already spent enough money to accomplish this. The foreign language problem in the U.S. Army is a management problem. We need to manage in a smarter way—not harder, emphasize quality—not quantity and, above all, recognize that foreign language learning is basically an art—not a science. Not everyone is an artist. ★

CWO 3 Garry L. Smith has 15 years experience as an interrogator. He holds a B. A. degree in History from Hardin Simmons University and an M.S. in Public Administration from the University of Oklahoma. Smith has studied Spanish, Vietnamese, and other languages. He has served overseas tours in Panama and Vietnam. Smith is currently the officer in charge of the Prisoner of War Interrogation Section, 311th MI Battalion, Fort Campbell, Ky.

Outlining a Vision of How to Lead

by Lt. Col. Robert J. Covalucci

Lt. Col. Robert J. Covalucci is currently the deputy assistant commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. What follows is the text of a speech he prepared while a student at the U.S. Army War College. As Lt. Col. Covalucci shares his reflections on his 22 years of military service, so, too, should we, as leaders in the U.S. Army, take some time to reflect upon our own "guiding principles," particularly during this, the Year of Army Values.

Ed.

Although I am going to give you an overview of my philosophy, I caution you not to be trapped into thinking that I believe that I have found the school solution. There are basic axioms that are above challenge, but much of what I will discuss reflects my personality and that with which my soul is comfortable. You should pick out the axioms and choose the techniques that suit you and your style.

Command, simply stated, is the authority to order others or, better yet, to order with authority. In a military context, command authority has been entrusted to us by the Secretary of Defense and the President. What must be kept clearly in focus is the awesome level of authority entrusted in military commanders. Soldiers should, and do, look toward their commanders for discipline, strength, counsel, courage, and enlightened knowledge. They expect a commander to have the wisdom of Solomon, the strength of Atlas, the knowledge of Aristotle, the courage of Sergeant York, and the loyalty of Nathan Hale.

For many, we, as leaders, become father, mother, career counselor, financial manager, judge and jury, idol, and a means to a better and more rewarding life for themselves and their families. If you do not feel that you are

up to this task, you should get out now! Your commitment must be 100 percent, and your effort must even exceed 100 percent in some cases. Now, I recognize that none of us is born without blemish. Added to that, we acquire bad habits and weaknesses as we go through life; but none of that can change the kind of commitment that we must be willing to make. The execution of command must be tempered with sensitivity, an open mind, and warm, genuine concern for our fellow human being, be he private or general. A commander who does not strive to acquire all the necessary available facts prior to making a decision is like an unguided missile. Although he may have direction and force, he may not strike the intended target. Only you can determine when you have developed the *necessary* facts required to make your decision. Remember, although men may die because of your decision, many more may perish without it.

While command is inherited by virtue of position, leadership is truly an art that can be taught and, therefore, learned. The specific style and technique used may be selected from a number of models. The secret is selecting the style that naturally fits in with your individual temperament. When considering your own style and

approach, keep in mind the following "thou shalt's":

- Be a teacher. This is the most important challenge that I can issue to you: take the time and effort to teach your subordinates. A well trained and informed officer is a jewel in any commander's crown. We must impart to our young leaders the skills and knowledge that we have acquired through formal education and the school of hard knocks. If you think that you do not have time to do this, look at it from a selfish point of view: If I teach him to do it right today, for all the tomorrows he will do it as well as I can, without my supervision. If you could meet the above objective once a day, think how much easier your job would become.
- Be a technician. Subordinates expect their leader to know their profession cold. It is a matter of life and death to them.
- Critique and praise. Once an order is issued, follow up on it and let your subordinates know what you think of their performance. Chew on him if necessary, but do it as a teaching technique and not to vent your frustration. And for heaven's sake, do it privately. Never humiliate a man in front of his subordinates, even if you are going to fire him.
- Use the chain of command. There is nothing, I say again, nothing more sacred than the chain of command. If you violate it, you will be damned to Dante's inner circles of hell.
- Generate cohesion and team work. Look for that special spark that draws and holds your unit together, whether it be a staff section or a command. It can be a slogan, a sense of purpose, a distinctive PT warm-up suit, outperforming a sister unit, or it may be that you are the best leader in town and your soldiers know it!
- Listen to subordinates. For 22 years, I have listened to people say, "If those folks 'up there' only understood my problems and gave me . . ." Well, those "folks" up there are you and me, and I know that we understand the problems because we have lived through most of them. I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the

admonition issued to the U.S. Army by Gen. Edward C. Meyer in the early 1980s is true today: "You worry about the half of the glass that is full and let me worry about the half that is empty." Most of the solutions to our problems are to be found by looking down—down to the soldiers who are performing the tasks with the currently available resources. Ask a soldier what he thinks. First, is it broken? Second, how would he fix it? After all is said and done, he will have to implement the solution, so listen to his recommendation. We have some very savvy young officers and NCOs out there. Let's take advantage of them.

- Have personal integrity and display it. I do not expect anyone to wear a hair shirt, but I do expect each of you to practice what the Army, the UCMJ, and you preach. Each of us lives in a fish bowl. We are constantly observed from all angles more by subordinates than by supervisors. Everything that we do is evaluated and discussed by members of our unit. If a soldier is given special treatment, everyone will know it within 48 hours. If you play hard ball with drug offenders and malingerers, the word will be out in 24 hours. If you commit an indiscretion, the unit will know about it before chow. This invasion of your privacy is a fact of life. Learn to live with it. I will judge you by these standards as will your subordinates.
- Play hard ball. Soldiers expect to be challenged, and they expect demands to be placed upon them. Demands may be harsh as long as they are not unreasonable. They did not join the Army expecting it to be easy; don't disappoint them. This is a hard and sometimes unrewarding profession. But more than that, it is a profession that requires a dedication and commitment found in few other professions. If you are going to train a man to die for you, give him the reason why, and make him feel fully prepared to meet the challenge of battle. This is your job, and he expects nothing less from you. Ultimately, he knows, and you know, that he may die because of, or for, you. Be worthy of his trust. This is not a slow pitch league. Get tough with yourself!
- Be innovative. Never be content with a solution. Find a better way to

"Soldiers expect to be challenged, and they expect demands to be placed on them."

***"Say what you mean
and, at all costs,
mean what you say."***

do it better. Make your innovations stress the abilities of your subordinates so that they become learning and growing experiences versus more drills.

- Anticipate and be flexible. The leader who takes the initiative has a much greater chance of success on the battlefield than the man who is always reacting. Look out ahead of where you are. A man looking at the toe of his boot can, at best, hope to see his own reflection. Design achievable objectives in your programs. But, always be prepared to modify your activity. Mental flexibility comes from thinking through the problem and selecting alternative courses of action. Learn to expect the unexpected.

- Demonstrate loyalty. Let people know that you can stand the heat, and that you will support them even if they make a mistake. Many a chance for quality improvement has been stifled because the subordinate was not sure if the "boss" would back him up. Make sure your folks know where you stand and then take advantage of the opportunities to demonstrate your support.

- Develop feedback mechanisms. If you don't know what subordinates think about your performance or programs, you are groping in the dark. Formulate techniques that are fun for you and allow you to get next to your people. It might be the afternoon racquetball game, frequent trips to unit dining facilities, luncheons with leaders, or a post radio program called "Ask the Commander." Decide what you can handle and pursue it vigorously.

- Determine your goals and objectives. First, determine where you are. Do not get trapped by false indicators. Take time to be sure you know your true situation. Take six months, if necessary. But, don't drag your feet; people are looking for direction. Second, be sure your goals overcome the problems. Make your goals realistic. If supply distribution is a problem, firing the deputy chief of staff for logistics may not be the solution. If readiness is a problem, perhaps unit commanders are not being given sufficient flexibility to design tailored unit training programs. The solution

may not be to redesign the 2715 report. Finally, design a plan to meet your goals. Build in sufficient flexibility to accept change and modification but specific direction to focus everyone on your ultimate target(s).

Now let me discuss management for a few moments. I shall call it "Management of Change." In our profession, the greatest challenge we shall face for the indefinite future involves the ability to match our adversary in a world of technological explosions. The quantum improvements which are made within a decade require a virtual redesign of our armed forces on a continuing basis. We are on the threshold of developing weapons systems targeted from space, particle beam weapons, anti-gravity propulsion vehicles, teleported logistic systems, fire and target artillery rounds that seek targets, and the like. Our environment requires constant modification and redesign. Being able to manage the changes as we continually modernize our force will be the major challenge for the foreseeable future. Rather than give you a lecture on management theory, I will simply make the following brief points:

- Recognize the impact change has upon people. We are all creatures of habit. We are most comfortable with known quantities and have an inherent fear of the unknown. Do not dramatize the modernization process. It must be looked upon as a natural phenomenon. Only by getting people into the proper mind set can you dampen the impact of change.

- Do not make change only to accommodate technological advancements. Because it is more shiny does not mean it is necessarily better. If it "ain't broke," don't fix it.

- Let subordinates participate in the decisionmaking process. Everyone wants to be a member of the team. Let them be!!! The more a man participates in the decisionmaking process, the more willing he is to support the decision.

- Eliminate gold watches. Many folks have a pet project or idea. Look for them and redirect their efforts toward more productive activities.

- Give clear and measurable objec-

tives to subordinates. Let folks know what is expected of them and periodically discuss with them their programs and performance. Be a mentor!

- Delegate authority. The unit leader down to platoon level will be fighting more and more on his own. We must train him now to live in an environment where he is given a mission and the resources and then directed to execute that mission without interference. Try it! If we do not learn to decentralize to the lowest possible level, we will be soundly defeated in the next battle.
- Explain your decision. Everyone wants to know why. Time permitting, let people know the factors involved and why you selected your course of action. You will be teaching them and establishing your own credibility.
- Say what you mean and, at all costs, mean what you say. Do not give the wrong signal to your people. If you say you cannot exceed end strength by more than plus or minus one percent, then don't.
- Be human and supportive. Give credit where it is due. Make it a public matter, if appropriate. Enhance the self image of your subordinates.
- Use statistics prudently. Statistics should be used as indicators only after an appropriate sample has been established. Do not let people compete to get better "stats" than the next guy. This type of competition seldom serves the best interest of the command.

I have painted a good deal of landscape for you today. Although I recognize that the picture is incomplete, it should provide a common basis to which each one of you can add his own detail. Once you have done that, the picture should help to direct you and your subordinates. I will issue one admonition before I conclude. Do not ever tell a subordinate that he must do something "because the boss said to do it this way." I detect in today's Army an increasing tendency to push the weight of the decision up an echelon whenever the task is difficult or unpopular. Be your own man. If you leave my office with a task, you

have either agreed with me or given your objections and presented counterproposals to my solution. In either case, my solution becomes ours when you walk out the door. Execute it with the same vigor you would if it were your own idea. Loyalty is contagious. If you display genuine loyalty to your superiors, you are teaching your subordinates what you expect from them and perhaps, more importantly, what they can expect from you. Loyalty is a sacred trust of men in arms.

Having given you some of my philosophy, I will leave you with this challenge: Perform each task given you with full recognition that the lives of American men and women are on the line. Each task must be accomplished to perfection. Remember, "Practice does not make perfect!" "Perfect practice makes perfect." ★

Lt. Col. Robert J. Covalucci previously served as the director of training and doctrine at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He began his Army career in the Infantry serving in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Vietnam. His intelligence assignments include: senior intelligence advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone, Vietnam; commander, Los Angeles Field Office; Joint Personnel Recovery Center, MACSOG/J2 MACV, Vietnam; deputy G2, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; commander, 502 Combat Intelligence Company, and executive officer, 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas; force structure/concept and doctrine staff officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and commander, 533d Military Intelligence Battalion, 3d Armored Division. Covalucci is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

"The leader who takes the initiative has a much greater chance of success on the battlefield than the man who is always reacting."

Editor's Perspective

Mentoring and Training Are Not Synonymous

by Capt. Stephen P. Aubin

*But, as the world, harmoniously
confused:
Where order in variety we see,
And where, though all things differ,
all agree.*

Alexander Pope
18th Century English Poet

When Army Chief of Staff Gen. John A. Wickham Jr. first outlined his views on mentoring, he presented a clear, well-thought-out description of just what a mentor is supposed to be. The mentor is both a teacher and coach. And yet, he or she must be much more. A mentor has to care and take a sincere interest in the soldiers who, through the development of a special relationship, become his or her proteges.

Each time Gen. Wickham addresses the topic of mentoring, he does so in the context of leadership. In this writer's view, he does this first to stress the fact that mentoring is a function of good leadership and, secondly, to increase the awareness throughout the Army about the phenomenon itself.

The chief of staff, while quite perceptive in his description of mentoring, would readily admit that he did not invent the phenomenon; rather, he drew attention to something which has existed in the military, as well as in the private sector, from time immemorial. In academia, the idea of a mentor conjures up visions of the more seasoned professor guiding and nurturing the eager protege in whom a certain talent or aptitude is recognized. In the corporate world, too, instances of a senior manager taking a young, first-line manager under his wing are neither unheard of, nor unusual. Somehow, though, the same familiarity with the phenomenon is not so commonplace within the military. It could be that the perception of a rigid rank structure obscures it, or that the informal structure within the military is less visible. On the other

hand, maybe the mentor approach has been in front of us all along.

The important point, when discussing the mentor concept, is that "mentoring" is a subset of good leadership, nothing more, nothing less. It is not to be confused with patronage, favoritism, or cronyism. The true mentor relationship is centered around a professional, mutually-initiated friendship between the more experienced soldier and the less experienced, be it battalion commander and junior officer, senior NCO and junior NCO, senior NCO and junior officer, or junior NCO and new recruit. It cuts across many lines, and the possibilities are only limited by the distribution of experience and the time and chemistry required to form the bond that develops.

This may all seem relatively straightforward; however, any time the most senior Army general presents a view, along with his personal endorsement, people react. Then, almost inevitably, what he "said" and "meant" are interpreted and, almost always, confused as well-intentioned subordinates try to put the "guidance" into practice. And so it is with mentoring. Suddenly, anything which embraced some of the principles of mentoring got called "mentoring."

It may have all started when those who began to discover that the phenomenon of the mentor actually existed eagerly searched for paradigms which could be used to promote the chief of staff's "new" guiding philosophy of leadership. It seems as if the initial quest for an enlightened approach to mentoring became fixed on what those in the Army know best: the formal structures. Though well-intentioned, they were looking in the wrong place. As Gen. Wickham himself noted, "The Army has no formal program or checklist for mentoring." And it shouldn't.

Some of the early attempts at developing mentoring programs originated

after the completion of the Army's Professional Development Officer Study, or PDOS, a study which was prompted when the Army decided that it must reexamine its whole approach to officer professional development. One conclusion of PDOS was that the Army needed to move its leadership development "system," both in the schoolhouse and in the field, toward a "mentorship" approach.

But as those who explored the concept of mentoring within the confines of the schoolhouse soon learned, a mentor cannot be "issued" to a prospective protege. Nor can the bonding which occurs as the relationship develops be quantified. It just happens. What is most important is not the scientific explanation behind the mentoring phenomenon, but an awareness that such a phenomenon exists. By recognizing it, a good leader can take advantage of opportunities to become a mentor as they present themselves; in doing so, a leader can help cultivate tomorrow's leaders by instilling in them the desire to help guide their subordinates.

Mentoring cannot be infused into the formal structures by creating a new and more clever training strategy. Rather, it will, and should, remain an informal element of successful leadership. Those who hastily tried to apply mentoring as a training tool were much too preoccupied with the Army's formal structures. On the other hand, those who discovered certain principles, or elements, of mentoring which could be applied to training came much closer to hitting the mark. For several years now, the Army has begun to recognize the benefits of the senior/subordinate interplay, such as that which has been successfully applied to training in the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³).

However, the lieutenant colonel assigned to lead a small group of cap-

tains was never envisioned to become a mentor to each of the captains he helped guide through the seminar-oriented training. If a mentor relationship did develop, it was purely by accident: certain conditions, personal chemistry, and the time needed to get to know one another, all combined in a unique way, leading eventually to the professional friendship at the base of the mentor relationship.

Such relationships have always existed in the military. Nevertheless, as those eager to pin down all the elements of the mentor concept meandered through the Army's formal structures, they happened upon this highly-successful, less-formal, small-group approach to training, like the training incorporated in CAS³. What some failed to realize, though, was that "training" does not equal "mentoring."

For two centuries, Americans have shown a great aptitude for pulling through in spite of mass confusion. Somehow, that rare combination of creativity, determination, and naive idealism, has produced unexpected, and often unbelievable, success. Reconstruction after the Civil War is but one example.

And so, out of the misdirected search for the mentor, a renewed focus on the small group approach to training has resulted. And while the potential exists within this type of training for building the kind of foundation which could be cemented into a mentor/protege relationship later on, the thrust of small-group instruction is altogether distinct from the concept of mentoring. The small-group approach traces its roots to the Socratic method of instruction, and its goal is to teach the student to think, not just to regurgitate facts. By producing young officers who have learned the thinking skills, the Army receives a great return on its investment: creative officers equipped to start thinking for themselves, the kind of officers the Army needs if it is to be victorious in the AirLand Battle.

This small-group seminar approach may have been the inspiration for an experiment in training advanced course officers at the Engineer school. The experiment involves forming small groups composed of 12 students. A team leader from the faculty is then assigned to the group for the duration of the advanced course. The

team leader is usually a senior captain possessing more tactical and technical experience than the junior captains attending the course. Instruction proceeds from the larger group, which receives the basic conceptual foundation in the subject being taught, to the small group, which actually must apply the material. The small group is guided by the team leader, who functions as a facilitator and coach, but much of the learning takes place through the exchange of shared experiences by the students themselves. Through the small group approach, students are forced to think for themselves; the focus is on teaching "process" as opposed to simply learning facts.

The team leader program has been a phenomenal success thus far. What started as an experiment has become a model for other U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) pilot schools. At the Engineer school, officers are getting in line to become team leaders, and the officers who have been team leaders are being sought after by field units. Apparently, the small-group approach has reinvigorated the advanced course with a new dynamism impossible to achieve using the standard lecture format. Moreover, this new approach, because it teaches officers to think, promises to have a greater effect on the Army's future leaders than anything previously envisioned.

While the team leader approach could revolutionize instruction at the service schools, care must be taken to properly define this new training approach. As stated earlier, this new creative training approach should not be confused with the concept of mentoring. Mentoring currently exists, and should continue to exist, as an informal phenomenon within the formal structures of the Army. New, innovative approaches to training using informal means of instruction have found their way into the formal structures of the Army; and, some of these approaches certainly contain some of the principles underlying the mentoring concept. The coaching aspects of mentoring come to mind immediately.

On the other hand, there are more differences than similarities between mentoring and training. Take the wider gap in experience found in the mentor/protege relationship, not

found in the seminar-oriented approach to training. There is also the question of chemistry, of the "professional friendship" which develops based on a *mutual* desire between mentor and protege. In spite of the informality in the new training approach, the dynamics are not the same as those involved in a true mentor/protege relationship. And while the instruction is informal, it is still an integral part of the formal training structure within the Army.

Finally, there is an even greater difference between the two: there is the thorny issue of resources. Mentoring costs nothing more than an awareness and willingness to develop good leadership skills; it is, above all, a time investment. Small group instruction, on the other hand, requires increased resources in an area already critically short of qualified instructors. Here lies the crux of the problem. And until the resource question is solved, confusion over what this "new" small group training encompasses, and whether "mentoring" is related to it, will continue.

TRADOC is currently evaluating the team leader training approach at pilot schools. Proponents of the new approach contend that the resources issue can be overcome by taking advantage of the experience which the students themselves bring to the advanced course. But even if the team leader approach does prove to be more costly, maybe the Army's leaders should ask themselves whether the Army can afford not to adopt such a program, given the current complexities and the demands expected to be placed upon junior leaders fighting the AirLand Battle. They will have to be able to think for themselves and react quickly, and creatively, to situations as they arise on the battlefield.

Although creativity is seldom valued, or put to the ultimate test, in peacetime, wars cannot be won without it. Perhaps it is feared and suppressed in peacetime because it often flaunts the "prescribed" method of doing things. In order to begin the small group experiment at the Engineer school, one courageous general, spurred on by a creative subordinate who possessed vision, deviated from the school model 83 system. He took a risk; the results speak for

(Continued on page 48)

Pro Oppressis Antiquis*

Essay 4

by 2nd Lt. Eric H. May

Ever since West Point gave up the ghost and changed its curriculum from Classics to Engineering, the great men of military history have been rolling in their graves. Somehow, the belief has emerged that the Classics are largely irrelevant to the modern military scene, that the ancient military writers have little to teach us in this modern age—our forbears thought otherwise.

It goes without saying that a rank amateur like George Washington, like all gentlemen of his time, learned Latin composition before he learned English; another soft hand, Robert E. Lee, also had the disadvantage of reading too much Caesar and Livy at too young an age. Amazingly, these men transcended the emasculating influences of the classic military writers and muddled through to some noteworthy battles. For my own part, it takes a rough-and-tumble modern like "Blood-n-Guts" Patton to show me the worthlessness of the Classics. He read no Latin, no Greek; on the other hand, he was an avid student of that ancient period of military glory—so much so that he envisioned himself as having lived in an earlier incarnation, as a pagan warrior. Patton's operations from the tip of Africa, through Sicily, and into Italy, encompass things which remind a soft-headed classicist like me of maneuvers which took place during the First, Second, and Third Punic Wars.

The truly "modern" military thinkers will be the first to tell you that the Classics are merely a branch of that fuzzy-headed body of Letters—the Humanities—which appeals to the herbivores among us. In short, according to this crowd, the Classics are not the red meat of warriors, and do not benefit the commander. Strange to say, but if I had to recommend an ally for those of this view, I should unhesitatingly take Cato, an ancient Roman potentate. Eying what he saw as the effeminacy of Greek Letters, he constantly opposed the widening of the Greek influence in the commonwealth: these Letters, he said, would sap the vitality of the Roman spirit.

On the other hand, should a modern military man resort to Cato in order to discredit the classicist, he would be appealing to the very classical tradition he otherwise reviles. Every time the anti-classicist voices an argument against the Humanities, he owes a footnote to Cato; he also owes it to himself—here the paradox—to pick up those musty works which he deprecates in order to better understand his own point. All of this, of course, adds to the notion that the Classics are a vital source for the thinking officer.

I do not propose, however, to say here and now that an in-depth familiarity with the wide range of classical military writers is a must for the effective officer—far be it for me to suggest that we can replace Clausewitz with Catullus, or Sherman with Sophocles. What I do propose to do is to put forth a defense of a handful of authors whom most of us have heard of, but not

read. To ignore them is akin to a modern-day tragedy, and a disservice to our profession, for they were the first documented masters of that profession, and may never be surpassed.

Modern military thinkers can gain the greatest insight by reading the ancient historians. And the historian who should be selected first is Caesar. Consider that Caesar wrote two *magna opera* in his life, each of them about one of the two great wars of his career. The first of them, *De Bello Gallico*, concerns his long-term efforts to subdue the warlike peoples of present-day France; the second, *De Bello Civili*, concerns the civil war between him and Pompey the Great in the twilight of the republic. For one man to have successfully waged two great wars in his lifetime—one foreign, one domestic—is in itself a recommendation of how worthwhile that man, as an author, could be; and, when the magnitude of his two wars is considered, then the temptation should be overpowering to see just what this man was about. Caesar's two conquests, of Gaul and of Rome, endured for better than five centuries after his death. They were epoch-making conflicts of international stature; yet, these wars were more personally directed than can ever be the case again. To Caesar the commander, the tasks of the most lowly private were altogether familiar; he had the ability to comprehend every technical detail of the operations he was conducting. Besides this, he was his own liaison to Rome. By a steady stream of agents and letters to and from the city, he was able to keep in touch with the vital pulse of Roman politics, politics which could literally cost a man his life.

Some may argue that Caesar, because of his distance in time, is no longer pertinent to the modern military condition. I disagree. Caesar is indeed distant from our present condition, but distant in such a way as to make him all the more worthy of close attention. For Caesar, the area of influence was discernible by the naked eye, and the area of interest was comprehensible through the reports of his select political agents. All this goes to say that he had a unique advantage: total perspective, an advantage which the range of our modern operations has caused us to lose. Given the depth of his perspective, Caesar is in the position to provide us the model of what is, after all, the purest representation of the officer—the total leader. Not so the modern American officer. Take World War II as an example: there was General George C. Marshall (Caesar the diplomat) taming the lions in the political arena; there was General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Caesar the strategic commander) drawing the long-range plans for the conduct of the European war; then there was General George S. Patton (Caesar the field commander), actually moving combat forces he could see. Caesar clearly presents a put-up or shut-up issue before the U.S. Army: How can we preach a doctrine of the total leader if we do not

* In Defense of the Oppressed Ancients

look closely at the reality of the total leader?

Aside from Caesar, the *magnus victor*, there are other ancient military writers who were archetypal leaders. Take one of my favorites, Xenophon. Xenophon, a young philosopher in post-Peloponnesian War Athens, was persuaded that it would be worthwhile to go on an expedition with a mercenary army. The army, as it turned out, was working for the overthrow of the Persian Great King, and the expedition was one of those disasters which give the great leader the chance to assert his genius. Xenophon was such a leader. About a tenth of his great military classic, *The Anabasis*, is devoted to the Greek offensive; the remaining nine-tenths concern the hard-fought retreat of his ten thousand soldiers through over a thousand miles of modern day Iranian and Iraqi wastelands, with the might of the Persian Empire aimed at their destruction. As in the case of Caesar, Xenophon is also a leader undertaking a major expedition; but Xenophon has a characteristic which makes him even more interesting than Caesar. Xenophon is a relatively inexperienced officer, an overnight prodigy who began his campaign as the Greek equivalent of a cadet, then came to be one of its commanders. The modern lieutenant seeking inspiration, as he suffers beneath the weight of his new-found responsibilities and headaches, need look no farther than Xenophon to find his professional paradigm.

While these two brief descriptions of two brilliant ancients may kindle some interest in their works, it is certainly not my wish that anyone take a few scant paragraphs about them as an adequate analysis. I leave it to each student of the classical writers to discover how much, and to what depth, the Classics will entice him. As each of us examines the ancient writers, we should each be struck by the way the ancients consider issues which we are inclined to think are uniquely our own. In the *History* of Herodotus, there is the image of a totalitarian Easterner (the Great King of Persia) who is unable to believe that a much smaller band of free men (the Spartans) can withstand his superiority of mass. Thucydides, in his *Peloponnesian War*, gives an enduring definition of *Realpolitik* through this line of dialogue: "You know as well as we do that right . . . is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak do what they must." And, finally, Plutarch, in his *Life of Alexander*, presents a compelling study of the authoritarian personality. When Parmenio, Alexander's advisor, said that he would certainly accept a favorable and bloodless peace, were he Alexander, Alexander replied, "so would I, were I Parmenio."

There are, no doubt, those who will say that my theme is a step back toward general studies, toward the "soft-skills" school of thought. Since the criticism of the "soft skills," and the corresponding elevation of the "hard skills," is such a tenacious fixture in the current wisdom, I think it judicious to bring my essay into final focus side by side with it.

Only a fool would deny that every soldier on the modern battlefield had better have technical know-how beyond that of two thousand years ago. Colonel Colt and Thomas Edison have brought the imple-

ments of our art to a level of lethality which makes the phalanx look more like a parade-ground antic than the military marvel it once was. But what has not changed over these two millennia is that, behind the mechanics and maneuvers of battle, there is still *the leader*. I am not, however, edging my argument over to the combat arms side of the Army house and leaving intelligence and other support branches out in the dark. *All* the branches have their leaders. And these leaders are those whose powers of overall understanding are more important than their technical adroitness. In short, the leader becomes all the more a leader as he moves from mechanics to men; and it is with men, not mechanics, that the ancient writers are always concerned.

Each officer, then, must be first and foremost a generalist. Technical know-how should be recognized as a thing of secondary importance; it is a means of enhancing the leader's vision, since it cannot supply that vision. It will not hurt matters to take a moment and ponder the etymology of the word we use to describe our highest-ranking officers. We call them *general* officers. As a matter of tradition, we have made the paramount quality of the officer the title of the paramount rank among officers.

The hard-skills-first school of thought must face the fact that hard skills, grounded as they are in the sciences, are preeminently concerned with identifying and evaluating data, not with judging and acting. The moment the leader decides to lead, one way or the other, he has taken a sort of impulsive leap; he has ceased to be a scientist, an evaluator, and become an artist, an inspired creator.

Since the total officer, the total leader, is this creator, let him study the purest examples of military creativity. While it may be argued that the perfect, creative, leader is a myth, that is not really in question. What is in question is whether or not the myth of such a leader is one which gives each professional of our art a star to follow. If, as I believe, the answer to this question is yes, then the classical emphasis is still the right emphasis.

One of the most interesting qualities of the military system is its ability to supply, with command and staff experience, what is omitted by inadequate training. I have never yet served under a commander who mistook technical data or "leadership modes" for the stuff of true leadership—not yet. But every time I hear the ancients roughly dismissed as *excrementum tauri* (a bit of Latin which I will not translate), I pause to shudder. If, being too faddish and current, we ignore the ancients, we may give a new twist to an old custom: we may stride forth blindly, trip, and fall on our own swords. ★

2nd Lt. Eric H. May studied the Classics and received his B.A. in that field from the University of Houston in 1985. He is currently serving as a ground surveillance radar platoon leader with the Training Support Company (CEWI) at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. May enlisted in the Army in 1977 and has served tours with the U.S. Army Reserve and the U.S. Army National Guard.

Writer's Award Nominee

In accordance with the guidelines for the *Military Intelligence* annual Writer's Award Program, published in the January-March 1986 issue, the magazine's editorial staff is pleased to announce that Capt. Ralph Peters' article, "Unmatched Spurs: A False Step in Soviet Doctrine?" will be the nominee for the first quarter. Nominees will be announced each quarter; the fourth quarter's nominee, and the at-large nominee, will be announced along with the winner in the January-March 1987 issue.

FEEDBACK

(Continued from page 7)

Putting PSYOP in its Place

the capability it needs to prepare for future conflict.

Col. John S. Perry

Director, Special Project Division,
2d PSYOP Group
Cleveland, Ohio

Dear Editor:

This is in response to Capt. McEwen's article, (*Military Intelligence*, October-December 1985) which argues that Psychological Operations (PSYOP) should be placed under the aegis of Military Intelligence.

As the G3 PSYOP plans officer for the 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM), I have an inescapable institutional bias on this subject. I also have fourteen years experience as an intelligence officer, two years service with an active component PSYOP battalion, and am not Special Forces trained. Capt. McEwen, incidentally, was one of my instructors when I attended the PSYOP Officers' Course, and was absolutely the best instructor in the PSYOP Department.

While I share many of Capt. McEwen's concerns and frustrations with the existing structure, and tend to agree with some of his suggestions, I feel the problem is far broader than he has described. Wholesale transfer of PSYOP to MI will, by and large, not improve the situation.

The active component PSYOP force consists of the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, N.C., with fewer than 1,000 sol-

diers. While it is generally recognized that this force is not adequate to meet the current needs of the Army, it is not going to change to any meaningful degree in the foreseeable future. This force must prepare for and conduct operations in four broad categories: independent peacetime operations, crisis and contingency operations, low intensity conflict, and large scale conventional war. For a variety of reasons, SOCOM is the most effective peacetime headquarters for this force.

It is true that the PSYOP force in a crisis or contingency operation may be supporting conventional combat forces rather than special operations forces (SOF). However, our inability to define the combat force in advance also prevents us from identifying one "best" location for the PSYOP force. Rather, it seems to me most effective to ensure

that the active component PSYOP force is placed where it can train for any deployment, and be available when needed. In fact, elements of the 4th PSYOP Group were deployed to Grenada, where they performed with distinction.

SOCOM is even a good headquarters for the mission of preparing for conventional war. Here the critical function performed by the active component PSYOP force is to support Reserve Component preparedness and planning, since virtually all PSYOP support to combat units in any large-scale conflict will come from the Reserve Component PSYOP force. SOCOM already has the requirement to perform similar functions for the large Reserve Component Special Forces community, and thus is already staffed to support this role.

It might indeed be effective to place PSYOP forces supporting the division or corps under the CEWI battalion or group. This could simplify command and control relationships and might improve logistic support. In this sense, the PSYOP force should be similar to EW assets, which belong to the CEWI unit but are tasked by the G3. It does not deal, however, with the critical problem—the fact that the forces are not there in peacetime. As I said, these forces are, almost without exception, in the Reserve. Doctrinal placement of a Reserve PSYOP company under the division CEWI battalion is unlikely to improve the understanding of any member of the division staff about how to use that force effectively. Only putting

Military Intelligence Receives Award

On June 3, 1986, *Military Intelligence* magazine was awarded a certificate from the National Association of Government Communicators for being selected as an "Honorable Mention" winner in the 24th Annual Blue Pencil Competition. The competition was open to communicators who work for federal, state, county, and other government organizations. *Military Intelligence* competed in the category covering periodicals issued at least quarterly for a technical or professional audience (two or more colors).

The award reflects great credit upon the entire Military Intelligence community. The magazine staff would not be able to produce a high-quality publication without the excellent support of the entire intelligence community—military, civilian, and others who are simply interested in the field. The staff sends its congratulations to the intelligence community: Your contributions and feedback make the difference. With your help, we will be able to continually improve our branch professional journal.

the force where the commander and his staff can exercise it on a routine basis will do that. In short, I have no particular objection to such a move, but see little real benefit from it either.

On the other hand, I have serious doubts about placing staff proponentry under the G2. Every unified command has at least one PSYOP planner in the J3. The inadequacy of this staffing is generally recognized. More important, though, is the fact that this officer has typically been in the special operations element of the J3, and thus is, to some degree, isolated from the conventional planners. This is already being remedied. The PSYOP element of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been moved from the Joint Special Operations Agency to the J3, where it is a separate division. Similar moves are being planned at unified commands, although adequate staffing is likely to remain a problem. At this level, there has been very little difficulty in attracting the attention of the commander-in-chief and the J3, regardless of the placement of the planner. Generally, the Army components face a similar situation, although at least one Army component still has PSYOP under the G5, Army doctrine notwithstanding.

At the corps and division level, the problem is again staffing. There is no strong advocate for PSYOP in the operations and plans arena because there is no PSYOP officer present. My experience in a variety of exercises indicates that the G3 is receptive to PSYOP when an effective PSYOP planner is present. At the present time, this only happens when a liaison officer is assigned from the supporting PSYOP unit. Capt. McEwen's concept implies that pulling PSYOP into the MI community will ensure that someone on the staff will be able to act effectively as the PSYOP officer. Maybe so—but I suspect that it would wind up being an extra duty for someone (probably with no training or experience) on the G2 staff. My goal is to see a PSYOP officer in the G3, just as there is an EW officer.

I have a more fundamental objection to placing PSYOP under the G2, though. The G2 function is to provide information and analysis to the commander. No matter how aggressive the collection methods, intelligence is fundamentally passive. Accurate intelligence estimates allow the commander to make decisions about what he should do. PSYOP, like EW, is a weapon: a means of doing something to the enemy. Execution of a PSYOP campaign will decrease and degrade the effective force available to the enemy by a measurable amount. The difficulty inherent in measuring results should not cause us to lose sight of that

operational function.

Capt. McEwen also falls into a common trap when he emphasizes the value of PSYOP to deception. Again, deception is a part of the G3's job, even if many G3s would rather not be reminded of this. More importantly, a commander who uses his PSYOP assets primarily for deception is wasting those assets. PSYOP forces support deception, and in certain circumstances may devote most of their efforts to this mission. But they generally will be far more effective as an offensive weapon.

In terms of training and doctrine, as well as branch proponentry, I am tempted to say that I don't care who has the responsibility. As long as the soldier can operate effectively on arrival, it doesn't matter who does the training. The 96F (enlisted PSYOP MOS) is already tightly tied to MI, although the training itself is done by the Special Warfare Center (SWC). The Army made a serious mistake when it removed PSYOP from the FAO field. In the absence of any sign that the Army will correct that error, I must agree that placing PSYOP in the 35 series would be better than keeping it in the 18 (Special Operations) field. Moreover, there is no essential difference between the PSYOP functions performed in independent operations, in support of other SOF, and in support of conventional forces, so one set of courses for training will be adequate.

On the other hand, as I said above, PSYOP is a weapon. Capt. McEwen argues that PSYOP is a major producer of intelligence. This is misleading. The active component PSYOP force does have a mission to produce certain finished intelligence products, and a unique organization to perform that mission. Some Reserve Component PSYOP units have the talent needed to perform similar functions in peacetime. In wartime, however, no PSYOP unit in the field is going to do this. The PSYOP unit in direct support of a division or corps has a limited capability to analyze information obtained from a variety of sources, as does an all source production section (ASPS). While this analysis is the primary function of an ASPS, it is a by-product of the PSYOP unit's efforts to accomplish its mission. All information (and analysis) will be shared with appropriate intelligence personnel, just as would be information which was obtained by any other unit in the battle area. But the mission of the PSYOP unit is also to produce propaganda products which will degrade the enemy's will to fight. The Army has seen fit to provide this capability (however poorly) in an environment of highly concentrated resources, and I know that Capt.

Second Annual Red Hat Reunion

The Society of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division is planning the Second Annual Red Hat Reunion to be held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from August 15-17, 1986. All former American and Vietnamese Red Hats and Red Markers who served with the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division are invited. Major events planned for the reunion include an airborne demonstration and static weapons display by the 82d Airborne Division and a capabilities demonstration by the 1st Special Operations Command. Additionally, an old timers' jump is planned. The reunion will conclude with a banquet on August 17 at the Fort Bragg Officers' Club. A large number of former American advisors to the Division and Vietnamese members of the Division are expected to attend. For specific details, contact Col. Joe Kinzer, 9 Donelson Street, Fort Bragg, N.C., 28307, (919) 497-6707, or Col. (Ret) Dan Baldwin, 737 Galloway Drive, Fayetteville, N.C., 28303, (919) 867-2674.

McEwen would agree with me about its value. I fear that placement of this asset in the intelligence arena would lead to its use as an in-house intelligence analysis organ, at the expense of its mission as a weapon supporting the commander. I doubt that it would enhance the ability of the commander to use that weapon effectively.

In summary, I am inclined to agree with Capt. McEwen that PSYOP officers should be included in the MI Branch, absent their return to the FAO specialty. I am afraid that placing the doctrinal function in the Intelligence Center and School would lead to an overemphasis on their peripheral intelligence production capability, at the expense of the operational capabilities. I am not sure that moving the training function from the Special Warfare Center would serve any purpose, and it might contribute to a focus on intelligence instead of operations. My experience with staff elements from the unified commands down through the corps suggests that G3s are highly receptive to PSYOP planning when it is effectively presented. Again, placing staff cognizance under the G2

would tend to weaken rather than strengthen appreciation of the value of psychological operations as opposed to psychological intelligence.

If we were able to place active component PSYOP forces in each active component combat unit, locating that force under the CEWI unit might well be indicated. Of much greater importance at this time, however, is establishing and maintaining the CAPSTONE relationship between the Reserve Component PSYOP unit and the combat unit it supports. I'm not convinced that reporting through the CEWI unit commander and the G2 will contribute to building that relationship. And, of course, I believe that the limited active component PSYOP force should remain part of SOCOM.

Maj. Paul Valette
1st SOCOM
Fort Bragg, N.C.

MENTORING

(Continued from page 43)

themselves.

If small group training is encouraged and officially adopted, then one day the graduates of small group instruction may become tomorrow's enlightened mentors. And those who become proteges of these enlightened mentors will benefit from superiors who have grown as "thinkers" throughout their careers. The alternative, while less costly, is something this writer is not prepared to contemplate, for it is as short-sighted as it is dangerous. ★

Capt. Stephen P. Aubin is currently the editor of Military Intelligence magazine at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He holds a master's degree in National Security Studies and a bachelor of arts degree in International Relations and French, both from Georgetown University. Aubin has previously served with the 522d Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas, and with the U.S. Southern Command, Panama, as a J2 briefer to the commander-in-chief during a six-month TDY tour. Before entering the Army, he worked as a writer/editor for the Office of Research and Analysis at the Pentagon.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(Continued from page 15)

ing the Wizard War, European Style," *Armed Forces Journal*, February 1986, pp. 60-61.

29. James A. Russell, "SOF: They Can't Get There From Here," *Military Logistics Forum*, April 1986, pp. 40-49. See also Noel C. Koch, "Is There a Role for Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict?" *Armed Forces Journal*, May 1985, pp. 32-42, and Alan Gropman, "Air Power and Low-Intensity Conflict: An Airman's Perspective," *Armed Forces Journal*, May 1985, pp. 33-42.

30. See William H. Burgess III, "Strategic Targeting," *Armed Forces Journal*, March 1985, pp. 66-75.

31. Benjamin Netanyahu, et al., "The Challenge to the Democracies," in *Terrorism: How the West Can Win*, pp. 5-37.

32. Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution states that "The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War . . . To raise and support Armies . . ." No such power is vested in either of the other two branches of the Government of the United States. Also, Article I of the 1907 Hague Convention Number III, Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, provides that " . . . hostilities . . . must not commence without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war." See also Summers, pp. 14, 21.

33. "The War Powers Resolution sets arbitrary 60-day deadlines that practically invite an adversary to wait us out, that invariably send signals that the United States, despite our power, may be 'short of breath.'" (George Shultz, "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity," from a speech before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference at the National Defense University, January 15, 1986, Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State.) Congressional oversight should not be eliminated, but reduced to proportions consistent with the principles of war and the need to pursue the popular will. See Robert S. Greenberger, "Free the Presidency to Fight Terrorism," *Wall Street Journal*, December 19, 1985, p. 22.

34. See William S. Cohen, "A Defense Special Operations Agency: Fix for a SOF Capability That Is Most Assuredly Broken," *Armed Forces Journal*, January 1986, pp. 38-45.

35. Caryle Murphy and Charles R. Babcock, "Army's Covert Role Scrutinized," *Washington Post*, November 29, 1985, p. 1. See also Daniel Greene, "Officer's Trial Sheds Light on Covert World," *Army Times*, February 24, 1986, pp. 29, 45, "Army Officer Gets Mixed Verdict on Charges of Defrauding the Govern-

ment," *Armed Forces Journal*, March 1986, p. 20, and Daniel Greene, "Ex-Chief of Special Operations Convicted," *Army Times*, April 28, 1986, p. 13.

36. Gabriel, p. 162.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

38. For example, as forward observers, air guards, door gunners, etc.

39. See William J. Casey, "International Terrorism: Potent Challenge to American Intelligence," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, September 15, 1985, pp. 713-717.

40. See Raymond Price, "Terrorism: Do Unto Others," *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, October 19, 1985, p. 12, and Charles Waterman, "Response to Terrorism Depends on the Importance It's Given," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 23, 1986, p. 5.

Capt. William H. Burgess III served in Special Forces from 1979-1985, most recently as commander of a specialized intelligence detachment in the Washington, D.C. area. He has also worked and trained with several special operations units, including the 10th Special Forces Group, Airborne, and Britain's 22 Special Air Service Regiment. Burgess has a BA in Political Science from Southeastern Massachusetts University, an MPA from Clark University, and a JD from American University. He was commissioned in the Infantry after he was graduated from OCS in 1978. Burgess recently completed the MI Officer Advanced Course at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

ATTENTION READERS

In lieu of one of the subscription inserts, a readership survey has been included in this issue. The survey is designed as a self-mailer. We ask each reader to take a moment and complete the survey. By expressing your views, you will help us to better serve you. We appreciate hearing from our readers.

MI Magazine Staff

USAICS Notes

Counter Signals Intelligence Development

by SFC Anthony L. Johnson

Counter Signals Intelligence (C-SIGINT) is not just another term for Signal Security (SIGSEC). C-SIGINT is a counterintelligence (CI) function. Counterintelligence supports the commander and his operations security (OPSEC) program by focusing on defeating or degrading the enemy's multidisciplinary threat. CI personnel engage in a broad range of operational activities to counter this hostile human intelligence (HUMINT), SIGINT, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) threat. C-SIGINT supports CI by defeating or degrading the enemy's SIGINT efforts. C-SIGINT supports the commander's decision-making through a four-step cyclic process:

- Determining the enemy SIGINT and related electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and activities.
- Assessing friendly operations to identify patterns, profiles, and signatures.
- Developing and recommending countermeasures.
- Evaluating the effectiveness of applied countermeasures.

Although C-SIGINT and SIGSEC are distinctly separate, they are mutually supportive. SIGSEC remains a valid U.S. Army program, hence the mission of regulatory compliance remains valid. Many of the traditional SIGSEC functions are applicable in the C-SIGINT arena.

C-SIGINT is governed by Field Manual (FM) 34-62, *C-SIGINT Operations*. Development of this doctrinal publication was initiated at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass., in June 1982. The manual was first published as a field circular and, in October 1985, received approval for final printing. FM 34-62 went to press in February 1986 and is now available through normal publications distribution channels.

While FM 34-62 puts forth policy guidance for the conduct of the C-

SIGINT mission, C-SIGINT personnel must have expertise in all disciplines to assist in the accomplishment of the CI mission. The responsibility for training C-SIGINT personnel, MOS 97G, will be transferred from the Intelligence School, Fort Devens to the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., in January 1987. The C-SIGINT Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course has resided at the Intelligence Center and School since February 1985. The Department of Human Intelligence is responsible for conducting all resident training within the school pertaining to C-SIGINT. Subject matter experts (SMEs) in the C-SIGINT Section, CI Division, Department of Human Intelligence, are actively involved in the preparation and staffing of programs of instruction (POI) pertaining to C-SIGINT training at skill levels one and three. The input for the skill level one POI has been completed and is being staffed internally within the school. This POI will be submitted to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) prior to July 1, 1986. The skill level three POI must be modified to include the skills and knowledge delineated in FM 34-62. The C-SIGINT Section is presently involved in a series of internal meetings which are expected to result in the compilation of new input for construction of the POI based on doctrine. In the interim, the C-SIGINT Section has recommended that instructor personnel in the 97G MOS from the Intelligence Center and School conduct mobile training team (MTT) visits to centralized locations in CONUS, Europe, and the Pacific during FY '88. There are ten such MTTs planned; however, the specific details regarding these training visits have not been finalized. The field will be updated once final decisions are made.

One major point regarding C-SIGINT doctrine is that it dictates a need for automated support to the concept. To develop this capability, a prototype system called the Army CLASSIC FOX Demonstration System was designed (originally as a SIGSEC system, but later modified to test the C-SIGINT concept). CLASSIC FOX is a unique system that is

owned by the U.S. Army. C-SIGINT Section members received this system on May 2, 1986. CLASSIC FOX was accompanied by representatives from the Sperry Corporation which developed the system. They will train selected 97G NCOs in the operation and preventive maintenance of CLASSIC FOX. The 97G SMEs will then train remaining C-SIGINT personnel and provide system demonstrations to interested command and staff members. CLASSIC FOX will be followed by a subsequent second generation system which is expected to further define specific support needs for the C-SIGINT concept. Unlike CLASSIC FOX, the second generation system will be produced in two copies: one for the Intelligence Center and School, the other for U.S. Army, Europe. Specific time frames for delivery of the prototypes are not yet firm; however, the target period is FY '88. Again, these systems are not scheduled for fielding by the U.S. Army. The final C-SIGINT system, presently called the C-SIGINT/Deception Collection and Analysis System (C-D/CAS), is the actual equipment that is scheduled for fielding. This system is expected sometime in the 1990 time frame. Nonetheless, there is a concerted effort underway to ensure that there will be equipment to support the commander's C-SIGINT requirements well into the 1990s.

In the interim, the 97G in the field must become intimately familiar with doctrinal policy guidance, everything from FM 100-5, *Operations*, to FM 34-62, *C-SIGINT Operations*, and everything in between. 97Gs need to read the reference material and apply the procedures to the best of their abilities. It is understandable that there are personnel shortages in many areas and overages in others. The Military Personnel Center, Department of the Army, is working to solve some of these problems.

Please feel free to share your ideas with us here at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. Your comments regarding this article or any matter pertaining to C-SIGINT are welcomed. Please write to: Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Cen-

ter and School, ATTN: ATSI-HI-CI (C-SIGINT), Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 85613-7000.

97E BNCOC Interrogation Course

by MSgt. Michael A. Behrends

Historically, the 97E10 Basic Interrogation course of instruction contained interrogation methodology, concentrating on skill level one tasks that are critical for performance in the field. The course was designed to provide graduates the foundation upon which to build their skills as interrogators. As they moved through the ranks, interrogators were expected to learn the higher skill level tasks through experience, on-the-job training and monitoring by senior NCOs.

It has long been recognized in the interrogation field that additional technical training is needed for sergeants and staff sergeants to prepare them for the supervisory responsibilities of skill level three interrogators. The ANCOC, while adequately addressing the areas which are common for all skill level four MI NCOs, does not address the interrogation-specific technical skills.

In July 1985, subject matter experts from the Exploitation Division of the Department of Human Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, proposed a course designed to address skill level three tasks. The individual training plan (ITP) for skill levels 1-5 was submitted to TRADOC and was approved in March 1986. This ITP includes a resident BNCOC to be taught at the Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The coordinating draft of the program of instruction (POI) for the BNCOC is to be completed before November 1987, with a final draft submitted to TRADOC for approval before March 1988. The lesson plans and course materials will be completed before July 1988 for the first class which is scheduled for October 1988.

The purpose of the course is to teach the techniques and methodology of conducting advanced interrogation, assigning interrogators, establishing document exploitation centers, conducting liaison with counterintel-

ligence and military police assets, advanced approach techniques, and foreign language enhancement with emphasis on military terminology as applied during the conduct of tactical interrogation.

The course is presently planned to be thirteen weeks long. This includes 50 hours of common core, which emphasizes the leadership skills at skill level three. Platform instruction will include classes on the use of the MICROFIX computer by interrogation assets in the field, classes on the new Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) report writing formats, interrogation in a low intensity conflict (LIC), and the new force structure under the Army of Excellence.

There will also be an intensive practical exercise during which the students will practice advanced interrogation techniques and do several in-language interrogations. The course will end with a ten-day FTX. On day one of the FTX, the students will roadmarch to the FTX site and set up an interrogation operations center. The scenario begins with LIC (days two through six) and escalates to mid-intensity (days seven through nine). On day ten, the students will tear down the operations center and recover.

At present, there are plans to conduct two iterations of the course each year, with a maximum of 30 students per class. The expected student input for FY '89 is 53 students. For further information, contact the Exploitation Division, Department of Human Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, AV 879-2813/3837, or commercial (602) 538-2813/3837.

Brigade All-Source Intelligence Exercise

by Capt. Michael W. Boardman and
Capt. David M. McQueen

Instructors at the Intelligence Center and School have developed an exercise designed to provide Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course (MIOBC) students with the opportunity to embarrass, defeat and "roll over the bones of the instructional staff," all in the name of good training. Using Fort

Huachuca and vicinity maps, the Brigade All-Source Intelligence Exercise (BASIX) reinforces all of the instruction in the Army Common and Tactical All-Source Intelligence phases of the MIOBC.

The four-day exercise, developed using lessons learned from NTC, REFORGER, and other exercises, requires students to staff one brigade and two battalion task force tactical operations centers (TOCs), as well as a technical control and analysis element (TCAE), a collection and jamming planning TOC, and SIGINT/EW team assets. The entire architecture is designed for a class of 35 students.

Day one of the exercise is devoted to administrative, logistical preparation and the student development of the brigade/task force operations orders (OPORDs). Instructors brief the students on the training objectives and issue them the necessary items to organize their tactical operations center and SIGINT/EW support element operations. The instructors issue a division-level operations order, explain the physical layout of the exercise area, communications procedures, the positions to be filled in both the brigade and battalion task force and SIGINT/EW sides of the exercise, and end with a detailed safety briefing. The students are taken on an aerial visual reconnaissance flight of the exercise area and then begin their intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and staff planning process. Numerous instructors are available to assist during this preparation phase, to include Combat Arms and Military Intelligence officers to answer any questions which may arise.

The execution phase begins on day two, when the students deploy to the field site and set up their assigned working areas. The brigade order is issued shortly after arrival at the exercise areas. Instructors evaluate the brigade order and the battalion order a short time later. Once the battalion order is given and instructor feedback is passed to the battle staff, a very intense three-hour free play begins. The instructors who have taken the battalion orders (one Military Intelligence and one Combat Arms officer for each task force) return to the control cell and post the battalion graphics to the master game map. They analyze the concept of the

operation with reference to the opposing forces (OPFOR) disposition, weather and terrain factors. As the students maneuver their battalions and companies across the game board, the controllers (who are acting as maneuver company commanders) repeat the enemy situation, engagements, battle damage and anything else to assist or, if appropriate, confuse the students. Occasionally, a commander will be "killed," and the controller will come up on the net as a company executive officer or first sergeant, requesting instructions. The idea is to test the students' nerve, to evaluate their ability to react to the unexpected and still accomplish the mission.

The fire support officer (FSO) controller moves the artillery units, indirect fires, reports to the player FSOs, and controls the target acquisition battery. Meanwhile, the OPFOR controller plays a doctrinally correct Red force, passing information over real OPFOR nets for intercept by SIGINT assets. If the students perform the SIGINT mission correctly, they make a critically useful contribution to the S2's effort.

The controllers decide whether or not a plan would be successful and apply battlefield effects accordingly. If the students have developed a firm plan based heavily on the S2's input and they maintain good control of their maneuver elements during free play, they are usually successful. If the students develop a poor plan or show lack of aggressiveness and agility in controlling their maneuver elements, they may lose the battle. Instructors do not stress winning or losing; the staff coordination and interaction between the S2s, S3s, FSOs, and the SIGINT/EW elements is of primary concern. We have found that many times the player-students focus on their own areas of concern as S2, S3, or FSO, and do not communicate their needs to other members of the staff. They quickly learn that communication within the TOC is essential.

Once the free play portion has been completed (approximately three hours), a complete after-action review is conducted by the instructors. They explain what went wrong, why it went wrong, and what the students can do to keep the same mistakes from happening again. The students are en-

couraged to critique each other. They often respond ferociously, venting frustration with higher or lower student echelons, usually without realizing they committed the very same mistakes they are so vigorously criticizing in their peers. As a "significant emotional event," these after-action reviews contribute greatly to the learning process. When the after-action review is completed, a new order is issued and the cycle begins again. The same sequence is followed for two more missions. The sequence of mission is attack, defense, attack.

On the third day, after the last attack, the students rotate player positions. Those working in the brigade and the battalion TOCs change with those who have been manning the SIGINT/EW positions, and three more operations are gamed. The exercise terminates on the fourth day, ending sixty continuous hours of staff planning and free play. After an exercise out-brief, the students recover and turn in their equipment.

BASIX has repeatedly been cited by MIOBC students as a most valuable training exercise because it allows them to put earlier classroom instruction into perspective: "Teamwork is the most important factor in mission accomplishment." "We saw

how they all work together to accomplish the mission." "This must not change." "This goes down in history as the most valuable training I've received at the school."

Instructors also understand the value of this exercise. Instruction has changed and been improved based on the lessons learned from previous BASIX exercises. The requirement for the Military Intelligence and Combat Arms officers to work closely together has developed a close relationship which in the long run provides better instruction for MIOBC students.

The BASIX exercise has recently received the attention of Gen. William R. Richardson, commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), who endorsed the staff interaction involved during the free play. His encouragement of other TRADOC schools to see the exercise firsthand has resulted in observers coming to Fort Huachuca to see this new training initiative in action. Observations provided by senior controllers at the NTC have also indicated that recent graduates of the MIOBC fare well in the intense battle environment of the NTC. BASIX will help future graduates improve upon this performance.

SQT Administration Dates for FY 87

The SQT Administration Dates for some MOSs in CMF 96 will change for FY 87. The dates for FY 87 are listed below:

MOS	FY 87 (Active Army)	FY 87 (Reserve Component)
96B	1 Jan - 31 Mar 87	1 Jan - 30 Jun 87
96D	1 Jul - 30 Sep 87	1 Jul - 31 Dec 87
96R	1 Aug - 31 Oct 87	1 Aug - 31 Jan 88
97B	1 Jun - 31 Aug 87	1 Jun - 30 Nov 87
97E	1 May - 31 Jul 87	1 May - 31 Oct 87

Soldiers who do not receive their SQT notices at least sixty days before the test period begins should contact the Test Site Officer (TSO) at their local installation.

POC is MSgt. Jacobsen, SQT Team, DOTD, AV 879-3365/2352 or commercial (602) 538-3365.

Proponency Notes

Activation of the MI Corps

The Army chief of staff approved the establishment of the Military Intelligence Corps as part of the Army's regimental system in December 1985. The official activation of the MI Corps will occur on July 1, 1987, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the MI Branch. Activation ceremonies for the MI Corps will occur at the Home of Military Intelligence, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and at all the MI units worldwide. The commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) has been designated as the chief of the MI Corps. The chief of staff, USAICS, will be the adjutant of the Corps and the command sergeant major, USAICS, will be the command sergeant major of the Corps.

The primary objective of the MI Corps is to bind together the whole of MI, military and civilian. Through unit and individual involvement, we can create an MI Corps which promotes cohesiveness and esprit and contributes to a solid sense of history and tradition for all MI soldiers and civilian personnel. The activation of the MI Corps is a momentous occasion for MI. The chief of MI would like to see all MI officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilian personnel have the opportunity to participate in the activation of the MI Corps. All MI soldiers not assigned to an MI unit will be able to attend the activation ceremony at a nearby MI unit.

All MI officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers will be affiliated with the MI Corps. Affiliation with the MI Corps, as with all the corps and regiments, will be accentuated by the wearing of distinctive MI Corps insignia (crest). An MI Corps crest is being developed for wear on the Army green, blue, and white uniforms. MI Proponency personnel are working with the Institute of Heraldry to develop an MI Corps crest and the MI Corps colors. Field input is being sought for a regimental belt buckle unique to the MI Corps. The purchase and wearing of the MI Corps belt buckle, which can be worn with the

class A or utility uniform, are optional. An MI Corps crest will be presented to all MI Corps soldiers as they are affiliated with the MI Corps.

MI Corps affiliation will begin during the MI Corps activation ceremonies. All MI soldiers assigned to an MI unit and present during the activation ceremony will be affiliated with the MI Corps as part of the activation ceremony of their unit. All MI soldiers assigned to non-MI units, as well as MI soldiers assigned to MI units but not present for the ceremony, will be affiliated with the MI Corps and will receive their MI Corps crest and certificate of affiliation from a USAICS representative or a senior member of a nearby unit. Affiliation of initial-entry-training soldiers will occur as part of a "Rites of Passage" ceremony at graduation exercises. Force Alignment Plan (FAP) III Officers will be affiliated with the MI Corps and receive their Corps crest and certificate of affiliation during a "Rites of Passage" ceremony at graduation exercises from the Pre-Advanced Course Tactical All-Source Intelligence Officer training. Our Reserve Component (RC) units will need help to develop MI Corps affiliation procedures for their RC personnel. Coordination is being made with the Reserve Affairs advisor (Col. Mosch) to incorporate the RC into the affiliation process and activation ceremonies.

As part of the Army's regimental/corps activations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, has approved the appointment of an honorary colonel, honorary sergeant major, and distinguished members of the MI Corps to provide a link with history for today's soldiers. The primary mission of these special appointees is to perpetuate the history and traditions of the MI Corps, thereby enhancing unit morale and esprit. The honorary colonel of the Corps must be a retired commissioned officer in the rank of colonel or above. The honorary sergeant major of the Corps must be a retired noncommissioned officer in the rank of sergeant first class or above, and the distinguished members of the Corps must be either active duty or retired officers, warrant offi-

cers, enlisted personnel, or non-retired civilians who have been recognized for their accomplishments. The honorary colonel and honorary sergeant major will be appointed for a three-year renewable term. The distinguished members may serve in their positions indefinitely. These special appointees will attend command ceremonies, participate in award ceremonies, speak about the MI Corps history and traditions at dinners-in, or other similar functions, and will assist in historical professional development programs for MI officers and NCOs. Travel and attendance to CONUS MI Corps functions are to be accomplished by invitation orders, funded by the installation or activity requesting their presence. In the event of overseas travel, funding is provided by the OCONUS command/activity requesting their presence.

The New Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) and the MI Officer

Although the "new" OPMS is over two years old, each proponent is responsible for implementing its policies within the unique mission and inventory profile of that branch in time for the 1987 start date. The MI Corps implementation plan was approved February 1986 and proposed the following changes to the structure and training strategy:

- **35A Military Intelligence (General):** Although this will continue to be labeled an area of concentration (AOC), only MI Branch immaterial TOE/TDA document positions requiring general intelligence training will be coded 35A. MI lieutenants will be awarded AOC 35D, Tactical Intelligence, upon completion of the MI Officer Basic Course (MIOBC). *Any MI officer may fill a 35A designated*

position.

- **35D Tactical Intelligence:** All graduates of the 24-week MIOBC and/or the MIOAC will be awarded AOC 35D automatically during an October 1986-March 1987 inventory screening and redesignation process. 35D becomes the baseline AOC for all MI officers. *Any MI officer is eligible for selection to fill a 35D designated position.* 35D positions include command of all CEWI battalions as well as the majority of CEWI battalion S3 jobs.

- **Additional AOC Training:** Every MI officer will receive training in an AOC in addition to 35D. This is essential to ensure that every officer has the opportunity to compete for command and career progression within two areas of concentration *while single tracking in MI.* Although some MI officers may be trained and assigned in a functional area (48-FAO, 49-ORSA, 53-ADP, etc.), *most MI officers will single track in MI.*

- **Officers Rebranched into MI:** Beginning in FY '87, the MI Corps will receive a substantial number of Combat Arms-trained officers through the Conditional Voluntary Indefinite (CVI) Board process. Force Alignment Plan (FAP) III recognized the imbalances between shortage and overage branches whose authorizations remain far above or below actual inventory. FAP and CVI effected the rebranching of approximately 159 year group '83 and 221 year group '84 officers into MI. These officers will require tactical all source intelligence training, and the subsequent award of AOC 35D, *before attending the MIOAC.* They, too, will receive additional MI AOC training and also may be dual tracked between MI and a functional area.

- **Primacy:** Primacy refers to recognition of one AOC as the principal focus of an officer's training and assignment specialization. Some officers will focus on AOC 35D, increasing their competitive edge for tactical intelligence assignments. Other officers will specialize in discipline-specific AOCs with non-tactical as well as tactical assignments. Very few MI officers will maintain primacy in their functional area. Primacy determination is the product of evaluating the officer's preference, the AOC inventory, and existing and projected AOC requirements.

- **Training:** Key to OPMS implementation within the MI Corps is the requirement for *formal, standardized training as the prerequisite for AOC award.* Officers will no longer be awarded an MI AOC based upon subjective evaluation of their experience. Officers trained in and awarded an AOC can expect assignment in that area of expertise, although repetitive assignments are closely related to primacy and Army requirements.

- **Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA):** Recognizing the critical need for officers who are technically competent in both MI and Aviation skills, an exception to the new OPMS has been requested by the MI and Aviation Branch proponents. This exception would allow Aviation Branch officers to select MI as a functional area. Most 15/35 officers will attend the MIOAC, receive SEMA (15M) training, and alternate between SEMA and MI ground assignments.

The mechanics of this implementation plan include careful screening of individual files, requesting primacy preference statements from all MI officers currently qualified in multiple AOCs, and evaluating force structure requirements. This process begins in June 1986 and will extend through the 2nd Quarter FY '87, which is the target date for redesigning the MI officer corps. Your proponenty office and branch assignment managers are working together to guide the force through the transition to the new OPMS.

The MI Proponenty point of contact is Capt. Ann Peterson, AV 879-4665.

Civilian Intelligence Personnel

A memorandum of agreement has been signed between the MI Proponent and the ACSI. This memorandum defines the relationship and responsibilities for management of the Army Civilian Intelligence Career Program-19 (CP-19). It addresses those common functional areas between the ACSI and the MI Proponent which are necessary to manage an effective civilian intelligence and security career program. The agreement underscores mutual coordination required for the structure, acqui-

sition, individual training and education, professional development, and sustainment of the civilian intelligence and security constituency. Under the provisions of this memorandum, the MI Proponent will support the ACSI in all matters pertaining to the management of the civilian workforce. Most significantly, the MI Proponent will take an active role in all policy and planning boards at the DA/CIVPERCEN level and will also play a prominent role in the development of policy for CP-19. One of the first actions to be accomplished under the provisions of the memorandum is to establish communications with the civilian constituency. A newsletter is being sent to all civilians within CP-19. In April 1986 the Intelligence Center and School hosted, on behalf of the ACSI, the CP-19 Career Planning Board. This board consisted of senior intelligence and security civilians from throughout the Department of the Army and was chaired by Mr. Jim Davis, the special assistant to the ACSI.

Both the ACSI and the MI Proponent are fully committed to improving the management of the civilian workforce and the enhancement of professional development opportunities. The memorandum of agreement will serve as the vehicle for attaining this goal.

Annual Army Intelligence Ball

The eleventh Annual Army Intelligence Ball will be held Saturday, September 20, 1986 in the Springfield Hilton, Springfield, Virginia.

The annual event will be hosted this year by the assistant chief of staff for intelligence and the commanding general, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. It brings together both active and retired officers and civilians of the U.S. Army intelligence community, as well as friends and close associates in related federal agencies.

All active and retired Army officers, warrant officers, sergeants major, civilians (GS-7 and above), and their guests are invited to attend. For further information contact your local ball coordinator or Maj. Phillips (AV 227-4885 or commercial 202-697-4885). For publicity contact Maj. Werner (AV 225-5063 or commercial 202-695-5063).

A SURVEY OF INTELLIGENCE LITERATURE

by Capt. Gary W. Allen and Capt. Anthony J. Ramienski

History involves a type of inquiry that begins with the knowledge of one's own self-ignorance. Every person who has asked the fundamental question, "Who am I?" soon realizes that self-knowledge leads to self-confidence. The pursuit of self-knowledge also leads one to a discovery of the world, for there is valuable knowledge to be gained from the experience of others.¹

There are those in the military profession who have grasped this idea and have applied it to their own professional development. Only a few will ever gain knowledge from actual battle; Valhalla is filled with those who did not survive that experience. Ignorance of history and its lessons has led to disaster time and time again: The modern battlefield will be no kinder to those ignorant of history.²

Although the field of military intelligence is in the midst of a vast technological revolution, every military intelligence professional should devote some time to the study of the history of the craft. Although the paper and pencil are rapidly being replaced by the computer, the process and object of military intelligence are still the same: analyze the information to clear away the "fog of war," allow the commander to see the battlefield, and know the enemy. This process and its object link us to our past. We are but a continuation of a long and proud tradition. Through history, we can find out who we are and what we have become. The young Military Intelligence professional, however, has much to learn. The training day is long; time for reflective study is short. Additionally, the vast amount of literature on intelligence is imposing and can frustrate anyone who attempts to study it.

This article offers a nucleus of books that provide the essentials of the branch. The focus is on those works that examine support to the military commander. We have drawn material from signals intelligence, photo intelligence, human intelligence and scientific intelligence. We have also included examples that deal with tac-

tical intelligence and analysis. This all-source approach is designed to complement school training. We have also endeavored to choose good literature that adds enjoyment to the task.

The first work of this nucleus should be a general history of American military intelligence. Unfortunately, there is no single publication that fills this need. M.B. Powe's and E.E. Wilson's **The Evolution of American Military Intelligence**, a supplementary reading booklet published by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) in 1973, is a well-researched, but brief work. In 1984, the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) published **Military Intelligence: A Picture History**. This, too, is a short, but well-written visual history of the branch. It traces the evolution of military intelligence from 1885, when the War Department established a permanent intelligence organization, to the Grenada operation in 1983. Rhodri Jefferys-Jones' **American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA** (New York: The Free Press, 1977) has several chapters concerning the Army's role in the origins of national-level intelligence. David Kahn's **The Code Breakers: The Study of Secret Writing** (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967) provides information on the Army's role in signals intelligence and cryptology. And Thomas F. Troy's **Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency** (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981) examines Army intelligence and its role in the development of a centralized national intelligence organization. However, in spite of these works, the Military Intelligence Branch still awaits a biographer.

Tactical Intelligence

The tactical intelligence officer requires the most comprehensive skills of any in the field. He or she must represent all the disciplines of intelligence to the commander. **G-2: Intelligence for Patton** (Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1971) provides an account of one of the more successful practitioners of tactical intelligence, Brig. Gen. Oscar W.

Koch. This book traces the campaigns from North Africa to the end of World War II. Since Koch was a senior member of General Patton's G2 staff throughout the period covered by the book, the book is at once an historical journal and an examination of the reasoning which led to those decisions that made history. Koch emphasizes that good intelligence production is not guided by the fortune of lucky breaks. Rather, it is a painstaking process that commences with operational planning. Koch goes on to emphasize the importance of using all sources of information to develop reliable intelligence. For example, during the invasion of North Africa, a good landing beach was discovered by reviewing a photograph in a tourist pamphlet. Another interesting aspect of the book is the discussion of Patton's managerial techniques and how he stressed to his primary staff that it is just as important for them to be out gaining information firsthand as it is for them to be supervising the headquarters' activities.

The most important aspect of this book is its discussion on the use of intelligence to postulate enemy capabilities and intentions. During World War II, this was not an accepted practice. Most intelligence professionals felt that their obligation was merely to collect and disseminate information and leave it up to the decisionmakers to analyze. Patton's intelligence staff members departed from that doctrine as they actively sought to provide their commander with enemy capabilities and likely enemy actions. This was one of the keys to Patton's success. The reader will find that the G2 estimates were accurate and that Patton's decisions were heavily influenced by those estimates. The lessons gained from this well-written work can be applied to all levels, from battalion to corps, and should be closely studied by all intelligence professionals. The process developed by Koch and the rest of the staff mark the beginning of the analysis techniques used today. **G-2: Intelligence for Patton** is one of the great contributions to the literature of military intelligence.

Electronic Warfare

The next book is also written by a man who tempers history with personal experience. The reader will be intrigued by trying to discover why an Army colonel would write a book about a World War II naval battle. Retired Col. Don E. Gordon, in his work, **Electronic Warfare: Element of Strategy and Multiplier of Combat Power** (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), selected the Battle of the Atlantic because it best demonstrated the power of an all-source intelligence and unified analysis center. Commanders used this intelligence to decisively wrest control of the Atlantic from the U-boats. Control of the Atlantic became the basis for victory in Europe. The work is a masterful blend of research, analysis, and intelligent speculation. Gordon provides both a good summary of the principles of electronic warfare and signals intelligence as well as a summary of the numerous books that examine the role played by cryptanalysis in World War II. The closing draws a thoughtful modern-day parallel between the situation faced by the NATO countries in central Europe and the danger the United States faces from the growing Soviet technological capability. Gordon was one of the first Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) battalion commanders. His explanation of the origin of, and the need for, the CEWI battalion is clear and concise. Gordon's book is a must for those desiring to learn the basics of electronic warfare, its roles in all-source analysis and the decisive nature of intelligence when properly used to prepare for future combat.

Photo Intelligence

Photographic intelligence also played a key role during World War II. Although Ursula Powys-Lybbe's **The Eye of Intelligence** (London: William Kimber and Co., Ltd., 1983) is a personal account, it provides an excellent introduction to imagery interpretation and its importance to intelligence. Photographic intelligence training, equipment, and procedures are examined in detail. The work discusses the campaigns against the U-boat (a good companion piece to Gordon's work) and the "V" weapons. Procedures in developing three-dimensional models and maps and methods of identifying camouflage and dummy positions are also

discussed.

Powys-Lybbe was assigned to the Allied Central Interpretation Unit and has insight into combined intelligence operations with the Americans. Her book concludes with a brief outline of modern photographic interpretation. It is a work that emphasizes the analyst, for intelligence resulted not from what was there, but why it was there. Good products depended upon well-trained, inquisitive soldiers who understood the importance of their mission.

Human Intelligence

Stuart A. Herrington's book, **Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages** (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), further underscores the idea that an individual analyst can fulfill a significant role in intelligence production. The author is a Military Intelligence lieutenant colonel who examined his Vietnam-era experiences and produced an exciting adventure that contains valuable lessons in human intelligence operations.

Herrington first teaches us that torture, as an interrogation technique, produces poor results. He then proves that both quantity and quality of intelligence increases with humane treatment coupled with the manipulation of verbal and nonverbal communication with the target. The Phoenix program is described as an attempt to template the local guerrilla infrastructure so that friendly operations could be directed against the grass roots of the Viet Cong movement. It was very similar to the effective British intelligence techniques and objectives used during the Malaysian insurgency of the '50s and '60s, not just an evil assassination program. Additional lessons are drawn from an examination of his daily activities, to include administrative tasks, coordination with allied forces, and interaction with the local population.

This book presents an understandable perspective of the South Vietnamese value system. The logic that guided their lives was very different from that which guides life in the United States. This underscores the need for an intelligence professional to study and understand both the culture and political issues of a people when operating on their soil during a low-intensity conflict. Herrington also brings up an interesting dilemma

which the intelligence community, as well as this nation's foreign policy-makers, must face: how can a nation cooperate with and guide an allied government system that is riddled with corruption? Unfortunately, the author only raises the issue and does not provide any thoughts on how corruption might be dealt with. This area still may be the most valuable aspect of his book, since many governments the United States supports possess many of the same attributes found in the South Vietnamese government. **Silence Was a Weapon** provides the reader with a look at a human intelligence officer's responsibilities, a good discussion of the political situation, and insight into conducting HUMINT in a low-intensity conflict. The information, along with its readability, makes it a good candidate for a "must read" list of publications.

Technical Intelligence

In the next area, scientific intelligence, the reader might ask the following question: Why would a book on scientific intelligence qualify to be a part of a nucleus of books aimed at the tactical arena? The reasons are many and all are found in R.V. Jones' book, **Most Secret War** (Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979).

Although little analysis in technical intelligence is done at the tactical level, tactical intelligence acts as a primary source of data for the sophisticated technicians working in the strategic area. Today, scientific intelligence is a significant part of the U.S. intelligence effort, providing valuable information to both strategic and tactical decisionmakers.

This book underscores the point that seemingly insignificant bits of information and other interesting phenomena, when properly analyzed, can provide highly valuable intelligence. Again, the theme, all-source intelligence, is a part of the message R.V. Jones is attempting to convey to the reader. The book describes how a multitude of academicians were pulled together to support this intelligence effort. Their academic research skills were directly applied to this esoteric intelligence arena with excellent results.

The length of the book may be imposing to some, but the length itself is actually deceiving. The book is compiled to be more like an anthol-

ogy of short stories rather than one long tome of historical nonfiction. The fact that much of the information presented has only been recently declassified makes this book current history. It, therefore, occupies a well-deserved place on this reading list.

Indications and Warning

In the area of indications and warning analysis, Roberta Wohlstetter's **Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision** (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962) is considered to be the definitive work on the December 7th surprise attack and the area of indications and warning analysis. Wohlstetter's discussion of the command and its intelligence establishment is both well researched and well written. The book examines how comfortable a nation can become with its own prejudices and how those prejudices can stifle initiative and creative thinking. It is a good examination of the problems encountered in joint operations, intelligence collection and dissemination, and relationships between operational and intelligence staffs and within the intelligence staff. Our nation's comfortable prejudice was exacerbated by a fragmented intelligence establishment that was looked upon with suspicion and disdain. The enemy's intention was not discerned until the first bombs fell. In her conclusion, Wohlstetter uses the example of Pearl Harbor as a warning for the future.

While the books presented here represent significant events of recorded military history, they barely make a dent in the vast body of available material. Recognizing that some readers will want to delve further into this body of literature, the following sources are offered to assist in the search for additional material.

Bibliographies

The **Bibliography of Intelligence Literature** is published by the Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. This reference is in its eighth edition and "... is intended to provide students and faculty of the Defense Intelligence College and intelligence professionals throughout the Intelligence Community with a selective listing of the most significant books in English on intelligence topics."

This bibliography is an excellent

reference and can be obtained by writing the college at the address shown above. An adjunct to the resource mentioned above is the USAICS Supplementary Reading SIS 02620-1. This is almost identical to the Defense Intelligence College bibliography in format and entries, but is not as current. However, since most of the key books have been in print for many years, this is not a significant drawback.

Two major bibliographies on intelligence literature were commercially published in 1983. These are the **Scholar's Guide to Intelligence Literature: Bibliography of Russell J. Bowen Collection** (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1983) and **Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography** (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983) by George C. Constatinides. Both of these cover a tremendously wide spectrum of intelligence-related books with the Bowen Collection containing over 5,000 entries. Either of these sources will keep anyone occupied with professional reading for years.

In closing, two final points must be covered. First, it is important for the reader to understand that the aim of this survey was not to justify the books presented as being the best in the field. The significance of these works has been established by people with far more experience than the authors of this survey. Rather, the point to be made is that professional development must include a conscious effort by the individual to examine, read, and study the literature that is available. This effort should be no less disciplined than the effort expended in taking on a new assignment or fulfilling a commander's requirements. This regimen should also include the field manuals and circulars that so many of us have seen, but rarely have taken the time to read. Finally, we ask the reader to question the value of the books presented here. Are they truly appropriate or are there others that would serve better? What books should a battalion or company commander recommend to the leaders under his or her command? By endeavoring to answer these questions, a person will invariably expand his or her horizons. ★

Footnotes:

1. R.G. Collingwood, **The Idea of History** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 9-10.

2. Martin Blumenson, "Why Military History?" **Army**, January 1975, p. 36. See also Jeffrey Record, "On the Lessons of Military History," **Military Review**, August 1985, p. 27.

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PROFESSIONAL READER

Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win by Richard A. Gabriel, New York: Hill and Wang, 1985, 208 pages, \$16.95.

Close and comparative study of major U.S. military operations over the past two decades suggests that the American military, although technically the most powerful war machine in the history of mankind, does not always perform to reasonable standards in armed conflict. In particular, if one looks in detail at the elements of failure in the Son Tay raid, the *Mayaguez* rescue, the Iran raid fiasco, destruction of the Marine garrison in Beirut, and the invasion of Grenada, one might be impressed with a pattern of military incompetence. Military incompetence, in this sense, is the inability of military leaders to avoid mistakes which, in the normal course of things, could and should be avoided, as well as the inability to render prudent judgments which would minimize foreseeable risks and increase probabilities of success. Because of the conspicuous absence of examination of such failures in the form of case studies or abstractions at U.S. military service schools, one is also prompted to speculate that the causes and effects of incompetence will continue to plague the American military for some time to come.

Richard A. Gabriel's **Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win** takes the above-stated definition of military incompetence as the starting point for a far-ranging and thought-provoking study of what he believes is a severe, pervasive flaw in the American military. Using Son Tay, the *Mayaguez*, Iran, Beirut, and Grenada as a backdrop, Gabriel places the blame for U.S. military failures squarely on the shoulders of the American military officer corps.

Gabriel argues that the officer corps has failed the test of fitness by consistently being unable to plan and execute successful military operations. Although its execution was technically flawless, the Son Tay raid was a failure to Gabriel because its planner ordered the mission to proceed in the face of Defense Intelligence Agency analysis that the prison camp was no longer occupied by Americans. In the case of the *Mayaguez*, Gabriel underscores the fact that the Koh Tang Island was attacked by the Marines without hard evidence that the *Mayaguez* crew was being held there and without sufficient information on enemy strength and disposition. He also contends that the attack should not have been continued after both the ship and its crew were recovered. When discussing the Iran raid, Gabriel outlines a plethora of factors leading to failure, not the least of which was the inclusion of Marine aviation assets in a plan for which such assets were grossly unsuited. In the case of the Beirut bombing, Gabriel blames the Marine commander, Colonel Geraghty, for the slaughter of 241 U.S. servicemen at the hands of a terrorist suicide truck bomber. In Gabriel's mind, the commander was completely at fault, and his invective is unforgiving: "... the failure to take routine precautions that the commander of any deployed military force would have taken under normal circumstances borders on criminal negligence and gross incompetence." As for the invasion of Grenada, the bulk of Gabriel's attention is focused on the supporting special operations, most of which failed to achieve their

objectives and few of which had real military significance. In particular, Gabriel blasts the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC): "It must be kept in mind that JSOC had overall operational responsibility for the execution of all these special operations. In retrospect, it appears that some of the same problems of command, control and communication which contributed to the failures in the Iran raid also surfaced in the special operations conducted in Grenada. Almost all of the operations were a failure The creation of JSOC after the Iran debacle has done little to improve the ability of U.S. forces to conduct commando operations, at least if the operations in Grenada are any test."

In essence, Gabriel argues that the officer corps is too large, its authority too diffused, its responsibility too diminished, its management and promotion too biased against the warrior and for the bureaucrat-manager, its education too thin on ethics and the study of past mistakes, and its turnover too turbulent. Gabriel also argues that U.S. military planning and decision-making structures compound the problem. After citing the bureaucratic imperative within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to give each service a role in major military operations, regardless of whether it can best contribute to the success of the mission (e.g., Grenada should have been strictly a Navy-Marine Corps operation), the splitting of **planning** and **execution** (so that different people do each), excessive compartmentalization, the phenomenon that no one in the U.S. planning cycle ever seems to get fired or otherwise punished for failure, and so on, Gabriel makes several moderate to radical recommendations for reform. His most extreme proposal calls for the abolition of the JCS and the creation of a General Staff. Other recommendations deal with more abstract matters of officer education, proficiency, and responsibility. Gabriel maintains throughout that the tendency to avoid individual responsibility and to blame "the system" is a major shortcoming of our officer corps, and that "when incompetence is not punished, nothing is learned. And when nothing is learned, mistakes are likely to be made again in a different place at a different time."

Overall, Gabriel has a good message but a flawed delivery. The first and last chapters of the book deal with his main themes on a mostly theoretical level and are generally good reading. The remainder of the book is somewhat of a Procrustean Bed of sloppy research and poor editing. In some cases old data is used to support his contentions, and much in the book is a rehash of ideas in his earlier book, **Crisis in Command**. In many other cases, Gabriel has minor but annoying lapses, such as referring to the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) as "CASS CUBE," calling the C-5A Galaxy the "Galaxie," listing incorrect casualty figures for the Marines in Lebanon, and referring to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) as "FORCECOM." More substantive errors appear where Gabriel's rhetoric outpaces his research. As one example, in reference to preparations for the Son Tay raid, Gabriel boldly states that "except in the Civil War, and despite scores of later attempts, there had never been a successful rescue of American prisoners from any prison camp in American history." Incredibly, Gabriel ignores such feats as the January 30,

1945 raid in which 511 American and Allied prisoners of war were rescued from a Japanese prison compound near Cabanatuan in the Philippines by elements of the 6th Ranger Battalion, reinforced by Alamo Scouts and Filipino guerrillas.

Despite its shortcomings, Gabriel's book could be a catalyst for a discussion of military ethics and leadership at the advanced course level and beyond by soldiers of all branches. It does prompt reflection on the nature of recent military operations that have not succeeded, and it does stimulate ideas for ways to improve the present situation. For the Military Intelligence soldier in particular, Gabriel's book continues to fuel recent assessments of an American intelligence community that puts a premium on anonymity, diffused personal authority, and diminished individual responsibility.

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Technology, Strategy and National Security, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta and Ralph Sanders, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985.

In concluding a recent speech at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sounded the following warning: "Only through the fusion of a comprehensive strategy with emerging technologies, will we find the means necessary to provide for the common defense and thus avoid the perils of which Churchill warned during his years in the political wilderness."

Finding this "fusion" or balance between technology and strategy in our blueprint for national security is not an easy task. It is a tough subject to tackle; and, as Secretary Weinberger indicates, the stakes are high. This issue should concern every one of us involved in the defense arena.

Technology, Strategy and National Security confronts the relationship between technology and strategy head-on. The roles that these two play in our defense calculations determine much more than our selection of weapons. As the editors explain: "Differences over weapons selection can influence all other components of military power: strategy, military operations, manpower, training and logistics. Above all, knowledgeable people understand that research and development decisions of today help to shape the fighting forces of tomorrow, including alterations in existing roles, missions and budgets of the military services."

The book's ambitious thrust is to develop a coherent conceptual framework for forging "technical leadership." Although it fails in this respect, it succeeds in airing some of the central issues that contribute toward this lofty end. The authors are more convincing in their goal to persuade our defense leaders to weigh more carefully the tug-of-war between the development of our strategy at one end of the rope and the drive of technological advances at the other. The main question: how to best harness technology to fulfill our military strategy (a dynamic strategy that is not developed in a vacuum, but one that must take advantage of new technological alternatives)? The editors offer the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines some strong advice on this point (perhaps reflecting skepti-

claim that our services even pay the issue lip service, much less serious thought or adequate resources): "... the Military Services could best strive for a sound technological foundation by understanding the complexity of the connection between **strategy pull** and **technology push**." That is, do the services recognize that this push and pull is a complex issue, and important?

The book includes a broad array of essays touching on this central theme (although the chapter by Barry Smernoff on a two-track strategy for space seems strangely out of place). Irving B. Holley provides a provocative historical review, although Secretary Weinberger would be disappointed to find not a single reference to Churchill. For after all, not only did Churchill understand the aggressive character of Nazi Germany, but he also had the wisdom to come up with a military response. As Weinberger relates, "For Churchill, the loss of air parity required not only an acceleration of England's own defense effort, but the creation of an early warning system—what he called an invention to enable the earth to control the air."

Nevertheless, Holley provides good historical fodder that every defense thinker and writer should file away in their historical lessons file (the tale of Eupalinus' tunnel, and his atom bomb, and the Royal Navy "Dreadnought" parallel are real gems).

Jacques Gansler contributes an excellent chapter on problems and prospects for the U.S. technology base (he is the best analyst around on this issue). It should be avoided, however, if you have read anything else he has written—the chapter is not much more than excerpts from his classic, **The Defense Industry** (either is anything else he has done, for that matter).

Ralph Sanders directs his essay toward how to integrate technology, military strategy and operational concepts. Franklin Margiotta and Michael Maccoby explore the "human implications of advanced technologies," an area that has been grossly neglected in the past, but is now, deservedly, starting to attract greater attention: How to mold technology so that humans—the all-volunteer force—can maintain, operate and take advantage of technological innovation.

Perhaps the most provocative chapter is the one by Walter Kross, entitled "High/Low Technology, Tactical Air Force, and National Strategies." In a fair, balanced and even-handed way, Kross explores the arguments of some prominent military reformers on TACAIR and, more broadly, the reformers' view of high technology. As he states, "Many of the reformers, as well as military officers, agree that advanced technology does not necessarily call for higher costs or less reliability." Rather, the challenge is how to "design hardware that soldiers, sailors and airmen can operate and maintain easily..." The reformers' disagreement has to do with what they see as a counterproductive dependence upon the "bells and whistles" of high technology. It is reflected in a different interpretation or spin on the "facts." An example: all agree that the Israelis' battle with Syria was a big military success. But for what reasons—high technology or prudent tactics? Kross explains: "Defense analysts worldwide admire the Israeli military success. Is that admiration based on the technology that Israelis bring to the battlefield? Or is it based on the innovative way they apply whatever weapons they have, their combat strategy, and tactics?"

The book, while raising significant questions

like this, is a valuable point of departure for a debate that will gain force and "snowball" in the coming years. In many ways, the tug-of-war between "strategy pull" and "technology push" is the most pressing issue facing our defense thinkers today. It will be interesting to see what the next step will be in developing Margiotta's and Sanders' "coherent conceptual framework" for forging technological leadership.

Jon Englund

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Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control by Jeffrey Simon, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, 218 pages, \$19.95.

This is a useful book for the specialist. Dr. Simon, currently a Soviet threat analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, writes with only a superficial grasp of military operations, but from a base of thorough research in military-political affairs. He has painstakingly tracked the development of major Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercise series, and he relates those many *Zapads* and *Druzhas*, *Severs*, *Soyuz*, and *Stits* to their contemporary political environments with a directness that helps the orthodox, workaday intelligence analyst step back and regard the military events in the Pact's history from a fresh—and stimulating—perspective.

Initially, the reader may be disappointed, for the book's title is misleading. This is definitely not a nuts and bolts examination of tactical or operational command and control. Rather, Dr. Simon spends most of his time addressing (and is clearly most comfortable with) the political brokering behind the great maneuvers. And, despite heavy larding with footnotes, some of the author's conclusions are not supported by exemplary logic. But none of this really matters. For the book's prime value, beyond a treasure of useful information unbothered by classification, lies elsewhere: it is more worthy in what it **does** than for what it is.

It helps pry open the mind. Too often, the military analyst degenerates into a professional simplifier, portraying (and perceiving) the Warsaw Pact as a disciplined, ruthlessly single-minded and malevolent colossus. Further, the Pact is uncritically accepted as a creature in being, not evolutionary but just plain *there*, without historical rationale or context. On the most elementary level (How many analysts even know which of the great treaty organizations was the first born, NATO or the Warsaw Pact?), Dr. Simon's book stresses the internal problems of often-divergent national interests—even *class* interests—within the Pact's community of nations. He helps the bleary specialist see beyond the smiling little socialist faces posing at ENDEX to the uses of the Warsaw Pact both as enforcer against, and reform school for, delinquent socialist states—then he balances the critique with examples of how non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states intermittently have been able to exploit the rhetoric and mechanics of the Pact to hold the huffing bear at bay. Rumania is only the most obvious example, playing its Chinese and Yugoslavian cards for all they might be worth (although Rumania may be headed for a come-uppance after all, thanks to remarkably inept economic planning). Hungary and Poland have

occasionally made subtler use of the Pact's structural tolerances—and even East Germany seems to be *consciously* well-behaved. The value in realizing all this, of course, is that it helps the analyst begin to see the shadows of living men, various, self-interested and fallible, beyond the clouds of his prejudice.

Then comes disappointment on another level. The reader begins to feel the lack of all the books that have yet to be written, the sudden weight of questions unanswered or even unasked in our gluttonous appetite for data unencumbered by meaning. What goes on in the minds of those Pact officers clustered around the exercise situation map? They speak Russian as one staff officer to another, but they think in Polish, Czech, German... How did General Jaruzelski's decisions evolve? Is he merely a Soviet stooge—or is he a calculating Polish patriot, a lone *Realpolitiker* in a passionately self-destructive nation? Or is he a complex of both these men and more? Where did the memories of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 fit into his emotional and intellectual make-up? And why did a brilliant World War II front commander such as Marshall Konev turn in such a thoroughly lackluster performance as the first commander-in-chief, Warsaw Pact? How would it feel to be an East German officer studying at the Frunze Academy? And how do ethnic Ruthenians and Galicians, Moravians and Pomeranians *really* feel as the tanks whine by, demonstrating the sole automotive triumph along the drab road of socialism?

By the end of this short book, the analyst even learns to respect the handful of really talented tightrope walkers among the East European heads of state and their assistants. And for those blustering children of Tail-gunner Joe among us, it may come as a shock just to realize that the Soviets have not always had it their way. Since at least the Middle Ages—which lingered long in the Balkans and on the indefensible Polish plains—the art of survival for an East European has involved a good bit of artful wiggling and craftiness. Even those who have learned the hard way what it costs to defy the Soviet Union are still not above disappointing the occasional Russian. And consider how the Hungarians have turned hundreds of tiny, clever steps into a breathtaking *fait accompli*—a Soviet state that eats well.

In closing, one note of caution. At the beginning of the last paragraph, an adjective borders on a lie. This is only a *short* book in terms of actual text length—218 pages, including big puddings of footnotes. Yet, in the reading, it seems at least twice as long (especially if read on a workday evening). Dr. Simon is evidently a dutiful volunteer in the Great American Academic Writing Experiment that has spent the last few decades attempting to perfect an absolutely flat, colorless and rhythmless prose style. It is the goal of this uncompromising experiment to eliminate any needless joy in reading that might derive from such suspect causes as crisp, incisive language, taut sentence structure, or (academic reputation forbid) wit. It is the earnest conviction of the tens of thousands of fanatical participants in this experiment that good prose is the implacable enemy of serious scholarship—any book that can be read a full chapter at a time without doping the reader into a near coma simply must not be taken seriously. After all, knowledge is supposed to be boring, isn't it? "Ain't that what education is all about?"

Well, Dr. Simon may be forgiven for being so

thoroughly a child of his age on this last count, since the final effect of his book is to smack a big flat board into our stagnant mental waters. But an apter title might have been **Warsaw Pact Forces—and Counterforces.**

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**NATO and the Defense of the West—
An Analysis of America's First Line of
Defense** by Lawrence Martin, New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1985, \$18.95.

Today in Europe the most powerful armed forces ever assembled face each other. Both the Warsaw Pact and NATO possess nuclear weapons and maintain a vast array of conventional forces. Over fifty percent of the U.S. Army's active divisions, in addition to substantial elements of the Reserve Component, are committed in one way or the other to supporting NATO. Assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is extremely complex and highly charged with political, economic, and military considerations.

NATO and the Defense of the West provides a concise overview of major issues affecting these critical questions: Can NATO deter a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe and, if deterrence fails, can NATO contain and terminate the conflict short of a global nuclear holocaust?

Professor Martin, a recognized authority on defense issues, provides reasonable, but "qualified," answers to these questions. In short, to the first question, he says "probably" and, to the second, "perhaps." He concedes that neither answer is sufficiently firm to be wholly reassuring. In addressing those vital questions, the U.S. Army is faced with a number of considerations, including political issues, the presence of "early warning" (a key focus for intelligence professionals), preparation of the battlefield, coalition solidarity, the technological edge possessed by NATO (if any), effects of urbanization in Western Europe on ground operations, and relative combat power, to name a few. In other words, there are no simple answers.

Now that theater and strategic nuclear parity exists between the United States and the Soviet Union, the ratio of conventional forces has gained in importance as a deterrent and as a factor in fighting non-nuclear war should the Warsaw Pact attack Western Europe. Recently, in an interview for *U.S. News and World Report*, Gen. Bernard Rogers, the combat-seasoned Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, echoed this point of view by saying, "... if trends continue and that gap [Warsaw Pact conventional superiority over NATO] gets wider, Western Europe will end up dancing to the tune of the Soviet Piper. With strategic defense initiatives (SDI) on both sides and Europe in the middle... conventional forces thus become more important for deterrent purposes than they are today." (emphasis added) He further reasons that NATO is not working to close the gap between its capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact, but simply trying to keep that gap from getting too big. "Too big" is not defined.

In an effort to reduce the size of forces, to achieve a balanced force reduction, and to save

resources (large standing armies are expensive), the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) committee has been meeting without significant success in Vienna, Austria, since 1973. A reduction of American forces deployed in Europe could result in their return to the United States. A comparable reduction of Soviet forces, along with their withdrawal to areas in the Soviet Union, may "look good" on paper, but, in reality, those withdrawn Soviet forces could be reintroduced into the theater much faster than American soldiers (with their equipment) could redeploy to Europe. This is only one of several points of contention affecting the MBFR talks.

NATO and the Defense of the West provides the intelligence professional with a well-written and capably illustrated, general, unclassified reference, which could be used to guide further research and thought concerning the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance. Although most analysts believe that a conventional war in Europe has a low probability of occurring, the fate of Western Europe cannot be trusted to such an assessment. Strong and flexible forces must be readily available to deter and, if necessary, repel a Warsaw Pact foray into Western Europe. U.S. forces must be committed to this endeavor to complement and reinforce the forces of the NATO allies. Moreover, a significant quantity of those American forces must be deployed forward for a variety of military and political reasons. Failure on the part of NATO and the United States to maintain requisite conventional forces to counter potential Warsaw Pact capabilities reduces the defense of the West to a nuclear balance of terror and deprives policymakers of the flexibility they need.

The book also includes a comprehensive overview of avenues of approach into Western Europe, an assessment of NATO defense options, a review of combat forces and weapons, and an analysis of the land battle and air power in the land battle, as well as other pertinent issues. Any Military Intelligence officer, NCO, or soldier destined for an assignment in Europe or currently assigned to a "reforger" unit should read this book and consider adding it to his or her library.

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Law and the Grenada Mission by
John Norton Moore, Charlottesville,
Virginia: Center for Law and National
Security, 1984, 129 pages.

The validity of the Grenada mission under international law has been hotly debated since the Marines and Rangers first landed on the Caribbean island. Professor Moore of the University of Virginia Law School, a former counselor on international law to the Department of State and ambassador to the United States Conference on the Law of the Sea, argues in this important book that the mission was thoroughly consistent with international law as stated in the United Nations Charter, regional peacekeeping treaties, and domestic constitutional law. Moore believes that many of the analyses published in the wake of the mission were erroneous and contradictory because they inadequately assessed the role of regional peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention in the employment of military forces.

This book is designed to fill that void in the post-mission scholarship.

The background facts which led to the landing of troops form an integral part of the work. As Moore summarizes, in 1979 Maurice Bishop's People's Revolutionary Government suspended the Grenadian Constitution, free elections and the press, and began a Soviet- and Cuban-sponsored militarization of the island. When Bishop was murdered by a hard-line Leninist faction, which opposed his gradual movement out of the Soviet camp, anarchy ensued. The Leninist faction never did consolidate control, in spite of a shoot-on-sight curfew. At that point, the states comprising the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), without U.S. prompting, recommended military action to restore order in Grenada and remove a security threat to their nations. The Grenadian governor general, the only authority on the island, then requested outside help from Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States to end the chaos and restore Grenadian self-determination. When diplomatic efforts to free the Americans on the island failed, due to the absence of any government to negotiate with, the American role in the mission began.

Moore first argues that Article 52 of the U.N. Charter permits the use of force to restore order under a regional peacekeeping arrangement when authority has broken down. Such actions cannot be coercive sanctions against a government; rather, they must be designed to permit self-determination through free elections. According to Moore, the mission also satisfied the legal requirements of the Charter of the Organization of American States and OECS Treaty. He notes that the request for assistance made by the governor general was also consistent with international principles of humanitarian protection. To further underscore the mission's legitimacy, Moore cites a poll which found that 96 percent of the Grenadians supported the mission.

One detects Moore's outrage at those who charge that the mission resembles the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the "Brezhnev Doctrine." On the contrary, Moore contends that the Grenada mission was founded on international legal principles of peacekeeping and self-determination, while recent Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan is entirely antithetical to these principles.

Moore's book provides a much needed perspective on the Grenada mission. Since Moore reprinted congressional testimony, press conferences, State Department opinion letters, and treaties in appendices, the reader is able to judge for himself the validity of the mission. Although the book could be strengthened by a more extensive discussion of the domestic constitutional questions, including the War Powers Resolution, this work advances the scholarship on the use of force under the U.N. Charter and regional treaties.

Jayson L. Spiegel
Member Maryland Bar

**The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead?
Military-Political Affairs in the 1980s**,
edited by Major Kenneth M. Currie
and Major Gregory Varhall, Washing-
ton, D.C.: published under the aus-

pices of the U.S. Air Force, 1984, 800 pages.

This compendium is the outgrowth of a conference sponsored in 1980 by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, in which close to one thousand Sovietologists from across the United States gathered to discuss the Soviet Union. Ninety-six papers were read during the proceedings, of which forty-six were finally chosen for enclosure in this 1984 publication.

Although voluminous and at times tedious to read, the editors' organizational approach is logical, educating the reader in an orderly fashion on seven complex and intriguing subjects which are vital to understanding the Soviet Union. First, there are discussions on the Soviet military-political environment (pp. 4-74). Second, there is a lengthy analysis of the Soviet Union as a global power (pp. 75-311) followed by a series of articles examining the Soviet Union's capabilities (pp. 312-431), its military economy (pp. 435-519), and its armed forces' organization-training (pp. 520-633). The book concludes with an exploration of Soviet strategic intentions (pp. 634-788) and possible Western approaches to counter them (pp. 789-797). All sections of the book provide the reader with the necessary background, framework, insight, and a serious analysis of Soviet military-political projections for the 1980s, albeit the impact of some original thoughts is lost due to the long time lapse from original presentation to publication.

Anthony Arnold, in a recent discussion on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, noted that generally there are two distinct approaches to studying the Soviet Union. One group of analysts tends to view the Soviet Union "essentially just as another great power . . . with the same underlying set of values roughly equivalent to our own." Traditionally, this view has been more acceptable, being portrayed as less alarmist. Conversely, the other approach has been to accept Soviet ideology, convictions, propaganda, and so on, at face value with Soviet actions viewed as a long-term pattern of communist strategy against capitalism. The editors and contributors to *What Lies Ahead?* recognize from the start this problem of "mirror imaging" and set the tone throughout the book by trying to present an "internal milieu" from which to grasp Soviet intentions, priorities and decisionmaking. Overall, the selection of articles is consistent with this approach, although at times there is an imbalance of subject matter toward Arnold's classification.

Since 1980, a wealth of Western analysis has been written on the Soviet Union's military capabilities, organization, training, and its reasons for global power projection. This book represents a synthesis of the above to date. At face value, the various authors discussing these topics paint a picture which initially chills the reader, leading one to believe in the superiority of Soviet power and, conversely, in the vulnerabilities and lack of direction and will of the West. It is only after the analysis of Soviet manpower requirements, Warsaw Pact forces' reliability, and Soviet strategic vulnerabilities that this prostrate effect is mitigated, placing the "correlation of forces," ideology, and strategic imperatives into a more realistic and proper equation.

Political and economic problems will continue to plague the Soviet Union until basic human rights are met and conditions improved. Consequently, the chapter on how the Soviet

economy supports its military merits the reader's attention. The discussion on civilian and military economic integration and purpose underscores this point. Although the microcosmic discussions on procurement methods and approaches to ensuring the development and supply of aircraft, tanks, battleships, and other weapons are interesting and can possibly assist in forecasting, overall, the author's conclusions remain unsettled and subjective. To understand the Soviet military complex, one must simply comprehend the Soviet definition of "centralism" and how it is paramount in the thinking of those who have the power. Until the Kremlin leaders come to terms with, and solve, this basic problem, there will remain frustration, dilemmas, inefficiencies, lack of worker trust and motivation, alcoholism, managerial incompetence and abuse, deceit, bureaucracy, nationalities questions, dependencies on foreign technology, and on and on. The question, again, is: To what extent will the West assist or nurture the socialist system as the Kremlin reaches beyond its own grasp?

Finally, the Soviet Union can, in part, be understood by analyzing the remarks of Andrei Amalrik, who gave three approaches to ponder. Be advised not only to study them, but also to examine and attempt to understand the thought process and mentality of this recent Russian emigre. Generally, Amalrik's views confirm the 1853 insights of British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston who characterized Russian power as opportunistic. What lies ahead for the Soviet Union is again contingent upon how far the West allows the Kremlin to test Western apathy or resolve.

All in all, an excellent reference work.

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The Polish Campaign 1939 by Steven Zaloga and Victor Madej, New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1985.

In most histories of the war in Europe, scant attention is paid to the battles in Poland. A few illustrations of the blitzkrieg are usually given and that is the end of it. This book represents the Polish side of the campaign and more: it is the story of the development, accomplishments and shortcomings of the Polish military establishment from the formation of the Polish Republic after the First World War until its defeat at the hands of the German Wehrmacht and the Russian Red Army. Underlying the entire book are the authors' beliefs that the Polish military was an admirable foe, that the odds were great, that the leadership at times left something to be desired, and that the shortness of the campaign in no way reflected the battle the Poles put up or the casualties suffered by the Germans.

The book covers the development of the Polish Army. Since both France and Poland were caught between the Soviet Union and Germany, and shared responsibility for populations in Poland that they could avow protectorship over, an alliance was formed. As the authors state: "France had an enormous impact on the Polish military, not only being the primary source of military equipment, but also providing much of the training and military theory upon which the Polish Army would be based. French officers were the main instructors at the Higher Military Academy where future Polish staff officers were

taught until the late 1920's, when Pilsudski requested their departure to lessen their influence." (pp. 7-8)

Coupled with the French thinking was the experience the Poles acquired in the east. The border conflicts poisoned relationships with her neighbors, and the fight with the Soviets in the east was characterized by "... mobile wars fought across vast plains and marshes where cavalry often proved the dominant arm." (p. 8) Even with this emphasis on cavalry, the Polish Army did experiment with armored warfare and began the development of an air arm; however, they never had the money or the industrial base to fully develop these arms. On the other hand, they did have admirable and sufficient anti-tank weapons, and they effectively employed them against the Germans. "A total of 674 tanks were lost, 217 of them totally destroyed and the remainder damaged to the extent that they could not be repaired in the field by divisional recovery units. The totally lost tanks . . . amounted to a quarter of the tanks committed to the conflict." (p. 156)

It is interesting to note that one of the "lessons" that came out of the First World War—at least suggested by historians—was the idea that a nation should never begin mobilization because it has a momentum of its own. Indeed, writers of the interwar years stated that a nation could not reverse the momentum toward war once mobilization was set in motion. Consequently, those that mobilized were blamed for the Great War.

Curiously enough, it was in deference to its allies that Poland did not begin its mobilization process until after the attack by the Germans. Initially, the Poles faced "... the Wehrmacht . . . [which] was already fully mobilized and concentrated and planning to go to war on September 1 no matter what the Poles did." (p. 104) As a result, the Polish forces were shorthanded throughout the war zones facing the Germans and the Russians. So much for applying the principles provided by the historians of the interwar years!

There are two problems with *The Polish Campaign 1939*. First, the reader detects that the authors are apologizing for the performance of the Polish Army. No one has ever doubted the bravery the Polish Army exhibited. The other problem is that the reader had better be familiar with Polish names and places. The battles described are hard to follow on the maps provided, even with a magnifying glass. On the other hand, the serious student of World War II and the campaigns in the east will have no problems.

Despite its shortcomings, it is a story that has not really been told before; nor is it found in the usual military histories of World War II. It is a saga of a brave people caught between giant antagonists, with too little equipment, and too much trust in alliances.

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105th Military Intelligence Battalion

Silver gray and oriental blue are the colors traditionally associated with Military Intelligence. The sword and the key in the saltirewise position represent support and symbolize military leadership. The lightning flashes refer to the speed and power of electronic warfare. The owl is the symbol of wisdom and alertness, and the red diamond refers to the support of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).



The history of the 105th Military Intelligence Battalion can be traced to three separate, but distinct lineages: the 5th Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment from World War II, the 405th Army Security Agency (ASA) Detachment from the Vietnam era, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 200th ASA Battalion.

The 5th CIC Detachment was activated in France in August 1944 and attached to Headquarters Company of the 5th Infantry Division. The detachment was responsible for detecting and combatting enemy agents and saboteurs operating behind division front lines.

In February 1962, the 5th CIC Detachment was redesignated the 5th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) and was activated at Fort Carson, Colorado. It was assigned to the 5th Infantry Division.

In 1968, a "slice" from the 5th MID was detached to support the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, deploying to Southeast Asia.

After a series of deactivations and activations, on April 21, 1978 the 5th MID was reorganized and subsequently activated as the 5th MI Company (provisional). A redesignation became necessary because a "5th MI Company" already existed and was stationed in

Europe. Consequently, the 15th MI Company was formally activated.

The 405th ASA Detachment was activated on June 1, 1965 at Fort Lewis, Washington, and assigned to the U.S. Army Security Agency. The detachment departed on June 25, 1965 for Vietnam and was subsequently inactivated on November 5, 1965.

On August 7, 1968, the 405th Radio Research Detachment, which was the cover designation of the 405th ASA Detachment, was reassigned to the 509th Radio Research Group and placed under the operational control of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. The 405th Radio Research Detachment provided direct support to the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division until December 5, 1969. When the brigade was redeployed to Fort Bragg, the 405th was deactivated.

On September 30, 1971, the 405th Radio Research Detachment (Airmobile) was activated by the U.S. Army Security Agency, assigned to the 175th Radio Research Field Station, and placed under the operational control of the commanding general, 3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division. The unit was inactivated on June 30, 1972. The detachment was not reestablished until its redesignation as the 405th ASA Company on March 16, 1979.

The 105th MI Battalion (CEWI) also derives its lineage from Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 200th ASA Battalion, established May 15, 1967 and assigned to the U.S. Army Training Center and School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. The existence of the company was brief: official deactivation came about on December 15, 1967.

On June 1, 1982, the 105th MI Battalion was officially activated and assigned to the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. At that time, Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the old 200th ASA Battalion became Headquarters, Headquarters and Operations Company with responsibility for the battalion staff, counterintelligence sections, and the direct support elements associated with the division G2. The 15th MI Company, redesignated from the 5th CIC Detachment, became Bravo Company with responsibility for ground surveillance radars. The 405th ASA Company became Alpha Company with responsibility for signals intelligence and electronic warfare support to the division. With the activation of the battalion, Charlie Company was established and charged with combat service support.

One final reorganization took place on September 17, 1985 in support of the Army of Excellence TOE concept.

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